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Wells Fargo & Co. v. City of Miami
15-1112
Ruling Below: City of Miami v. Wells Fargo & Co., 801 F.3d 1258 (11th Cir. 2015)
The City of Miami filed suit against Wells Fargo, on the grounds that the company had engaged
discriminatory lending practices (i.e. predatory loans, “redlining”) which violated the Fair
Housing Act and Florida law pertaining to unjust enrichment. The US District Court for the
Southern District of Florida dismissed for failure to state a claim. Plaintiff appealed.
The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that the city had in fact adequately alleged
injury from the allegedly discriminatory lending, that the city had adequately alleged a chain of
causation from the allegedly discriminatory lending, and that the term “aggrieved person” in the
Fair Housing Act can be construed as broadly as is allowed under Article III.
Question Presented: Whether the term “aggrieved” in the Fair Housing Act imposes a zone-ofinterests requirement more stringent than the injury-in-fact requirement of Article III; and
whether the City is an “aggrieved person” under the Fair Housing Act.

CITY OF MIAMI, a Florida municipal corporation, Plaintiff–Appellant,
v.
WELLS FARGO & CO., Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., Defendants–Appellees.
United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit
Decided on September 1, 2015
[Excerpt; some citations and footnotes omitted]
MARCUS, Circuit Judge:
On December 13, 2011, the City of Miami
brought three separate fair housing lawsuits
against Wells Fargo, Bank of America, and
Citigroup. Each alleged that the bank in
question had engaged in a decade-long
pattern of discriminatory lending by targeting
minorities for predatory loans. The
complaints in each case were largely
identical, each identifying the same pattern of
behavior and supported by empirical data
specific to each defendant. Moreover, each
complaint contained the same two causes of

action: one claim arising under the Fair
Housing Act (FHA), as well as an attendant
unjust enrichment claim under Florida law.
The three cases were heard by the same judge
in the Southern District of Florida, and were
resolved in the same way based on the district
court's order in the Bank of America case. In
this case, like the others, the district court
dismissed the City's FHA claim with
prejudice on three grounds: the City lacked
statutory standing under the FHA because its
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alleged injuries fell outside the statute's “zone
of interests”; the City had not adequately pled
that Wells Fargo's conduct proximately
caused the harm sustained by the City; and,
finally, the City had run afoul of the statute of
limitations and could not employ the
continuing violation doctrine. Each of the
three cases was appealed separately.
After thorough review, we are constrained to
disagree with the district court's legal
conclusions about the City's FHA claims.
The most detailed account of our reasoning is
set out in the companion case City of Miami
v. Bank of America Corp.. The same
conclusions of law apply here. As a
preliminary matter, we find that the City has
constitutional standing to pursue its FHA
claims. Furthermore, under controlling
Supreme Court precedent, the “zone of
interests” for the Fair Housing Act extends as
broadly as permitted under Article III of the
Constitution, and therefore encompasses the
City's claim. While we agree with the district
court's conclusion that the FHA contains a
proximate cause requirement, we find that the
City has adequately alleged proximate cause.
Finally, the “continuing violation doctrine”
would apply to the City's claims, if they are
adequately pled.
Because the district court imposed too
stringent a zone of interests test and wrongly
applied the proximate cause analysis, it erred
in dismissing the City's federal *1261 claims
with prejudice and in denying the City's
motion for leave to amend on the grounds of
futility. As for the state law claim, we affirm
the dismissal because the benefits the City
allegedly conferred on the defendants were
not sufficiently direct to plead an unjust
enrichment claim under Florida law.
I.

On December 13, 2013, the City of Miami
brought this complex civil rights action in the
United States District Court for the Southern
District of Florida against Wells Fargo & Co.
and Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (collectively
“Wells Fargo” or “the Bank”) containing two
claims. First, it alleged that the defendants
violated sections 3604(b) and 3605(a) of the
Fair Housing Act by engaging in
discriminatory mortgage lending practices
that resulted in a disproportionate and
excessive number of defaults by minority
homebuyers and caused financial harm to the
City. It also alleged that the Bank unjustly
enriched itself by taking advantage of
“benefits conferred by the City” while, at the
same time, engaging in unlawful lending
practices, which “denied the City revenues it
had properly expected through property and
other tax payments and ... cost[ ] the City
additional monies for services it would not
have had to provide ... absent [the Bank's]
unlawful activities.”
This complaint accused Wells Fargo of
engaging in both “redlining” and “reverse
redlining.” Redlining is the practice of
refusing to extend mortgage credit to
minority borrowers on equal terms as to nonminority borrowers. Reverse redlining is the
practice of extending mortgage credit on
exploitative terms to minority borrowers. The
City alleged that the bank engaged in a
vicious cycle: first it “refused to extend credit
to minority borrowers when compared to
white borrowers,” then “when the Bank did
extend credit, it did so on predatory terms.”
When minority borrowers then attempted to
refinance their predatory loans, they
“discover[ed] that [the Bank] refused to
extend credit at all, or on equal terms as
refinancing similar loans issued to white
borrowers.”
The City claimed that this pattern of
providing more onerous loans—i.e., those
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containing more risk, carrying steeper fees,
and having higher costs—to black and Latino
borrowers (as compared to white borrowers
of identical creditworthiness) manifested
itself in the Bank's product placements and its
wholesale mortgage broker fees. It also
averred that the Bank's internal loan officer
and
broker
compensation
systems
encouraged its employees to give out these
types of loans even when they were not
justified by the borrower's creditworthiness.
The City said that the Bank's conduct violated
the Fair Housing Act in two ways. First, the
Bank intentionally discriminated against
minority borrowers by targeting them for
loans with burdensome terms. And second,
the Bank's conduct had a disparate impact on
minority borrowers, resulting in a
disproportionate number of foreclosures on
minority-owned
properties,
and
a
disproportionate number of exploitative
loans in minority neighborhoods.
The City employed statistical analyses to
draw the alleged link between the race of the
borrowers, the terms of the loans, and the
subsequent foreclosure rate of the underlying
properties. Drawing on data reported by the
Bank about loans originating in Miami from
2004–2012, the City claimed that a Wells
Fargo loan in a predominantly (greater than
90%) minority neighborhood of Miami was
6.975 times more likely to result in
foreclosure than such a loan in a majoritywhite neighborhood. According to the City's
regression analysis (which purported to
control for objective risk characteristics such
as credit history, loan-to-value ratio, and
loan-to-income ratio), a black Wells Fargo
borrower in Miami was 4.321 times more
likely to receive a loan with “predatory”
features3 than a white borrower, and a Latino
borrower was 1.576 times more likely to
receive such a loan. Moreover, black Wells
Fargo borrowers with FICO scores over 660

(indicating good credit) in Miami were 2.572
times more likely to receive a predatory loan
than white borrowers, while a Latino
borrower was 1.875 times more likely to
receive such a loan.
The City's data also suggested that from
2004–2012, 11.1% of loans made by Bank of
America to black and Latino customers in
Miami were high-cost, compared to just 3.2%
of loans made to white customers. Data cited
in the complaint showed significantly
elevated rates of foreclosure for loans in
minority neighborhoods. While 50.5% of
Wells Fargo's Miami loan originations were
in “census tracts” that are at least 75% black
or Latino, 63.9% of loan originations that had
entered foreclosure by June 2013 were from
such census tracks. Likewise, 24.3% of Wells
Fargo's loans in predominantly black or
Latino neighborhoods resulted in foreclosure,
compared to only 4.4% of its loans in nonminority (at least 50% white) neighborhoods.
The complaint also alleged that the bank's
loans to minorities resulted in especially
quick foreclosures. The average time to
foreclosure for Wells Fargo's black and
Latino borrowers was 2.996 years, while for
white borrowers it was 3.266 years. The City
also gathered data from various non-Miamibased studies (some nationwide, some based
on case studies in other cities) to demonstrate
the elevated prevalence of foreclosure,
predatory loan practices, and higher interest
rates among black and Latino borrowers, and
the foreseeability of foreclosures arising from
predatory lending practices and their
attendant harm.
The City's charges were further amplified by
the statements of several confidential
witnesses who claimed that the Bank
deliberately targeted black and Latino
borrowers for predatory loans. For example,
one former loan officer attested that Wells
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Fargo management steered low- and middleincome borrowers away from less expensive
Community Reinvestment Act loans and
toward more expensive Fair Housing Act and
Freddie Mac loans. Another claimed that the
Bank targeted minority churches and their
congregations for subprime loans. A third
claimed
that
Hispanic
borrowers'
applications
for
refinancing
were
disproportionately denied: “a Rodriguez in
the last name was treated differently than a
Smith,” he stated. The witness also claimed
that loan officers would not fully inform lowand middle-income Hispanic customers of
the financial repercussions of their
mortgages, and would submit false
documents that exaggerated the borrowers'
incomes in order to place them in loans that
they should not have qualified for. One
witness also alleged that the Bank would
change its paperwork to disguise which
branches were originating loans to minorities
in order to avoid federal scrutiny.
The City sought damages based on reduced
property tax revenues. It claimed that the
Bank's lending policies caused minorityowned property to fall into unnecessary or
premature foreclosure. The foreclosed-upon
properties lost substantial value and, in turn,
decreased the value of the surrounding
properties, thereby depriving the City of
property tax revenue. The City alleged that
“Hedonic regression” techniques could be
used to quantify the losses the City suffered
that were attributable to the Bank's conduct.
The City also sought damages based on the
cost of the increased municipal services it
provided to deal with the problems attending
the foreclosed and often vacant properties—
including police, firefighters, building
inspectors, debris collectors, and others.
These increased services, the City claimed,
would not have been necessary if the
properties had not been foreclosed upon due
to the Bank's discriminatory lending

practices. The City also sought a declaratory
judgment that the Bank's conduct violated the
FHA, an injunction barring the Bank from
engaging in similar conduct, and punitive
damages, as well as attorneys' fees.
On July 9, 2014, the district court granted
defendants' motion to dismiss, adopting and
incorporating its order from the companion
case between the City of Miami and Bank of
America. First, the court found that the City
of Miami lacked statutory standing to sue
under the FHA. The court determined that,
based on this Court's earlier opinion in
Nasser v. City of Homewood, the City's claim
fell outside the FHA's “zone of interests,”
and, therefore, the City lacked standing to
sue. In particular, the trial court determined
that the City had alleged “merely economic
injuries” that were not “affected by a racial
interest.” Like the plaintiffs in Nasser, the
court suggested, the City was seeking redress
under the FHA for “an economic loss from a
decrease in property values,” and as with the
plaintiffs in Nasser, this was insufficient. The
City's goal went far beyond the purpose of the
FHA, which is to “provide, within
constitutional limitations, for fair housing
throughout the United States.”
The court also concluded that the FHA
contains a proximate cause requirement, but
that the City had not adequately pled
proximate cause. The City had not
sufficiently traced any lending disparities to
the defendants' conduct, as opposed to
confounding background variables such as “a
historic drop in home prices and a global
recession,” and “the decisions and actions of
third parties, such as loan services,
government entities, competing sellers, and
uninterested buyers.” The court also
determined that the City had not shown that
the Bank's mortgage practices caused the
City any harm. It was unimpressed with the
“statistics and studies” the City cited, noting
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that some were not based on data from
Miami, some were not limited to the
defendants' practices, and others “d[id] not
control for relevant credit factors that
undoubtedly affect lending practices.”
Moreover, some of the harm to the City
stemmed directly from “the actions of
intervening actors such as squatters, vandals
or criminals that damaged foreclosed
properties.”
The district court also concluded that the
City's federal claim ran afoul of the statute of
limitations. It noted that for the FHA, a
plaintiff must bring his claim “not later than
2 years after the occurrence” of the
discriminatory housing practice, and that for
discriminatory loans the statute of limitations
begins to run from the date of the loan
closing. But the City had not alleged that any
loans were made later than 2008, a full five
years before its complaint was filed. The
court was not persuaded by the City's
invocation of the continuing violation
doctrine—which can allow plaintiffs, under
some circumstances, to sue on an otherwise
time-barred claim—since the City had not
alleged sufficient facts to support any claim
that the specific practices continued into the
statutory period. The district court dismissed
the City's FHA claim with prejudice,
reasoning that even if the statute of
limitations deficiencies could be cured by an
amended pleading, the City's lack of statutory
standing could not be.
Finally, the district court rejected the City's
unjust enrichment claim on several grounds.
As a preliminary matter, the City had failed
to draw the necessary causal connection
between the Bank's alleged discriminatory
practices and its receipt of undeserved
municipal services. Moreover, the City had
failed to allege basic elements of an unjust
enrichment claim under Florida law. The
court determined that any benefit the Bank

received from municipal services was not
direct but “derivative” and, therefore,
insufficient to support an unjust enrichment
claim. Moreover, the City had failed to allege
that the Bank was not otherwise entitled to
those services as a Miami property owner.
Finally, the court rejected the City's argument
that Miami was forced to pay for the Bank's
externalities (the costs of the harm caused by
its predatory lending), holding that paying for
externalities cannot sustain an unjust
enrichment claim. The unjust enrichment
claim was dismissed without prejudice,
leaving the City free to amend its complaint.
The City chose not to proceed on its unjust
enrichment claim alone “because the two
claims are so intimately entwined and based
on largely the same underlying misconduct.”
Instead, it moved for reconsideration and for
leave to file an amended complaint, arguing
that it had standing under the FHA and that
the amended complaint would cure any
statute of limitations deficiency. The
proposed amended complaint alleged that the
Bank's discriminatory lending practices
“frustrate[ ] the City's longstanding and
active interest in promoting fair housing and
securing the benefits of an integrated
community,” thereby “directly interfer[ing]”
with one of the City's missions. It also made
more detailed allegations about properties
that had been foreclosed upon after being
subject to discriminatory loans. Specifically,
the proposed amended complaint identified
ten foreclosed properties that corresponded to
predatory loans that originated between 2004
and 2012. Notably, it also identified 11
properties that corresponded to predatory
loans that the Bank had issued after
December 13, 2011 (within two years of
filing the suit) that had not yet been
foreclosed upon but were likely to
“eventually enter the foreclosure process,”
based on expert analysis.
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The district court denied the City's motion for
reconsideration and for leave to amend, as it
did in each of the companion cases, relying
upon its reasoning in the Bank of America
case.
The City timely appealed the court's final
order of dismissal.
II.
As explained, our reasoning is set forth in
detail in the companion case Bank of America
Corp. Our legal conclusions in that case
apply equally here, and dictate the same
results. We briefly summarize those
conclusions.
A. Standard of Review
We review the district court's grant of a
motion to dismiss with prejudice de novo,
“accepting the [factual] allegations in the
complaint as true and construing them in the
light most favorable to the plaintiff.” We
generally review the district court's decision
to deny leave to amend for an abuse of
discretion, but we will review de novo an
order denying leave to amend on the grounds
of futility, because it is a conclusion of law
that an amended complaint would necessarily
fail. Finally, we review de novo whether
plaintiffs have Article III standing.
B. Fair Housing Act Claim
1. Article III Standing
For the reasons we set forth in Bank of
America Corp., the City has constitutional
standing to bring its FHA claim. Just as in
that case, the City here claims injury on the
basis of lost property tax revenue due to
premature or unnecessary foreclosure
resulting from predatory loans. In Gladstone
Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, the Supreme

Court held that a village had Article III
standing to bring an FHA claim for
discriminatory renting practices partly on the
basis of “[a] significant reduction in property
values,” because such a reduction “directly
injures a municipality by diminishing its tax
base, thus threatening its ability to bear the
costs of local government and to provide
services.” The City of Miami alleges the
same kind of injury here. Thus, like the
Village of Bellwood, the City of Miami had
adequately alleged an injury in fact.
As for Article III causation, again, we find
that at this stage in the proceeding the City's
alleged chain of causation is perfectly
plausible: taking the City's allegations as true,
the
Bank's
extensive
pattern
of
discriminatory lending led to substantially
more defaults on its predatory loans, leading
to a higher rate of foreclosure on minorityowned property and thereby reducing the
City's tax base. Moreover, the complaint
supports its allegations with regression
analyses that link the Bank's treatment of
minority borrowers to predatory loans,
predatory loans to foreclosure, and
foreclosure to reduced tax revenue. All told,
the City has “allege[d] ... facts essential to
show jurisdiction.”
2. “Statutory Standing”
The district court dismissed the City's claim
because it lacked what the court
characterized as “statutory standing.” It
found that the City fell outside the FHA's
“zone of interests,” and that its harm was not
proximately caused by the Bank's actions.
Ultimately, for the reasons fully explained in
Bank of America Corp., we disagree with the
district court's legal conclusions.
a. Zone of Interest
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This case, too, requires us to define the
breadth of the term “aggrieved person” as it
is used in the FHA. As explained in detail in
the companion case, we are bound by the
Supreme Court's interpretation of the FHA in
Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Insurance,
Gladstone, and Havens Realty Corp. v.
Coleman: statutory standing “under [the
FHA] ... is ‘as broad as is permitted by Article
III of the Constitution.’ ” Although the
Supreme Court has suggested that it may be
prepared to reconsider that holding, we must
“follow the case which directly controls,
leaving to the Supreme Court[ ] the
prerogative of overruling its own decisions.”
Moreover, our circuit precedent in Nasser is
not to the contrary; that case stands for the
unremarkable proposition that a plaintiff has
no cause of action under the FHA if he makes
no allegation of discrimination (or disparate
impact) on the basis of race (or one of the
FHA's other protected characteristics: color,
religion, sex, handicap, familial status, and
national origin). In this case, however, the
complaint explicitly alleged race-based
discrimination in the Bank's predatory
lending practices.
Thus, we agree with the City that the term
“aggrieved person” in the FHA sweeps as
broadly as allowed under Article III. To the
extent a zone of interests analysis applies to
the FHA, it encompasses the City's
allegations in this case.
b. Proximate Cause
As we explained at some length in the
companion case, we agree with the district
court that a plaintiff bringing an action for
damages under the Fair Housing Act must
plead proximate cause between his injury and
the defendant's unlawful conduct. The
Supreme Court has instructed that such a
claim is “in effect, a tort action,” governed by

general tort rules, and proximate cause is a
classic element of a tort claim.
And we look to the law of torts to guide our
proximate
cause
analysis,
using
foreseeability as our touchstone. Under this
standard, we conclude again that the City has
made an adequate showing. Proximate cause
“is not ... the same thing as ... sole cause,” and
the fact that there are multiple plausible,
foreseeable links in the alleged causal chain
is not fatal to the City's claim.
3. Statute of Limitations and Remand
The district court dismissed the City's FHA
claims with prejudice (and denied its motion
for leave to amend) because it concluded that
the City fell outside the statute's zone of
interests and had not adequately pled
proximate cause, and that these deficiencies
were incurable. Resolving a plaintiff's motion
to amend is “committed to the sound
discretion of the district court,” but that
discretion “is strictly circumscribed” by Rule
15(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, which instructs that leave to
amend should be “freely give[n] when justice
so requires.” Because the district court
wrongly concluded that the City was outside
the FHA's zone of interests and had not
adequately pled proximate cause, its
determination that any amended complaint
would be futile was legal error and therefore
an abuse of discretion. On remand, the City
should be granted leave to amend its
complaint.
In its original complaint, the City failed to
allege that any of the offending loans closed
within the limitations period (between
December 13, 2011, and December 13,
2013). On appeal, the City does not contend
that its original complaint was adequate;
rather, it argues that it could readily cure the
statute of limitations flaws if given the
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opportunity. The City points to its proposed
amended complaint for support, in which it
identified
five
specific
properties
corresponding to predatory loans issued after
December 13, 2011. On remand, the district
court will have the opportunity to evaluate
whether the City's new pleadings satisfy the
statute of limitations, in a manner consistent
with our explanation of the continuing
violation doctrine in the companion case.
C. Unjust Enrichment Claim
As for the City's state law unjust enrichment
claim, we agree with the district court and
affirm its ruling for the reasons detailed in the
companion case. We have not found—and
the City has not provided—a single Florida
case supporting an unjust enrichment claim
in these circumstances, and the City's claims
do not fit within an unjust enrichment
framework. Missing tax revenue is in no way
a benefit that the City has conferred on the
Bank. Municipal expenditures, meanwhile,
do not appear to be among the types of
benefits that can be recovered in an unjust
enrichment action under Florida law. They
are also not a benefit directly conferred on the
Bank, as is required for an unjust enrichment
claim under Florida law. Finally, the City has
provided no arguments and cited no Florida
caselaw explaining why the Bank would not
be entitled to such services like any other
property owner.
The judgment of the district court is
AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part,
and REMANDED for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
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Bank of America Corp. v. City of Miami
15-1111
Ruling Below: City of Miami v. Bank of Am. Corp., 800 F.3d 1262 (11th Cir. 2015)
The City of Miami filed suit against Bank of America, on the grounds that the company had
engaged discriminatory lending practices (i.e. predatory loans, “redlining”) which caused
economic harm to the city. The US District Court for the Southern District of Florida dismissed
for failure to state a claim and denied reconsideration. Plaintiff appealed.
The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that the city had in fact adequately alleged
injury from the allegedly discriminatory lending, that the city had adequately alleged a chain of
causation from the allegedly discriminatory lending, that the term “aggrieved person” in the Fair
Housing Act can be construed as broadly as is allowed under Article III, that the proper standard
for proximate causation on a Fair Housing Act claim is based on foreseeability, that the city
adequately alleged that the harm was reasonably foreseeable, and that the city failed to allege
that the city had given a direct benefit to the lender to which the lender was not otherwise
entitled.
Question Presented: Whether, by limiting suit to “aggrieved person[s],” Congress required that
a Fair Housing Act plaintiff plead more than just Article III injury-in-fact; and whether
proximate cause requires more than just the possibility that a defendant could have foreseen that
the remote plaintiff might ultimately lose money through some theoretical chain of
contingencies.

CITY OF MIAMI, a Florida Municipal Corporation, Plaintiff–Appellant,
v.
BANK OF AMERICA CORPORATION, Bank of America, N.A., et al., Defendants–
Appellees.
United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit
Decided on September 1, 2015
[Excerpt; some citations and footnotes omitted]
MARCUS, Circuit Judge:
The City of Miami has brought an ambitious
fair housing lawsuit against Bank of
America, alleging that it engaged in a decadelong pattern of discriminatory lending in the

residential housing market that caused the
City economic harm. The City claims that the
bank targeted black and Latino customers in
Miami for predatory loans that carried more
risk, steeper fees, and higher costs than those
offered to identically situated white
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customers, and created internal incentive
structures that encouraged employees to
provide these types of loans. The predatory
loans, as identified by the City, include: highcost loans (i.e., those with an interest rate at
least three percentage points above a
federally established benchmark), subprime
loans, interest-only loans, balloon payment
loans, loans with prepayment penalties,
negative
amortization
loans,
no
documentation loans, and adjustable rate
mortgages with teaser rates (i.e., a lifetime
maximum rate greater than the initial rate
plus 6%). The City alleged that by steering
minorities toward these predatory loans,
Bank of America caused minority-owned
properties throughout Miami to fall into
unnecessary or premature foreclosure,
depriving the City of tax revenue and forcing
it to spend more on municipal services (such
as police, firefighters, trash and debris
removal, etc.) to combat the resulting blight.
The City asserts one claim arising under the
Fair Housing Act (FHA) as well as an
attendant unjust enrichment claim under
Florida law.
The district court dismissed the City's FHA
claim with prejudice on three grounds: the
City lacked statutory standing under the FHA
because it fell outside the statute's “zone of
interests”; the City had not adequately pled
that Bank of America's conduct proximately
caused the harm sustained by the City; and,
finally, the City had run afoul of the statute of
limitations and could not employ the
continuing violation doctrine. We disagree
with each of these conclusions.
As a preliminary matter, we find that the City
has constitutional standing to pursue its FHA
claims. We also conclude that under
controlling Supreme Court precedent, the
“zone of interests” for the Fair Housing Act
extends as broadly as permitted under Article
III of the Constitution, and therefore

encompasses the City's claim. While we
agree with the district court that the FHA
contains a proximate cause requirement, we
find that this analysis is based on principles
drawn from the law of tort, and that the City
has adequately alleged proximate cause.
Finally, we conclude that the “continuing
violation doctrine” can apply to the City's
claims, if they are adequately pled.
Because the district court imposed too
stringent a zone of interests test and wrongly
applied the proximate cause analysis, we
conclude that it erred in dismissing the City's
federal claims with prejudice and in denying
the City's motion for leave to amend on the
grounds of futility. As for the state law claim,
we affirm the dismissal because the benefits
the City allegedly conferred on the
defendants were not sufficiently direct to
plead an unjust enrichment claim under
Florida law.
I.
On December 13, 2013, the City of Miami
brought this complex civil rights action in the
United States District Court for the Southern
District of Florida against Bank of America
Corporation, Bank of America N.A.,
Countrywide
Financial
Corporation,
Countrywide Home Loans, and Countrywide
Bank, FSB (collectively “Bank of America”
or “the Bank”) containing two claims. First,
it alleged that the defendants violated
sections 3604(b) and 3605(a) of the Fair
Housing Act by engaging in discriminatory
mortgage lending practices that resulted in a
disproportionate and excessive number of
defaults by minority homebuyers and caused
financial harm to the City. It also alleged that
the Bank unjustly enriched itself by taking
advantage of “benefits conferred by the City”
while, at the same time, engaging in unlawful
lending practices, which “denied the City
revenues it had properly expected through
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property and other tax payments and ... cost[
] the City additional monies for services it
would not have had to provide ... absent [the
Bank's] unlawful activities.”
The complaint accused Bank of America of
engaging in both “redlining” and “reverse
redlining.” Redlining is the practice of
refusing to extend mortgage credit to
minority borrowers on equal terms as to nonminority borrowers. Reverse redlining is the
practice of extending mortgage credit on
exploitative terms to minority borrowers. The
City alleged that the Bank engaged in a
vicious cycle: first it “refused to extend credit
to minority borrowers when compared to
white borrowers,” then “when the bank did
extend credit, it did so on predatory terms.”
When minority borrowers then attempted to
refinance their predatory loans, they
“discover[ed] that [the Bank] refused to
extend credit at all, or on terms equal to those
offered ... to white borrowers.”
The City claimed that this pattern of
providing more onerous loans—i.e., those
containing more risk, carrying steeper fees,
and having higher costs—to black and Latino
borrowers (as compared to white borrowers
of identical creditworthiness) manifested
itself in the Bank's retail lending pricing, its
wholesale lending broker fees, and its
wholesale lending product placement. It also
averred that the Bank's internal loan officer
compensation system encouraged its
employees to give out these types of loans
even when they were not justified by the
borrower's creditworthiness. The City
claimed that Bank of America's practice of
redlining and reverse redlining constituted a
“continuing and unbroken pattern” that
persists to this day.
The City said that the Bank's conduct violated
the Fair Housing Act in two ways. First, the
City alleged that the Bank intentionally

discriminated against minority borrowers by
targeting them for loans with burdensome
terms. Second, the City claimed that the
Bank's conduct had a disparate impact on
minority borrowers, resulting in a
disproportionate number of foreclosures on
minority-owned
properties,
and
a
disproportionate number of exploitative
loans in minority neighborhoods.
Among other things, the City employed
statistical analyses to draw the alleged link
between the race of the borrowers, the terms
of the loans, and the subsequent foreclosure
rate of the underlying properties. Drawing on
data reported by the Bank about loans
originating in Miami from 2004–2012, the
City claimed that a Bank of America loan in
a predominantly (greater than 90%) minority
neighborhood of Miami was 5.857 times
more likely to result in foreclosure than such
a loan in a majority-white neighborhood.
According to the City's regression analysis
(which purported to control for objective risk
characteristics such as credit history, loan-tovalue ratio, and loan-to-income ratio), a black
Bank of America borrower in Miami was
1.581 times more likely to receive a loan with
“predatory” features than a white borrower,
and a Latino borrower was 2.087 times more
likely to receive such a loan. Moreover, black
Bank of America borrowers with FICO
scores over 660 (indicating good credit) in
Miami were 1.533 times more likely to
receive a predatory loan than white
borrowers, while a Latino borrower was
2.137 times more likely to receive such a
loan.
The City's data also suggested that from
2004–2012, 21.9% of loans made by Bank of
America to black and Latino customers in
Miami were high-cost, compared to just 8.9%
of loans made to white customers. Data cited
in the complaint showed significantly
elevated rates of foreclosure for loans in
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minority neighborhoods. While 53.3% of
Bank of America's Miami loan originations
were in “census tracts” that are at least 75%
black or Latino, 95.7% of loan originations
that had entered foreclosure by June 2013
were from such census tracks. And 32.8% of
Bank of America's loans in predominantly
black or Latino neighborhoods resulted in
foreclosure, compared to only 7.7% of its
loans in non-minority (at least 50% white)
neighborhoods. Likewise, a Bank of America
borrower in a predominantly black or Latino
census tract was 1.585 times more likely to
receive a predatory loan as a borrower with
similar characteristics in a non-minority
neighborhood.
The complaint also alleged that the bank's
loans to minorities resulted in especially
quick foreclosures. The average time to
foreclosure for Bank of America's black and
Latino borrowers was 3.144 years and 3.090
years, respectively, while for white
borrowers it was 3.448 years. The allegations
also gathered data from various non-Miamibased studies (some nationwide, some based
on case studies in other cities) to demonstrate
the elevated prevalence of foreclosure,
predatory loan practices, and higher interest
rates among black and Latino borrowers, and
the foreseeability of foreclosures arising from
predatory lending practices and their
attendant harm.
The City's charges were further amplified by
the statements of several confidential
witnesses who claimed that the Bank
deliberately targeted black and Latino
borrowers for predatory loans. Thus, for
example, one mortgage loan officer with
Bank of America who worked on loans in the
Miami area claimed that the bank targeted
less savvy minorities for negative
amortization loans. Another noted that Bank
of America paid higher commissions to loan
officers for Fair Housing Act loans as

opposed to the allegedly more advantageous
Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) loans,
incentivizing officers to steer borrowers
away from the CRA loans. Still another noted
that back-end premiums (a premium earned
by the loan officer equal to the difference
between the borrower's loan rate and the rate
the bank pays for it) on loans were not
disclosed and “often eluded less educated,
minority borrowers.” One of the witnesses
explained that from 2011–2013, Bank of
America did not offer regular refinancing to
persons with mortgages at over 80% of the
value of the house (including many negative
amortization
loans),
which
disproportionately affected minorities in
danger of losing their homes.
Notably, the City sought damages based on
reduced property tax revenues. It claimed that
the Bank's lending policies caused minorityowned property to fall into unnecessary or
premature foreclosure. The foreclosed-upon
properties lost substantial value and, in turn,
decreased the value of the surrounding
properties, thereby depriving the City of
property tax revenue. The City alleged that
“Hedonic regression” techniques could be
used to quantify the losses the City suffered
that were attributable to the Bank's conduct.
The City also sought damages based on the
cost of the increased municipal services it
provided to deal with the problems attending
the foreclosed and often vacant properties—
including police, firefighters, building
inspectors, debris collectors, and others.
These increased services, the City claimed,
would not have been necessary if the
properties had not been foreclosed upon due
to the Bank's discriminatory lending
practices. The City also sought a declaratory
judgment that the Bank's conduct violated the
FHA, an injunction barring the Bank from
engaging in similar conduct, and punitive
damages, as well as attorneys' fees.
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On July 9, 2014, the district court granted
defendants' motion to dismiss. First, the court
found that the City of Miami lacked statutory
standing to sue under the FHA. The court
determined that, based on this Court's earlier
opinion in Nasser v. City of Homewood, the
City's claim fell outside the FHA's “zone of
interests,” and therefore the City lacked
standing to sue under this statute. In
particular, the trial court determined that the
City had alleged “merely economic injuries”
that were not “affected by a racial interest.”
Like the plaintiffs in Nasser, the court
suggested, the City was seeking redress under
the FHA for “an economic loss from a
decrease in property values,” and as with the
plaintiffs in Nasser, this was insufficient. The
City's goal went far beyond the purpose of the
FHA, which is to “provide, within
constitutional limitations, for fair housing
throughout the United States.”
The court also concluded that the FHA
contains a proximate cause requirement, but
that the City had not adequately pled
proximate cause. The City had not
sufficiently traced any foreclosures to the
defendants' conduct, as opposed to
confounding background variables such as “a
historic drop in home prices and a global
recession,” and “the decisions and actions of
third parties, such as loan services,
government entities, competing sellers, and
uninterested buyers.” The court also
determined that the City had not shown that
the Bank's mortgage practices caused the
City any harm. It was unimpressed with the
“statistics and studies” the City cited, noting
that some were not based on data from
Miami, some were not limited to the
defendants' practices, and others “d[id] not
control for relevant credit factors that
undoubtedly affect lending practices.” Id.
Moreover, some of the harm to the City
stemmed directly from “the actions of
intervening actors such as squatters, vandals

or criminals
properties.”

that

damaged

foreclosed

The district court also concluded that the
City's federal claim ran afoul of the statute of
limitations. It noted that for the FHA, a
plaintiff must bring his claim “not later than
2 years after the occurrence” of the
discriminatory housing practice, and that for
discriminatory loans the statute of limitations
begins to run from the date of the loan
closing. But the City had not alleged that any
loans were made later than 2008, a full five
years before its complaint was filed. The
court was not persuaded by the City's
invocation of the continuing violation
doctrine—which can allow plaintiffs, under
some circumstances, to sue on an otherwise
time-barred claim—since the City had not
alleged sufficient facts to support its
allegation that the specific practices
continued into the statutory period. The
district court dismissed the City's FHA claim
with prejudice, reasoning that even if the
statute of limitations deficiencies could be
cured by an amended pleading, the City's lack
of statutory standing could not be.
Finally, the district court rejected the City's
unjust enrichment claim on several grounds.
As a preliminary matter, the City had failed
to draw the necessary causal connection
between the Bank's alleged discriminatory
practices and its receipt of undeserved
municipal services. Moreover, the court
found that the City had failed to allege basic
elements of an unjust enrichment claim under
Florida law. It determined that any benefit the
Bank received from municipal services was
not direct but “derivative” and, therefore,
insufficient to support an unjust enrichment
claim. It also found that the City had failed to
allege that the Bank was not otherwise
entitled to those services as a Miami property
owner. Finally, it rejected the City's argument
that Miami was forced to pay for the Bank's
195

externalities (the costs of the harm caused by
its mortgage lending), holding that paying for
externalities cannot sustain an unjust
enrichment claim. The district court
dismissed the unjust enrichment claim
without prejudice, leaving the City free to
amend its complaint.
The City chose not to proceed on its unjust
enrichment claim alone “because the two
claims are so intimately entwined and based
on largely the same underlying misconduct.”
Instead, it moved in the district court for
reconsideration and for leave to file an
amended complaint, arguing that it had
standing under the FHA and that the amended
complaint would cure any statute of
limitations deficiency. The proposed
amended complaint alleged that the Bank's
discriminatory lending practices “frustrate[ ]
the City's longstanding and active interest in
promoting fair housing and securing the
benefits of an integrated community,”
thereby “directly interfer[ing]” with one of
the City's missions. It also made more
detailed allegations about properties that had
been foreclosed upon after being subject to
discriminatory loans. Specifically, the
proposed amended complaint identified five
foreclosed properties that corresponded to
predatory loans that originated between 2008
and 2012, and three that originated between
2004 and 2008. It also identified seven
properties that corresponded to predatory
loans that the Bank had issued after
December 13, 2011 (within two years of
filing suit) that had not yet been foreclosed
upon but were likely to “eventually enter the
foreclosure process,” based on expert
analysis. The complaint continued to invoke
the continuing violation doctrine and claimed
that the statute of limitations had not run.

that “[a]rguing that this Court's reasoning
was flawed is not enough for a motion for
reconsideration.”
And the court was unimpressed by the City's
new argument that it “has a generalized noneconomic interest ... in racial diversity,”
ruling that these were “claims [the City]
never made and amendments it did not
previously raise or offer despite ample
opportunity,” and were therefore “improperly
raised as grounds for reconsideration.”
Finally, the court noted that these
“generalized allegations [do not] appear to be
connected in any meaningful way to the
purported loss of tax revenue and increase in
municipal expenses allegedly caused by
Defendants' lending practices.”
The City timely appealed the court's final
order of dismissal.
II.
A. Standard of Review
We review the district court's grant of a
motion to dismiss with prejudice de novo,
“accepting the [factual] allegations in the
complaint as true and construing them in the
light most favorable to the plaintiff.” We
generally review the district court's decision
to deny leave to amend for an abuse of
discretion, but we will review de novo an
order denying leave to amend on the grounds
of futility, because it is a conclusion of law
that an amended complaint would necessarily
fail. Finally, we review de novo whether
plaintiffs have Article III standing.
B. Fair Housing Act Claim
1. Article III Standing

The district court denied the City's motion for
reconsideration and for leave to amend. As
for statutory standing, the court explained

We come then to the first essential question
in the case: whether the City of Miami has
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constitutional standing to bring its Fair
Housing Act claim. Although the district
court addressed only the issue of so-called
“statutory standing,” the Bank contests both
Article III standing and statutory standing,
and we address each in turn.
“[S]tanding is an essential and unchanging
part of the case-or-controversy requirement
of Article III.” It is by now axiomatic that to
establish constitutional standing at the
pleading stage, the plaintiff must plausibly
allege: (1) an injury in fact that is concrete,
particularized, and actual or imminent; (2) “a
causal connection between the injury and the
conduct complained of,” such that the injury
is “fairly traceable to the challenged action of
the defendant”; and (3) that a favorable
judicial decision will “likely” redress the
injury. The “line of causation” between the
alleged conduct and the injury must not be
“too attenuated.” The party invoking federal
jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing
these elements. At the pleading stage,
“general factual allegations of injury
resulting from the defendant's conduct may
suffice” to demonstrate standing.
The district court did not address whether the
City had Article III standing because it
granted the Bank's motion to dismiss on other
grounds. On appeal, the Bank argues that the
City lacked Article III standing because it had
not adequately alleged the causal
connection—that is, the “traceability”—
between its injury and the Bank's conduct.
We are unpersuaded.
To recap, the City claims that the Bank's
discriminatory lending practices caused
minority-owned properties to fall into
foreclosure when they otherwise would not
have, or earlier than they otherwise would
have. This, in turn, decreased the value of the
foreclosed properties themselves and the
neighboring properties, thereby depriving the

City of property tax revenue, and created
blight, thereby forcing the City to spend
additional money on municipal services. We
have little difficulty in finding, based on
controlling Supreme Court caselaw, that the
City has said enough to allege an injury in
fact for constitutional standing purposes. Our
analysis is guided by Gladstone, Realtors v.
Village of Bellwood. In that case, the Village
of Bellwood sued a real estate firm under the
FHA for discriminatory renting practices that
caused racial segregation. The Supreme
Court held that the village had Article III
standing to bring its claim partly on the basis
of “[a] significant reduction in property
values,” because such a reduction “directly
injures a municipality by diminishing its tax
base, thus threatening its ability to bear the
costs of local government and to provide
services.” Like the Village of Bellwood, the
City of Miami claims that an allegedly
discriminatory policy has reduced local
property values and diminished its tax base.
Thus, like the Village of Bellwood, the City
of Miami has adequately alleged an injury in
fact.
As for Article III causation, the Bank claims
that the City's harm is not fairly traceable to
the Bank's conduct. Specifically, it suggests
that a myriad of other factors cause
foreclosure and blight—including the state of
the housing market and the actions of third
parties like other property owners, competing
sellers, vandals, etc.—thereby breaking the
causal chain. While we acknowledge the real
possibility of confounding variables, at this
stage in the proceeding the City's alleged
chain of causation is perfectly plausible:
taking the City's allegations as true, the
Bank's extensive pattern of discriminatory
lending led to substantially more defaults on
its predatory loans, leading to a higher rate of
foreclosure on minority-owned property and
thereby reducing the City's tax base.
Moreover, the complaint supports its
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allegations with regression analyses that link
the Bank's treatment of minority borrowers to
predatory loans, predatory loans to
foreclosure, and foreclosure to reduced tax
revenue.
Of course, the City has limited its claim only
to those damages arising from foreclosures
caused by the Bank's lending practices. At a
subsequent stage in the litigation it may well
be difficult to prove which foreclosures
resulted from discriminatory lending, how
much tax revenue was actually lost as a result
of the Bank's behavior, etc. But at this early
stage, the claim is plausible and sufficient.
The City has said enough to establish Article
III standing.
2. “Statutory Standing”
The district court dismissed the City's claim,
however, not on the basis of Article III
standing, but because it lacked what the court
characterized as “statutory standing.” It
found that the City fell outside the FHA's
“zone of interests,” and that its harm was not
proximately caused by the Bank's actions.
Ultimately, we disagree with the district
court's legal conclusions. As for the zone of
interests, we conclude that we are bound by
Supreme Court precedent stating that socalled statutory standing under the FHA
extends as broadly as Article III will permit,
and find that this includes the City. As for
proximate cause, we agree that it must be
pled for a damages claim under the FHA, but
find that the City has adequately done so
here.
Notably, the Supreme Court recently
clarified in Lexmark International, Inc. v.
Static Control Components, Inc. that the
longstanding doctrinal label of “statutory
standing” (sometimes also called “prudential
standing”) is misleading. The proper inquiry
is whether the plaintiff “has a cause of action

under the statute.” But that inquiry isn't a
matter of standing, because “the absence of a
valid ... cause of action does not implicate
subject-matter jurisdiction, i.e., the court's
statutory or constitutional power to
adjudicate the case.” Instead, it is “a
straightforward question of statutory
interpretation.”
This issue comes before the Court on a
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim,
and the City's pleadings are evaluated for
plausibility using the standard set forth in
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly. “The
complaint must contain enough facts to make
a claim for relief plausible on its face; a party
must plead ‘factual content that allows the
court to draw the reasonable inference that
the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.’ ” Of course, in evaluating the
plausibility of the claim we must take all of
the plaintiff's factual allegations as true.
a. Zone of Interests
In general, a statutory cause of action
“extends only to those plaintiffs whose
interests ‘fall within the zone of interests
protected by the law invoked.’ ” The
Supreme Court has instructed us that this test
“applies to all statutorily created causes of
action,” but its application is not uniform:
“certain statutes ... protect a more-thanusually ‘expansive’ range of interests.”
The FHA provides that:
[a]n
aggrieved
person
may
commence a civil action in an
appropriate United States district
court or State court not later than 2
years after the occurrence or the
termination
of
an
alleged
discriminatory housing practice ... to
obtain appropriate relief with respect
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to such discriminatory
practice or breach.

housing

loss of important benefits from interracial
associations.”

It defines an “aggrieved person” as anyone
who “claims to have been injured by a
discriminatory housing practice,” or
“believes that such person will be injured by
a discriminatory housing practice that is
about to occur.”

Seven years later, in Gladstone, the Village
of Bellwood brought suit under the FHA
against two real estate firms for “steering”
black and white homeowners into targeted,
race-specific
neighborhoods,
thereby
“manipulat[ing] the housing market,”
“affecting the village's racial composition,”
and causing “[a] significant reduction in
property values.” The Court concluded that
the village had stated a cause of action under
the FHA and reaffirmed, based on the
legislative history and purpose of the statute,
that statutory standing under the FHA “is as
broad as is permitted by Article III of the
Constitution.”

The Bank claims that the City is not an
“aggrieved person,” and, therefore, falls
outside the statute's zone of interests and
cannot state a cause of action under the FHA.
The City argues, however, that “FHA
statutory standing is as broad as the
Constitution permits under Article III,” and
therefore it is within the statute's zone of
interests. Older Supreme Court cases appear
to support the City's view, while certain more
recent cases—as well as an older decision of
this Court—have cast some doubt on the
viability of those holdings. The answer
requires carefully parsing both Supreme
Court and Eleventh Circuit precedent, and a
review of the relevant cases is instructive.
i. Early Supreme Court cases
The first major FHA case explicated by the
Supreme Court is Trafficante v. Metropolitan
Life Insurance. Two tenants of an apartment
complex—one black, one white—alleged
that the landlord discriminated against
minorities on the basis of race when renting
units, in violation of the FHA. The Court held
that standing under the Act was defined “as
broadly as is permitted by Article III of the
Constitution ... insofar as tenants of the same
housing unit that is charged with
discrimination are concerned.” “The
language of the Act is broad and inclusive,”
the Court wrote, and “the alleged injury to
existing tenants by exclusion of minority
persons from the apartment complex is the

Next came Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman,
in which—along with other plaintiffs—a
nonprofit corporation whose purpose was “to
make equal opportunity in housing a reality
in the Richmond Metropolitan Area” brought
an FHA claim against a realty firm for racial
steering (i.e., fostering racial segregation by
guiding prospective buyers towards or away
from certain apartments based on the buyer's
race). In the clearest and most unambiguous
terms, the Supreme Court reiterated the
holding of Gladstone: “Congress intended
standing under [the FHA] to extend to the full
limits of Art. III and ... the courts accordingly
lack the authority to create prudential barriers
to standing in suits brought under [the
FHA].” As the Court explained, “the sole
requirement for standing to sue under [the
FHA] is the Art. III minima of injury in fact:
that the plaintiff allege that as a result of the
defendant's actions he has suffered ‘a distinct
and palpable injury.’ ” The organization's
allegation that the racial steering “perceptibly
impaired [its] ability to provide counseling
and referral services for low- and moderateincome homeseekers” was sufficient to
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constitute injury in fact for purposes of
Article III (and statutory) standing.
ii. Nasser
Less than a month after Havens, the Eleventh
Circuit issued an opinion in Nasser, on which
the district court and the Bank principally
rely. In Nasser, property owners challenged a
zoning ordinance that rezoned their property
from multi-family residential to singlefamily residential, alleging, inter alia, that the
ordinance violated the FHA. In 1976, the
plaintiffs entered into an agreement with a
developer for the construction of a multifamily housing complex on their property.
The developer had looked into the possibility
of making some units of this complex
available for low- and moderate-income
families via rent subsidies, and had inquired
with the Department of Housing and Urban
Development. But the development never
materialized. A detailed affidavit from a
member of the county planning commission
stated that the plaintiffs had never suggested
that their purpose “was to build a multifamily project for the use and benefit of low
income or minority groups.” Instead, the
affidavit claimed that the plaintiffs had
represented their project as “an exclusivehigh rent apartment complex.” The Court
found that there was no “evidence that the
1976 project was in any way affected by or
related to racial or other minority interests.”
Three years later, the land was re-zoned. The
plaintiffs claimed that the re-zoning had
reduced the value of their property by more
than 50% (from $285,000 to $135,000). A
panel of this Court concluded that the
plaintiffs lacked statutory standing under the
FHA despite this purported economic injury.
In making this determination, the Court
considered Trafficante and Gladstone, and
concluded: “There is no indication that the
[Supreme] Court intended to extend standing,

beyond the facts before it, to plaintiffs who
show no more than an economic interest
which is not somehow affected by a racial
interest.” The Nasser Court found that the
property owners lacked an economic interest
affected by a racial interest, and therefore
lacked standing to sue under the FHA.
iii. Newer Supreme Court cases on statutory
standing
Two recent Supreme Court cases have cast
some doubt on the broad interpretation of
FHA statutory standing in Trafficante,
Gladstone, and Havens. In Thompson v.
North American Stainless, LP, the Court
considered whether an employee had a cause
of action under Title VII, which uses nearly
identical statutory language to the FHA. The
Court rejected the argument that this
language expanded statutory standing to the
limits of Article III. Instead, it drew an
analogy to the Administrative Procedure Act
(which contains similar language) and held
that plaintiffs must “fall[ ] within the ‘zone of
interests' sought to be protected by the
statutory provision whose violation forms the
legal basis for his complaint.”
The Court acknowledged that this analysis
was in some tension with Trafficante and
Gladstone. But in glossing Trafficante, the
Thompson Court focused on language in the
opinion that arguably limited the holding to
its facts: the Trafficante Court stated that
standing under the FHA was coextensive
with Article III only “insofar as tenants of the
same housing unit that is charged with
discrimination
are
concerned.”
The
Thompson Court acknowledged that later
cases (such as Gladstone ) reiterated that
standing under the FHA “reaches as far as
Article III permits” without any limiting
language, but it stated that “the holdings of
those cases are compatible with the ‘zone of
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interests' limitation” that the Court went on to
read into Title VII.
Finally, the Supreme Court's recent opinion
in Lexmark (interpreting the Lanham Act)
discarded the labels “prudential standing”
and “statutory standing,” and clarified that
the inquiry was really a question of statutory
interpretation, and not standing at all. One
aspect of this interpretation, the Court
explained, was a zone of interests analysis,
which “requires [the court] to determine,
using traditional tools of statutory
interpretation, whether a legislatively
conferred cause of action encompasses a
particular plaintiff's claim.” The Court went
on to say that this zone of interests test
“applies to all statutorily created causes of
action.” Lexmark did not mention the FHA or
any of the Court's FHA cases.
iv. Analysis
The scope and role of the zone of interests
analysis in the FHA context is a difficult
issue, and one that has sharply divided the
courts that have considered it. Ultimately, we
disagree with the district court, and hold that
the phrase “aggrieved person” in the FHA
extends as broadly as is constitutionally
permissible under Article III.
Simply put, Trafficante, Gladstone, and
Havens have never been overruled, and the
law of those cases is clear as a bell:
“[statutory] standing under [the FHA]
extends ‘as broadly as is permitted by Article
III of the Constitution.’ ” While Thompson
has gestured in the direction of rejecting that
interpretation, a gesture is not enough. The
rule governing these situations is clear: “if a
precedent of the Supreme Court has direct
application in a case, yet appears to rest on
reasons rejected in some other line of
decisions, the Court of Appeals should follow
the case which directly controls, leaving to

the Supreme Court[ ] the prerogative of
overruling its own decisions.” In other words,
“the Supreme Court has insisted on reserving
to itself the task of burying its own
decisions.”
Notably, Thompson itself was a Title VII
case, not a Fair Housing Act case. Thompson
surveyed Trafficante and Gladstone, but did
not explicitly overrule them—nor could it,
given the different statutory context in which
it arose. Instead, the Court held that any
suggestion drawn from the FHA cases that
Title VII's cause of action is similarly broad
was “ill-considered” dictum. It's true that
Title VII contains nearly identical statutory
language to the FHA, and therefore the
Thompson Court's interpretation of Title VII
may signal that the Supreme Court is
prepared to narrow its interpretation of the
FHA in the future. (The dicta in Thompson
indicating that its Title VII interpretation is
“compatible” with the Court's previous FHA
holdings suggests as much.) But that day has
not yet arrived, and until it does, our role as
an inferior court is to apply the law as it
stands, not to read tea leaves. The stillundisturbed holding of the Supreme Court's
FHA cases is that the definition of an
“aggrieved person” under the FHA extends
as broadly as permitted under Article III.
This Court's binding precedent in Nasser is
not to the contrary. Nasser stands for the
unremarkable proposition that a plaintiff has
no cause of action under the FHA if he makes
no allegation of discrimination (or disparate
impact) on the basis of race (or one of the
FHA's other protected characteristics: color,
religion, sex, handicap, familial status, and
national origin). The allegation of
discrimination provides the “racial interest”
Nasser requires to bring an economic injury
within the scope of the statute. The Nasser
plaintiffs' claim was unrelated to race (or any
protected FHA characteristic) altogether;
they simply objected to the rezoning of their
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property because it cost them money. As the
Nasser Court put it, the plaintiffs' “interest in
[the] value of the property in no way
implicate [d] [the] values protected by the
Act.”
Indeed, this is exactly how subsequent
Eleventh Circuit caselaw has treated Nasser.
In Baytree of Inverrary Realty Partners v.
City of Lauderhill—the only case of this
Court to revisit or reference Nasser's
treatment of the FHA—we held that a nonminority real estate developer, Baytree,
stated a claim under the FHA when it
challenged the city's decision to rezone its
property, alleging that the decision was
racially motivated and rendered the property
worthless. We distinguished Nasser as a case
“in which plaintiffs alleged only an economic
injury unaffected by any racial interest,” and
found it inapposite because Baytree had
properly alleged that its injury “result[ed]
from racial animus.” The same is true of the
City of Miami's claim. Like Baytree, the City
claims to have suffered an economic injury
resulting from a racially discriminatory
housing policy; in neither case does Nasser
prevent the plaintiff from stating a claim
under the FHA.
In sum, we agree with the City that the term
“aggrieved person” in the FHA sweeps as
broadly as allowed under Article III; thus, to
the extent a zone of interests analysis applies
to the FHA, it encompasses the City's
allegations in this case. The City's claim does
not suffer from the same flaw as the Nasser
plaintiffs', because the City has specifically
alleged that its injury is the result of a Bank
policy either expressly motivated by racial
discrimination or resulting in a disparate
impact on minorities.
b. Proximate Cause

The district court also concluded that the
City's pleadings did not sufficiently allege
that the Bank's lending practices were a
proximate cause of the City's injury. It
determined that the City had not “allege[d]
facts that isolate Defendants' practices as the
cause of any alleged lending disparity”
compared to the background factors of a
cratering economy and the actions of
independent actors such as “loan services,
government entities, competing sellers, and
uninterested buyers.”
It also found that the City's statistical
analyses indicating that foreclosures caused
economic harm were “insufficient to support
a causation claim,” because some of the
studies were not limited to Miami, some were
not limited to the defendants' practices, and
some did not control for relevant credit
factors. The plaintiffs disagree, arguing that
they need not plead proximate causation at
all, only the lesser “traceability” required by
Article III. In the alternative, they say that
their pleadings were sufficient under either
standard. Although we agree with the Bank
and the district court that proximate cause is
a required element of a damages claim under
the FHA, we find that the City has pled it
adequately.
In Lexmark, the Supreme Court illuminated
the doctrine of proximate cause as it relates
to statutory causes of action. “[W]e generally
presume that a statutory cause of action is
limited to plaintiffs whose injuries are
proximately caused by violations of the
statute.” This principle reflects “the reality
that the judicial remedy cannot encompass
every conceivable harm that can be traced to
alleged wrongdoing,” as well as the Court's
assumption that Congress is familiar with the
traditional common-law rule and “does not
mean to displace it sub silentio.” The Court
made clear that proximate causation is not a
requirement of Article III, but rather an
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element of the cause of action under a statute,
and it “must be adequately alleged at the
pleading stage in order for the case to
proceed.” The Supreme Court has read a
variety of federal statutory causes of action to
contain a proximate cause requirement.
Although proximate cause “is not easy to
define,” the basic inquiry is “whether the
harm alleged has a sufficiently close
connection to the conduct the statute
prohibits.” The requirement is “more
restrictive than a requirement of factual cause
alone,” and we have said that it demands
“something [more]” than Article III
traceability. But the nature of the proximate
cause requirement differs statute by statute: it
is “controlled by the nature of the statutory
cause of action,” so the scope of liability
depends on the statutory context.
No case of the Supreme Court or this Court
has ever dealt directly with the existence or
application of a proximate cause requirement
in the FHA context. But certain statements by
the Supreme Court suggest that proximate
cause must exist for a damages action
brought under the FHA. First, the Lexmark
Court characterized proximate cause as a
“general[ ] presum[ption]” in statutory
interpretation. Moreover, the Supreme Court
has observed that an FHA damages claim is
“in effect, a tort action,” governed by general
tort rules, and proximate cause is a classic
element of a tort claim. If the City's claim is
functionally a tort action, then presumably
the City must adequately plead proximate
cause, just like any other plaintiff raising any
tort claim. At least two of our sister circuits
appear to have reached the same conclusion.
The Bank argues that proximate cause creates
a “directness requirement” within the FHA,
and that the City's pleadings, therefore, fail
because they do not allege that the Bank's
actions directly harmed the City. The City

does not accuse the Bank of discriminating
against the City itself in its lending practices;
instead, it claims that the Bank's
discriminatory practices led the City to lose
tax revenue and spend money combating the
resulting blight. This harm, the Bank claims,
is too indirect to have been proximately
caused by the Bank's conduct.
We disagree. The Bank proposes to draw its
proximate cause test from other statutory
contexts, primarily from the Supreme Court's
interpretation of the Racketeer Influenced
and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) in
Holmes. In that case, the Court read a
proximate cause requirement into RICO,
reasoning that its statutory language mirrored
language used in the antitrust statutes, which
had long been interpreted to contain such a
requirement. One of the “central elements” of
proximate cause in the RICO and antitrust
context, the Court explained, is “a demand
for some direct relation between the injury
asserted and the injurious conduct alleged.”
The Bank argues that proximate cause in the
FHA context must be the same.
But the Supreme Court in Lexmark made
clear that proximate cause is not a one-sizefits-all analysis: it can differ statute by
statute. Thus, for example, Lexmark involved
an allegation of false advertising under the
Lanham Act brought by one company against
a rival. As the Court noted, all such injuries
“are derivative of those suffered by
consumers who are deceived by the
advertising.” A claim based on such a
derivative injury might not satisfy proximate
cause under a statute that strictly requires a
direct connection between the plaintiff's harm
and the defendant's conduct. Nevertheless,
the Court found that the claim satisfied
proximate causation under the Lanham Act:
because the statute authorized suit “only for
commercial injuries,” the derivative nature of
the plaintiff's claim could not be “fatal” to the
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plaintiff's cause of action. In other words, the
statutory context shaped the proximate cause
analysis. So, too, in this case.
The FHA's proximate cause requirement
cannot take the shape of the strict directness
requirement that the Bank now urges on us:
indeed, such a restriction would run afoul of
Supreme Court and Eleventh Circuit caselaw
allowing entities who have suffered indirect
injuries—that is, parties who have not
themselves been directly discriminated
against—to bring a claim under the FHA.
Notably, the Village of Bellwood in
Gladstone was permitted to bring an FHA
claim even though it was not directly
discriminated against. So, too, was the nonprofit corporation in Havens, which alleged
impairment of its organizational mission and
a drain on its resources, not direct
discrimination. And in our own Circuit, the
same is true of the plaintiff in Baytree, a nonminority developer who challenged a city's
zoning decision as racially discriminatory.
Indeed, the Supreme Court in Havens
instructed that the distinction between direct
and indirect harms—or, as the Havens Court
characterized it, the difference “between
‘third-party’ and ‘first-party’ standing”—
was “of little significance in deciding”
whether a plaintiff had a cause of action
under the FHA.
In examining RICO and the antitrust statutes,
the Supreme Court has looked to the statutory
text and legislative history to determine the
scope and meaning of the proximate cause
requirement. Neither party has presented any
argument based on these considerations.
However, the Supreme Court has observed
that the language of the FHA is “broad and
inclusive,” and must be given “a generous
construction.” What's more, while the
Supreme Court has cautioned that “[t]he
legislative history of the [the FHA] is not too
helpful” in determining the scope of its cause

of action, it observed that the FHA's
proponents “emphasized that those who were
not the direct objects of discrimination had an
interest in ensuring fair housing, as they too
suffered.” In short, nothing in the text or
legislative history of the FHA supports the
Bank's cramped interpretation.
As we've noted, damages claims arising
under the FHA have long been analogized to
tort claims. Thus, we look to the law of torts
to guide our proximate cause analysis in this
context. We agree with the City that the
proper standard, drawing on the law of tort, is
based on foreseeability.
Under this standard, the City has made an
adequate showing. The complaint alleges that
the Bank had access to analytical tools as well
as published reports drawing the link
between predatory lending practices “and
their attendant harm,” such as premature
foreclosure and the resulting costs to the City,
including, most notably, a reduction in
property tax revenues. The district court
rejected the plaintiffs' claim partly because it
failed to “allege facts that isolate Defendants'
practices as the cause of any alleged lending
disparity.” But as we have said even in the
more restrictive RICO context, proximate
cause “is not ... the same thing as ... sole
cause.” Instead, a proximate cause is “a
substantial factor in the sequence of
responsible causation.” The City has surely
alleged that much: it claims that the Bank's
discriminatory lending caused property
owned by minorities to enter premature
foreclosure, costing the City tax revenue and
municipal expenditures. Although there are
several links in that causal chain, none are
unforeseeable. And, as we noted in the
context of Article III traceability, the City has
provided the results of regression analyses
that purport to draw the connection between
the Bank's conduct toward minority
borrowers, foreclosure, and lost tax revenue.
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This empirical data is sufficient to “raise the
pleadings above the speculative level.”
In the face of longstanding caselaw drawn
from the Supreme Court and this Court
permitting FHA claims by so-called third
party plaintiffs who are injured by a
defendant's discrimination against another
person, it is clear that the harm the City
claims to have suffered has “a sufficiently
close connection to the conduct the statute
prohibits.” Of course, whether the City will
be able to actually prove its causal claims is
another matter altogether. At this stage, it is
enough to say that the City has adequately
pled proximate cause, as required by the
FHA.
3. Statute of Limitations

2012 that had resulted in foreclosure. It then
listed ten specific property addresses that it
claimed
“corresponded
to
these
foreclosures,” but provided no specific
information (e.g., the *1284 type of loan, the
characteristics that made it predatory or
discriminatory, when the loan closed, when
the property went into foreclosure, etc.) for
each address. (The City also claimed that
“with the benefit of discovery,” it
“anticipate[d] ... be[ing] able to identify more
foreclosures resulting from the issuance of
discriminatory loans.”) As the district court
noted, however, the City failed to allege that
any of the loans closed within the limitations
period (between December 13, 2011, and
December 13, 2013).

This lawsuit was filed on December 13, 2013.
Thus, in a traditional statute of limitations
analysis, the complained-of loans must have
closed after December 13, 2011. The City
maintains that it has alleged a pattern and
practice of discriminatory lending by the
Bank, and its claims, therefore, qualify for
the application of the “continuing violation
doctrine.” The district court disagreed,
finding that the City had not alleged facts
sufficient to support its allegation that the
specific practices continued into the statutory
period. We remain unpersuaded.

On appeal, the City does not contend that its
original complaint was adequate; rather, it
argues that it could readily cure the statute of
limitations flaws if given the opportunity. In
support, the City points to the proposed
amended complaint that it provided along
with its motion for reconsideration and
motion to amend. The district court
acknowledged that the City might indeed be
able to remedy its statute of limitations
deficiencies with an amendment, but the
court never considered whether the City's
proposed amended complaint was sufficient,
because it concluded that the City remained
outside the statute's zone of interests and had
not adequately pled proximate cause.
Because the district court erred both as to the
zone of interests and proximate cause, we are
obliged to remand the cause of action in the
first instance to determine whether or not the
City could remedy any statute of limitations
deficiency. We decline to evaluate the City's
proposed amended complaint before the
district court has had the opportunity to do so.

The complaint alleged that the City had
identified 3,326 discriminatory loans issued
by the Bank in Miami between 2004 and

In order to provide guidance on remand, we
offer this discussion of the application of the
continuing violation doctrine to this case. In

The FHA also requires that claims be filed
“not later than 2 years after the occurrence or
the termination of an alleged discriminatory
housing practice.” The district court
concluded, and the parties do not contest, that
an FHA claim for issuing a discriminatory
loan begins to run from the date that the loan
closes.
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addition to noting that the City never alleged
that any particular loan closed within the
limitations period (a deficiency that may well
be cured in an amended pleading), the district
court also seemingly held that the City's
claim could not qualify for the application of
the continuing violation doctrine because the
complaint did not identify a singular and
uniform practice of continuing conduct.
The continuing violation doctrine applies to
“the
continued
enforcement
of
a
discriminatory policy,” and allows a plaintiff
to “sue on otherwise time-barred claims as
long as one act of discrimination has occurred
... during the statutory period.” The
governing law on the continuing violation
doctrine in the FHA context is drawn from
the Supreme Court's decision in Havens. In
that case, three plaintiffs—a black individual
looking to rent an apartment, a black “tester,”
and a white “tester”—brought FHA claims.
Their lawsuit was filed on January 9, 1979.
At the time, the limitations period under the
FHA was 180 days. The plaintiffs identified
five separate incidents of discrimination: on
March 14, March 21, March 23, July 6, and
July 13 of 1978. Only the incident on July 13
was within the limitations period.
On March 14, March 21, and March 23, the
two testers asked Havens about available
apartments. Each time, the black tester was
told that nothing was available, while the
white tester was told that there were
vacancies. On July 6, the black tester made a
further inquiry and was told that there were
no vacancies, while another white tester (not
a party to the suit) was told that there were
openings. Finally, on July 13—the only
incident within the limitations period—the
black plaintiff who was genuinely looking to
rent asked Havens about availability and was
falsely told that there was nothing.

All three plaintiffs alleged that Havens's
practices deprived them of the benefits of
living in an integrated community. The
Supreme Court held that the claims were not
time-barred for any of the plaintiffs because
they alleged a “continuing violation” of the
FHA, despite the fact that only one
discriminatory incident was within the
limitations window, and that incident
involved only one of the three plaintiffs. “[A]
‘continuing violation’ of the Fair Housing
Act should be treated differently from one
discrete act of discrimination,” the Court
explained. The Court reasoned that “[w]here
the challenged violation is a continuing one,”
there is no concern about the staleness of the
plaintiff's claims. Moreover, the Court
emphasized “the broad remedial intent of
Congress embodied in the [Fair Housing]
Act” in rejecting the defendants' “wooden
application” of the statute of limitations. Id.
The Court concluded: “where a plaintiff,
pursuant to the Fair Housing Act, challenges
not just one incident of conduct violative of
the Act, but an unlawful practice that
continues into the limitations period, the
complaint is timely when it is filed within
[the limitations period, starting at] the last
asserted occurrence of that practice.”
The case before us—if the City is able to
identify FHA violations within the
limitations period—is on all fours with
Havens. The City has alleged “not just one
incident ... but an unlawful practice that
continues into the limitations period.” The
City alleges that the Bank has engaged in a
longstanding practice of discriminatory
lending in which it extends loans to minority
borrowers only on more unfavorable terms
than those offered to white borrowers. The
predatory qualities of the loans have taken
slightly different forms over time (e.g.,
higher interest rates, undisclosed back-end
premiums, higher fees, etc.), but the essential
discriminatory practice has remained the
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same: predatory lending targeted at
minorities in the City of Miami. The fact that
the burdensome terms have not remained
perfectly uniform does not make the
allegedly unlawful practice any less
“continuing.” The various instances of
discriminatory lending comprise the practice,
which continues into the limitations period.
At least at the pleading stage, this is enough
to plausibly invoke the continuing violation
doctrine.

areas and too few in predominantly white
suburban neighborhoods.” The claim was
brought on a disparate-impact theory,
alleging not that the Department's practice
was driven by a discriminatory intent, but
rather that it had a “ ‘disproportionately
adverse effect on minorities' and [was]
otherwise unjustified by a legitimate
rationale.” The question before the Court was
whether disparate-impact claims are
cognizable under the FHA. The Court held
that they are.

4. Remand
Resolving a plaintiff's motion to amend is
“committed to the sound discretion of the
district court,” but that discretion “is strictly
circumscribed” by Rule 15(a)(2) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which
instructs that leave to amend should be
“freely give[n] when justice so requires.”
As we have explained, we find that the City
is within the FHA's zone of interests and has
sufficiently alleged proximate causation
between its injury and the Bank's conduct.
The district court's refusal to allow the City
to amend, and its conclusion that any
amended complaint would be futile, was
legal error and therefore an abuse of
discretion. On remand, the City should be
granted leave to amend its complaint.
We also note that while this appeal was
pending, the Supreme Court handed down a
decision that may materially affect the
resolution of this case. In Texas Department
of Housing & Community Affairs v. Inclusive
Communities Project, Inc., a non-profit
organization brought a Fair Housing Act
claim against the Texas Department of
Housing and Community Affairs, alleging
that the Department's allocation of lowincome housing tax credits caused racial
segregation by “granting too many credits for
housing in predominantly black inner-city

However, in dicta, the Court announced the
“proper[ ] limit[s]” on disparate impact
liability under the FHA, needed both to avoid
serious constitutional issues and to protect
potential defendants from abusive disparateimpact claims. Specifically, the Court noted
that defendants must be allowed to “explain
the valid interest served by their [challenged]
policies,” and that courts should insist on a
“robust causality requirement” at the “prima
facie stage” linking the defendant's conduct
to the racial disparity. The Court emphasized
that disparate-impact claims must be aimed at
“removing
artificial,
arbitrary,
and
unnecessary
barriers,”
rather
than
“displac[ing] valid governmental and private
priorities.” Any newly pled complaint must
take into account the evolving law on
disparate impact in the FHA context. Without
the new pleadings before us, we have no
occasion to pass judgment on how Inclusive
Communities will impact this case, but we
flag the issue both for the parties and for the
district court on remand.
C. Unjust Enrichment Claim
As for the City's state law unjust enrichment
claim, we agree with the district court and
affirm its ruling. In deciding this claim, we
are obliged to apply Florida's substantive law.
Where the highest state court has not
provided the definitive answer to a question
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of state law, “we must predict how the
highest court would decide this case,”
looking to the decisions of the lower state
courts for guidance. Under Florida law, the
doctrine of unjust enrichment (sometimes
called a “contract implied in law,” “quasicontract,” and various other terms) governs
the situation in which one party has conferred
a valuable benefit on another in the absence
of a contract, but “under circumstances that
ma[ke] it unjust to retain it without giving
compensation.” There are three elements of
an unjust enrichment claim under Florida
law: first, the plaintiff has conferred a benefit
on the defendant; second, the defendant
voluntarily accepted and retained that
benefit; and, finally, the circumstances are
such that it would be inequitable for the
defendants to retain the benefit without
paying for it. As for the first element, the
benefit must be conferred directly from the
plaintiff to the defendant. “At the core of the
law of restitution and unjust enrichment is the
principle that a party who has been unjustly
enriched at the expense of another is required
to make restitution to the other.”
The City alleged that the Bank “received and
utilized benefits derived from a variety of
municipal services, including police and fire
protection, as well as zoning ordinances, tax
laws, and other laws and services that have
enabled [the Bank] to operate and profit
within the City of Miami.” It went on to
allege that “[a]s a direct and proximate result
of [the Bank's] predatory lending practices,
[the Bank] ha[s] been enriched at the City's
expense” by utilizing those benefits while
denying the City tax revenue and costing it in
additional municipal expenditures required to
address foreclosed properties. The Bank
“failed to remit those wrongfully obtained
benefits,” the complaint claimed. The City
also alleged that it had paid for the Bank's
externalities (the costs of the harm caused by
the discriminatory lending patterns), that the

Bank was aware of this benefit, and that its
retention would be unjust.
The district court dismissed the claim without
prejudice, in part because the City had not
alleged that it had conferred a direct benefit
onto the Bank to which they were not
otherwise legally entitled, as required under
Florida law. As for the denied tax revenues,
the district court noted that such a denial is
not a direct benefit conferred on the Bank by
the City. As for the municipal services, the
district court found that they did not create an
unjust enrichment claim for two reasons.
First, the municipal services were not
benefits conferred directly on the Bank—the
services were provided to the residents of
Miami, not to the Bank, and any benefit the
Bank received was merely derivative.
Second, the City had not adequately alleged
that the Bank, as a Miami property owner,
was not legally entitled to those services. We
agree.
The City maintains that its complaint states a
cause of action under Florida law, but it has
not cited to a single Florida case. The City
relies primarily on White v. Smith & Wesson
Corp., where the mayor and City of
Cleveland sued various gun manufacturers
and dealers alleging, inter alia, unjust
enrichment on the ground that the city had
conferred a benefit on the defendants by
paying for their “externalities”: “the costs of
the harm caused by Defendants' failure to
incorporate safety devices into their
handguns
and
negligent
marketing
practices.” The Ohio law of unjust
enrichment essentially tracks Florida law.
(“In order to maintain a cause of action for
unjust enrichment under Ohio law, a plaintiff
must allege: (1) a benefit conferred by a
plaintiff upon a defendant; (2) knowledge by
the defendant of the benefit; and, (3) retention
of the benefit by the defendant under
circumstances where it would be unjust to do
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so without payment.”). Without citing to a
single Ohio state court case in its unjust
enrichment analysis, the district court
determined that plaintiffs had stated such a
claim under Ohio law.
The City cites only two other cases, neither
of which were from Florida. None of these
cases, obviously, governs our application of
Florida law.
We have not found any case—and the City
has provided none—supporting an unjust
enrichment claim of this type under Florida
law. First, the City alleges that the Bank must
pay the City for the tax revenue the City has
been denied due to the Bank's unlawful
lending practices. Although a deprivation of
tax revenue may create an injury in fact under
Article III, such an injury does not fit within
the unjust enrichment framework. The
missing tax revenue is in no way a benefit
that the City has conferred on the Bank. The
City has provided no explanation for this
incongruity on appeal.
Instead, the City focuses on the municipal
services—including police, firefighters,
zoning ordinances, and tax laws—that it
claims it would not have had to provide if not
for the Bank's predatory lending. But this
version of the unjust enrichment claim fares
no better, for three independent reasons. For
starters, it's not clear that municipal
expenditures are among the types of benefits
that can be recovered by unjust enrichment
under Florida law. We have found no Florida
case in which a municipality recovered its
expenditures on an unjust enrichment theory.
Indeed, at least one case suggests that a
municipality
cannot
recover
such
expenditures without express statutory
authorization, which the City has never
alleged.

Moreover, the benefits provided by these
municipal services were not directly
conferred on the Bank, as is required for an
unjust enrichment claim under Florida law.
As the district court correctly noted,
municipal police and fire services directly
benefit the residents and owners of homes in
the City of Miami, not the financial
institution that holds the loans on those
properties. And tax laws and zoning
ordinances are quite clearly not direct
benefits conferred on Bank of America: they
are laws of general applicability that, indeed,
apply to all residents of Miami. No Florida
caselaw suggests that these benefits are direct
enough to sustain an unjust enrichment claim.
Finally, the City has failed to allege facts to
show that circumstances are such that it
would be inequitable for the Bank to retain
such benefits without compensation. Even
assuming that these municipal services did
confer a cognizable benefit on the Bank as the
owner of foreclosed property, the City does
not
challenge
the
district
court's
determination that the Bank was legally
entitled to those services. The City has
provided no arguments and cited no Florida
caselaw explaining why the Bank would not
be entitled to police and fire protection like
any other property owner.
The Florida Supreme Court has not ruled on
whether an unjust enrichment claim exists
under these circumstances. But given the
complete lack of supporting Florida caselaw,
we decline to invent a novel basis for unjust
enrichment under Florida law today.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court's
order dismissing the City's unjust enrichment
claim.
III. Conclusion
Nothing we have said in this opinion should
be taken to pass judgment on the ultimate
success of the City's claims. We hold only
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that the City has constitutional standing to
bring its FHA claims, and that the district
court erred in dismissing those claims with
prejudice on the basis of a zone of interests
analysis, a proximate cause analysis, or the
inapplicability of the continuing violation
doctrine.

The judgment of the district court is
AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part,
and REMANDED for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
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“U.S. Supreme Court to weigh Miami predatory lending lawsuit”
Reuters
Lawrence Hurley
June 28, 2016

The U.S. Supreme Court on Tuesday agreed
to decide whether Miami can pursue lawsuits
accusing major banks of predatory mortgage
lending to black and Hispanic home buyers
resulting in loan defaults that drove down city
tax revenues and property values.
The justices will hear appeals filed by Bank
of America Corp and Wells Fargo & Co of a
lower court's decision to permit the lawsuits
by the Florida city against the banks. They
were filed under the Fair Housing Act, a
federal law outlawing discrimination in
housing.
Bank of America spokesman Lawrence
Grayson said that although the bank is
committed to the aims of the Fair Housing
Act, "We believe that a municipality seeking
purely monetary recovery is not covered by
the statute, and we welcome the Supreme
Court's scrutiny and clarity."
Last September, the Atlanta-based 11th U.S.
Circuit Court of Appeals overturned a lower
court's decision to dismiss such lawsuits by
the city against Bank of America, Wells
Fargo and Citigroup Inc. Citigroup decided
not to appeal to the Supreme Court.
Miami accused the banks of a decade of
lending discrimination in its residential
housing market. The city accused Wells

Fargo, Bank of America and Citigroup of
steering non-white borrowers into highercost loans they often could not afford, even if
they had good credit.
It said the banks' conduct caused Miami to
lose property tax revenues, drove down
property values and required the city to pay
the costs of repairing and maintaining
properties that went into foreclosure due to
discriminatory lending.
Several U.S. cities, including Baltimore,
Chicago, Cleveland, Los Angeles and
Memphis, have accused banks, with mixed
success, of discriminatory mortgage lending
that prolonged the nation's housing crisis.
San Francisco-based Wells Fargo is the
largest U.S. mortgage lender and includes the
former Wachovia. Bank of America, based in
Charlotte, North Carolina, includes the
former Countrywide Financial.
The Supreme Court ruled last year in a major
Fair Housing Act case, upholding on a 5-4
vote a broad interpretation of discrimination
claims allowed under the Fair Housing Act.
That decision was in a Texas case and
delivered a setback to lenders and insurers
that sought to curtail such lawsuits.
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Business interests have sought to narrow the
scope of the law in a bid to fend off costly
litigation.
The Supreme Court will hear oral arguments
in the Miami litigation and issue a ruling in
its next term, which begins in October and
ends in June 2017. (Additional reporting by
Jonathan Stempel)
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“Supreme Court Could Cut Cities Out Of Fair Lending Fights”
Law360
Evan Weinburger
July 8, 2016

An upcoming battle before the U.S. Supreme
Court between the city of Miami and two of
the world’s largest banks could go a long way
toward determining whether municipalities
will be able to bring claims related to the
financial crisis, experts say.

much easier to capture those people who
aren’t accountable to the residents of
communities that are destabilized by these
practices,” said Rosenthal, who is now a
professor at Chapman University’s Dale E.
Fowler School of Law.

The Supreme Court in late June granted a
petition from Bank of America Corp. and
Wells Fargo & Co. to consider whether the
Eleventh Circuit wrongly ruled in Miami’s
favor when it revived a fair lending lawsuit
the city filed under the Fair Housing Act.

Miami sued Bank of America, Wells Fargo
and Citigroup Inc. in three separate
complaints alleging that they engaged in a
pattern of discriminatory mortgage lending in
minority neighborhoods and to minority
borrowers that wreaked havoc on
neighborhoods in in the city. Miami had the
highest foreclosure rate among the 20 largest
metropolitan areas in the country at the time
the complaints were filed.

Miami is just one of many cities to file similar
claims against big banks in recent years
alleging that their mortgage lending units
doled out shoddy loans to black and Latino
borrowers, leading to a wave of foreclosures
that lowered municipal tax revenues even as
the costs of maintaining and protecting those
properties rose. If the banks are successful in
overturning the Eleventh Circuit’s decision,
cities around the country will see one of their
only avenues for both recovering lost
revenues and protecting their citizens cut off,
said Lawrence Rosenthal, a former attorney
for the city of Chicago who helped bring
cases against tobacco, firearms and other
companies.
“The industry would like to have to only deal
with Congress and federal regulators. It’s

Miami alleged that the banks’ actions
resulted in a serious shortfall in tax revenues.
After seeing a federal district court judge
dismiss its complaint, Miami appealed to the
Eleventh Circuit, which in September 2015
ruled that the city had standing to bring its
complaint and remanding the cases to the
district court for further proceedings.
The two banking powerhouses argued in
separate petitions for writs of certiorari that
the Eleventh Circuit did not follow Supreme
Court decisions from 2011 and 2014 when it
revived Miami's FHA complaints.
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Without the Supreme Court weighing in on
the question, lower courts could feel
compelled to rely on cases stretching back to
the 1970s when determining standing
questions in FHA-related cases, even though
the high court has since made decisions that
pared down the definition of aggrieved
parties who have standing to bring a
discrimination case, the banks said.
Miami argues that earlier rulings clearly set
out that they have standing under the FHA to
sue.
At the center of the case are two related
questions. The first is whether cities meet the
standard of “aggrieved person” under the Fair
Housing Act, allowing them to sue over lost
tax revenues. The second is whether the cities
can sufficiently argue that a long chain of
events beginning with bad mortgage loans to
citizens led to the tax losses.
“This is not that the Supreme Court is ruling
whether the cities can recover or not. They’re
really asking, are the allegations in the
complaint sufficient to warrant being heard?”
said Kathleen Engel, a professor at Suffolk
University Law School.
Those questions are vital not just to Miami,
but also to a host of other municipalities like
Los Angeles, Baltimore and Birmingham,
Alabama, which have filed similar
complaints, as well as to the banks subject to
those court actions.
The banks argue that the municipalities are
stretching the reaches of the law with their
arguments about how lending decisions led to
increased costs for fire prevention and other
protections for foreclosed properties as well
as lower tax bases.

Those claims should be blocked because the
cities themselves were not the direct victims
of the alleged discriminatory lending
practices and are thus not in a position to sue
because the Fair Housing Act should be
subject to the same standing limitations as
other federal statutes, the banks argue.
“These plaintiff municipalities seek relief for
no alleged victim of discrimination,” said
Valerie
Hletko,
a
partner
with
BuckleySandler LLP, a firm that represents
banks in cases similar to the one headed to the
high court.
“Instead, they assert that alleged victims of
discriminatory mortgage lending practices
defaulted on their loans and went into
foreclosure; and that their properties became
vacant; and that these vacant properties
attracted criminals and became blighted; and
that this injured the plaintiff municipalities
by increasing the costs of providing
government services and decreasing property
tax revenues,” Hletko added.
Much of the fight between the banks and
Miami has focused on three cases.
The banks argue that the most recent of those
cases, the 2014 Lexmark Inc. v. Static
Control Components Inc., limited standing
and the definition of direct harm, foreclosing
the city’s claims.
The city of Miami relies on older cases,
including the Supreme Court’s 1972 decision
in Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Insurance
Co. and its 1979 ruling in Gladstone,
Realtors v. Village of Bellwood. Both of those
cases
allow
for
broader
standing
interpretations under the FHA than the banks
concede, the city says.
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If the Supreme Court overturns the Eleventh
Circuit and relies on the more recent rulings,
“the bottom would fall out” of the remaining
cases filed by municipalities, Hletko said.
And the damage may not be limited to the
ability of cities and counties to sue.
Nonprofit housing groups may also face the
challenge of proving direct harm if they want
to sue on behalf of groups of homeowners
who allege discriminatory lending practices,
said Robert Peck of the Center for
Constitutional Litigation, one of the attorneys
representing Miami before the Supreme
Court.

But at least the courthouse doors would
remain open, Rosenthal said.
“What Miami has found is really a very
creative and interesting piece of lawyering in
my view. They found a rear-door to
municipal activity in this field that the
industry forgot to have Congress bolt shut,”
he said.
--Editing by Sarah Golin and Philip Shea.

“You would limit FHA cases to the federal
government, potentially to the states and to
individual borrowers” who may not have the
resources or knowledge to file such litigation,
he said.
The current wave of litigation filed by cities
and counties marks one of the last areas
where municipalities can take action against
corporations and other actors for harm
allegedly perpetrated against citizens.
Congress has taken steps to stop
municipalities from bringing litigation
against the tobacco, firearms and other
industries, rendering that level of government
with few powers, Engel said.
“Cities are powerless because they can only
act on their own behalf,” she said.
If Miami prevails at the Supreme Court, it
would still face the prospect of getting a third
amended complaint to survive a motion to
dismiss, a trial and then a seemingly
inevitable appeal.
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“Miami mortgage lawsuits vs BofA, Citigroup, Wells Fargo are revived”
Reuters
Jonathan Stempel
September 1, 2015

A federal appeals court on Tuesday revived
three lawsuits in which the City of Miami
accused Wells Fargo & Co, Bank of America
Corp and Citigroup Inc of predatory
mortgage lending to black and Hispanic
borrowers.
By a 3-0 vote, the 11th U.S. Circuit Court of
Appeals said a lower court erred in
dismissing the city's claims under the federal
Fair Housing Act, over what Miami called a
decade of lending discrimination in its
residential housing market.
"It is clear that the harm the city claims to
have suffered has a sufficiently close
connection to the conduct the statute
prohibits," Circuit Judge Stanley Marcus
wrote.
U.S. cities including Baltimore, Chicago,
Cleveland, Los Angeles and Memphis have
with mixed success accused banks of biased
mortgage lending that prolonged the nation's
housing crisis.
Miami alleged that Wells Fargo, Bank of
America and Citigroup steered non-white
borrowers into higher-cost loans they often
could not afford, even if they had good credit.

The city said this "reverse redlining" led to a
large number of foreclosures, lower property
tax collections and increased spending to
combat urban blight.
In July 2014, U.S. District Judge William
Dimitrouleas in Fort Lauderdale, Florida
dismissed Miami's lawsuits. He said the city
lacked standing to sue, and that the alleged
harm was too remote from the banks'
conduct.
But the appeals court said that standard was
too stringent and that banks could have
reasonably foreseen the "attendant harm"
from their alleged discriminatory lending.
The 11th Circuit did not rule on the merits.
Wells Fargo is the largest U.S. mortgage
lender and includes the former Wachovia,
while Bank of America includes the former
Countrywide Financial.
Tom Goyda, a Wells Fargo spokesman, said
the San Francisco-based bank is disappointed
in the outcome and "prepared to present
strong arguments in support of our long
history of fair and responsible lending in
Miami and across the country."
Bank of America spokesman Rick Simon
said the Charlotte, North Carolina-based
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bank is considering its options. "Our record
demonstrates a firm commitment and strong
record for fair and responsible lending and
community revitalization," he said.
Mark Rodgers, a spokesman for New Yorkbased Citigroup, declined to comment.
The Miami city attorney's office had no
immediate comment.

The cases in the 11th U.S. Circuit Court of
Appeals are Miami v. Bank of America Corp
et al, No. 14-14543; Miami v. Wells Fargo &
Co, et al, No. 14-14544; and Miami v.
Citigroup Inc et al, No. 14-14706. (Reporting
by Jonathan Stempel in New York; Editing
by Bernard Orr, David Gregorio and Alan
Crosby)

In July, federal judges in Chicago and Los
Angeles dismissed lawsuit accusing Wells
Fargo of predatory lending in those cities.
Los Angeles' similar lawsuit against Bank of
America was dismissed in May.
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Fry v. Napoleon Community Schools
15-497
Ruling Below: Fry v. Napoleon Cmty. Sch., 788 F.3d 622 (6th Cir. 2015)
E.F., daughter of Stacy and Brent Fry, was born with spastic quadriplegic cerebral palsy, and was
prescribed a service dog. Her schools refused to allow her to bring her service dog into the
school. Parents sued on behalf of their daughter on the grounds that this violated Title II of the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The defendants filed a motion to dismiss, which was
granted by the District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. The plaintiffs appealed.
The Court of Appeals held that the claim required the plaintiffs to exhaust the procedures found
in the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act before they could fil suit, though one judge
dissented.
Question Presented: Whether the Handicapped Children’s Protection Act of 1986 commands
exhaustion in a suit, brought under the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation
Act, that seeks damages – a remedy that is not available under the Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act.

Stacy FRY and Brent Fry, as next friends of minor E.F., Plaintiffs–Appellants,
v.
NAPOLEON COMMUNITY SCHOOLS; Pamela Barnes; Jackson County Intermediate
School District, Defendants–Appellees.
United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit
Decided on June 12, 2015
[Excerpt; some citations and footnotes omitted]
ROGERS, Circuit Judge.
The administrative exhaustion requirements
of the Individuals with Disabilities Education
Act (IDEA) must, under that act, be met even
with respect to some claims under the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and
the Rehabilitation Act. The question on this
appeal is whether the ADA and
Rehabilitation Act claims in this case are
such claims requiring IDEA exhaustion.

The Frys' daughter, E.F., suffers from
cerebral palsy and was prescribed a service
dog to assist her with everyday tasks. Her
school, which provided her with a human
aide as part of her Individualized Education
Program (IEP) under the IDEA, refused to
permit her to bring her service dog to school.
The Frys sued the school, its principal, and
the school district, alleging violations of the
ADA and the Rehabilitation Act and state
disability law. The district court granted the
defendants' motion to dismiss under
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Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c) on the grounds that
because the Frys' claims necessarily
implicated E.F.'s IEP, the IDEA's exhaustion
provision required the Frys to exhaust IDEA
administrative procedures prior to bringing
suit under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act.
The Frys appeal, arguing that the IDEA
exhaustion provision does not apply because
they do not seek relief provided by IDEA
procedures. But because the specific injuries
the Frys allege are essentially educational,
they are exactly the sort of injuries the IDEA
aims to prevent, and therefore the IDEA's
exhaustion requirement applies to the Frys'
claims.
Because this is an appeal from a grant of a
motion to dismiss based on the pleadings, we
take as true the facts alleged in the Frys'
complaint.
E.F., the daughter of Stacy and Brent Fry,
was born with spastic quadriplegic cerebral
palsy, which significantly impairs her motor
skills and mobility. In 2008, E.F. was
prescribed a service dog. Over the course of
the next year, E.F. obtained and trained with
a specially trained service dog, a hybrid
goldendoodle named Wonder. Wonder
assists E.F. by increasing her mobility and
assisting with physical tasks such as using the
toilet and retrieving dropped items. At the
time this dispute arose, E.F. could not handle
Wonder on her own, but at some point in the
future she would be able to. In October 2009,
when Wonder's training was complete, her
school, Ezra Eby Elementary School, refused
permission for Wonder to accompany E.F. at
school. There was already an IEP in place for
E.F. for the 2009–2010 school year that
included a human aide providing one-on-one
support. In a specially convened IEP meeting
in January 2010, school administrators
confirmed the decision to prohibit Wonder,
reasoning in part that Wonder would not be
able to provide any support the human aide

could not provide. In April 2010, the school
agreed to a trial period, to last until the end of
the school year, during which E.F. could
bring Wonder to school. During this trial
period, however, Wonder was not at all times
permitted to be with E.F. or to perform some
functions for which he had been trained. At
the end of the trial period, the school
informed the Frys that Wonder would not be
permitted to attend school with E.F. in the
coming school year.
The Frys then began homeschooling E.F. and
filed a complaint with the Office of Civil
Rights at the Department of Education under
the ADA and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.
Two years later, in May 2012, the Office of
Civil Rights found that the school's refusal to
permit Wonder to attend with E.F. was a
violation of the ADA. At that time, without
accepting the factual or legal conclusions of
the Office of Civil Rights, the school agreed
to permit E.F. to attend school with Wonder
starting in fall 2012. However, the Frys
decided to enroll E.F. in a school in a
different district where they encountered no
opposition to Wonder's attending school with
E.F.
The Frys filed suit on December 17, 2012,
seeking damages for the school's refusal to
accommodate Wonder between fall 2009 and
spring 2012. The Frys alleged the following
particular injuries: denial of equal access to
school facilities, denial of the use of Wonder
as a service dog, interference with E.F.'s
ability to form a bond with Wonder, denial of
the opportunity to interact with other students
at Ezra Eby Elementary School, and
psychological harm caused by the
defendants' refusal to accommodate E.F. as a
disabled person. The Frys sought relief under
Title II of the ADA, § 504 of the
Rehabilitation
Act
(which
prohibits
discrimination based on disability in “any
program or activity receiving Federal
219

financial assistance”), and the Michigan
Persons with Disabilities Civil Rights Act.
The district court declined to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over the state law
claim.
On January 10, 2014, the district court
granted the defendants' motion to dismiss
pursuant to Rule 12(c), finding that the
IDEA's exhaustion requirements applied to
the Frys' claims and dismissing them without
prejudice. The court noted that although the
Frys did not specifically allege any flaw in
E.F.'s IEP, if she were permitted to attend
school with Wonder, that document would
almost certainly have to be modified in order
to articulate the policies and practices that
would apply to the dog. Therefore, the Frys'
request for permission for E.F. to attend
school with Wonder “would be best dealt
with through the administrative process,” and
exhaustion was required. Because the Frys
had not exhausted IDEA administrative
remedies, the district court dismissed their
suit without prejudice. The Frys timely
appealed.
The IDEA exhaustion requirement applies to
the Frys' claims. Under that statute, plaintiffs
must exhaust IDEA procedures if they seek
“relief that is also available” under IDEA,
even if they do not include IDEA claims in
their complaint. This language requires
exhaustion when the injuries alleged can be
remedied through IDEA procedures, or when
the injuries relate to the specific substantive
protections of the IDEA. The core harms that
the Frys allege arise from the school's refusal
to permit E.F. to attend school with Wonder
relate to the specific educational purpose of
the IDEA. The Frys could have used IDEA
procedures to remedy these harms.
Therefore, the nature of the Frys' claims
required them to exhaust IDEA procedures
before filing suit under the ADA and the
Rehabilitation Act.

The IDEA's exhaustion requirement ensures
that complex factual disputes over the
education of disabled children are resolved,
or at least analyzed, through specialized local
administrative procedures. The IDEA
outlines standards and procedures for
accommodations and services provided to
disabled children whose disabilities cause
them to need “special education and related
services.” One of its primary purposes is to
“ensure that all children with disabilities have
available to them a free appropriate public
education that emphasizes special education
and related services designed to meet their
unique needs and prepare them for further
education, employment, and independent
living.” To this end, the IDEA requires that
schools and school districts develop an IEP
for each such child. The IEP outlines “the
child's present levels of academic
achievement and functional performance[,]
... measurable annual ... academic and
functional goals,” measurement criteria for
meeting those goals, and the “special
education and related services and
supplementary aids and services ... and ... the
program modifications or supports for school
personnel that will be provided for the child”
to make progress in achieving the goals.
The IDEA's procedures for creating and
amending a child's IEP encourage
participation by those directly involved in the
child's care in education, application of
expert analysis, and swift dispute resolution.
There must be an IEP in effect for each
disabled child by the start of each school
year. The IEP is created by an IEP team,
which includes the child's parents, at least
one of the child's regular education teachers,
at least one of the child's special education
teachers, and a representative of the “local
education agency” who is qualified in special
education, knowledgeable about the general
curriculum, and knowledgeable about the
local education agency's resources. Any party
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can present a complaint “with respect to any
matter relating to the identification,
evaluation, or educational placement of the
child, or the provision of a free appropriate
public education to such child,” including
disputes over the content of the child's IEP.
Within 15 days of receiving notice of a child's
parents' complaint, the local educational
agency must hold a “preliminary meeting”
with the parents and other members of the
IEP team to give the local educational agency
“the opportunity to resolve the complaint.” If
the local educational agency has not resolved
the dispute within 30 days of receiving the
complaint, the timeline for a “due process
hearing” begins. This process must
conclude—with the local or state educational
agency issuing a written decision to the
parties—within 45 days. If the local agency
conducted the hearing, the decision can be
appealed to the state educational agency,
which conducts an impartial review and
issues a decision within 30 days. These
deadlines are of course not entirely set in
stone, but in the abstract a dispute about an
IEP should go through a resolution meeting,
a local agency determination, and a state
agency determination within 105 days of the
initial complaint. Only at this point may
either party take the dispute to court, and the
court then receives “the records of the
administrative proceedings.” The statute and
implementing regulations ensure that the
parties have a chance to resolve the dispute
without going to court and that local and state
educational agencies have a chance to
analyze and study it.
Requiring exhaustion of administrative
procedures prior to filing suit under the IDEA
has clear policy justifications: “States are
given the power to place themselves in
compliance with the law, and the incentive to
develop a regular system for fairly resolving
conflicts under the Act. Federal courts—
generalists with no expertise in the

educational needs of handicapped students—
are given the benefit of expert factfinding by
a state agency devoted to this very purpose.”
The IDEA calls for highly fact-intensive
analysis of a child's disability and her
school's ability to accommodate her. The
procedures outlined above ensure that the
child's parents and educators, as well as local
experts, are first in line to conduct this
analysis.
The IDEA's substantive protections overlap
significantly with other federal legislation
and constitutional protections, and so this
policy justification would be threatened if
parties could evade IDEA procedures by
bringing suit contesting educational
accommodations under other causes of
action. The IDEA contemplates and
explicitly precludes this possibility:
[B]efore the filing of a civil action
under [the ADA, the Rehabilitation
Act, or other Federal laws protecting
the rights of children with disabilities]
seeking relief that is also available
under this subchapter, the procedures
under subsections (f) and (g) shall be
exhausted to the same extent as would
be required had the action been
brought under this subchapter.
The exhaustion requirement was intended “to
prevent courts from acting as ersatz school
administrators and making what should be
expert determinations about the best way to
educate disabled students.” Accordingly, it
makes sense to require IDEA exhaustion in
order to preserve the primacy the IDEA gives
to the expertise of state and local agencies.
We have held that exhaustion is not required
when the injuries alleged by the plaintiffs do
not “relate to the provision of a FAPE [free
appropriate public education]” as defined by
the IDEA, and when they cannot “be
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remedied through the administrative process”
created by that statute. When they do relate to
the provision of the child's education and can
be remedied through IDEA procedures,
waiving the exhaustion requirement would
prevent state and local educational agencies
from addressing problems they specialize in
addressing and require courts to evaluate
claims about educational harms that may be
difficult for them to analyze without the
benefit of an administrative record. Under
S.E. and F.H., exhaustion is required at a
minimum when the claim explicitly seeks
redress for a harm that IDEA procedures are
designed to and are able to prevent—a harm
with educational consequences that is caused
by a policy or action that might be addressed
in an IEP. Similarly, the Seventh Circuit
required exhaustion when “[b]oth the genesis
and the manifestations of the problem [were]
educational.” In such a situation, the
participants in IDEA procedures will answer
the same questions a court would ask, and
they have a chance of solving the child's and
the child's parents' problem before the parents
and their child become plaintiffs.
The exhaustion requirement applies to the
Frys' suit because the suit turns on the same
questions that would have determined the
outcome of IDEA procedures, had they been
used to resolve the dispute. The Frys allege in
effect that E.F.'s school's decision regarding
whether her service animal would be
permitted at school denied her a free
appropriate public education. In particular,
they allege explicitly that the school hindered
E.F. from learning how to work
independently with Wonder, and implicitly
that Wonder's absence hurt her sense of
independence and social confidence at
school. The suit depends on factual questions
that the IDEA requires IEP team members
and other participants in IDEA procedures to
consider. This is thus the sort of dispute
Congress, in enacting the IDEA, decided was

best addressed at the first instance by local
experts, educators, and parents.
In the context of the accommodations the
school already provided to E.F., the
additional value of allowing Wonder to
attend with E.F. was educational—the sort of
interest the IDEA protects. E.F.'s IEP already
included a human aide who, it appears,
assisted E.F. with the tasks Wonder could
perform. Thus the Frys' claim is not that the
school failed to accommodate E.F.'s
disability at all, but that the accommodation
provided was not sufficient. Whether this
claim amounts to alleging a denial of a free
appropriate public education, or whether it
could be resolved through IDEA procedures,
depends on why the existing accommodation
was not sufficient relative to what Wonder
could provide.
If the human aide was not a sufficient
accommodation, it was because he or she did
not help E.F. learn to function independently
as effectively as Wonder would have and
perhaps because he or she was not as
conducive to E.F.'s participating confidently
in school activities as Wonder would have
been. The complaint does not allege that the
human aide was less effective than Wonder
would have been in providing immediate
physical assistance; thus the Frys do not
appear to suggest that E.F. was directly
denied physical access to public school
facilities. Instead, having Wonder at school
was important for E.F. to “form a bond” with
the dog, a bond that would make Wonder a
more effective service animal “outside of
school.” The Frys characterize Wonder's
independent value to E.F. as assistance with
specific physical tasks, enabling her “to
develop independence and confidence,” and
helping her “to bridge social barriers.” Thus
if the human aide was not a sufficient
accommodation relative to Wonder, that was
because he or she did not increase E.F.'s
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ability to perform physical tasks and function
confidently and independently outside of
school. One might also infer, though the Frys
do not allege it directly, that relying on only
a human aide without the additional presence
of a service dog would inhibit E.F.'s sense of
confidence and independence, as well as her
ability to overcome social barriers, in school.
The other harms that the Frys specifically
identify—denial of access to school facilities,
denial of the use of Wonder as a service dog
at school, harms caused by having to leave
the school, and emotional distress caused by
the school's refusal to accommodate her—all
depend on the assumption that the school's
refusal to permit Wonder's attendance
harmed E.F. in the ways identified above. For
example, E.F. was denied access to school
facilities in the sense that school facilities did
not provide her with an accommodation (i.e.,
permission to use Wonder) she reasonably
needed, but she needed Wonder in school
only (it appears on the face of the complaint)
to form a stronger bond with the dog and,
perhaps, to feel more confident and
independent. In sum, each of these secondary
injuries exists only to the extent that
Wonder's absence is harmful, or else (in the
case of injuries resulting from switching
schools, for instance) would be entirely
avoidable if Wonder's absence were not
harmful.
The primary harms of not permitting Wonder
to attend school with E.F.—inhibiting the
development of E.F.'s bond with the dog and,
perhaps, hurting her confidence and social
experience at school—fall under the scope of
factors considered under IDEA procedures.
Developing a bond with Wonder that allows
E.F. to function more independently outside
the classroom is an educational goal, just as
learning to read braille or learning to operate
an automated wheelchair would be. The goal
falls squarely under the IDEA's purpose of
“ensur[ing] that children with disabilities

have available to them a free appropriate
public education that emphasizes special
education and related services designed to
meet their unique needs and prepare them for
further education, employment, and
independent living.” Thus developing a
working relationship with a service dog
should have been one of the “educational
needs that result from the child's disability”
used to set goals in E.F.'s IEP. “Educational
needs” is not limited to learning within a
standard curriculum; the statute instructs the
IEP team to take into account E.F.'s
“academic, developmental, and functional
needs,” which means that the IEP should
include what a student actually needs to learn
in order to function effectively. “A request
for a service dog to be permitted to escort a
disabled student at school as an ‘independent
life tool’ is hence not entirely beyond the
bounds of the IDEA's educational scheme.”
The Frys' stated argument for why E.F.
needed Wonder at school would have
provided justification under the IDEA for
allowing Wonder to accompany E.F.
To the extent that the Frys also allege that
Wonder would have provided specific
psychological and social assistance to E.F. at
school, the value of this assistance is also
crucially linked to E.F.'s education.
Accommodations that help make a student
feel more comfortable and confident at
school should be included in an IEP, which
lists “the program modifications or supports
for school personnel that will be provided for
the child ... to be educated and participate
with other children with disabilities and
nondisabled children in [educational
activities].” Thus an IEP should take into
account any potential accommodations that
will make a disabled child feel more
comfortable in the school environment, since
such accommodations will help the child
participate actively in school activities. The
IDEA is designed to address precisely the
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sorts of harms the Frys allege in their
complaint; assuming their claims are correct,
they should have been able to obtain relief
under IDEA procedures, if followed
properly.
In fact, the school did use IDEA procedures
to attempt to resolve its dispute, and the
injuries alleged by the Frys here could have
been raised then. In a January 2010 IEP team
meeting requested by the school, E.F.'s IEP
team considered, among other questions,
“[w]hat disability-related educational need ...
the service animal [is] intended to address”
and whether “the service animal [will]
enhance or hinder [E.F.'s] ability to progress
in the general curriculum[.]” The IEP team
reached conclusions that pertain directly to
the Frys' complaint: “[E.F.] was being
successful in [the] school environment
without the service animal, ... all of her needs
were being met by the program and services
in place, and ... adding the service animal
would not be beneficial to [E.F.].” These
statements either directly contradict the
injuries alleged in the Frys' complaint or
reflect an excessively narrow conception of
educational success contradicted by the text
of the IDEA. Either way, the Frys could have
relied on the injuries alleged in the complaint
here (or on the likelihood of those injuries
arising in the future) to challenge the IEP
team's conclusion under IDEA procedures.
Had the Frys pursued IDEA procedures at
this point, they would have achieved one of
two outcomes. Either they would have
prevailed and effectively resolved their
dispute without litigation, making it possible
for E.F. to attend school with Wonder, or else
they would have failed but in the process
generated an administrative record that
would have aided the district court in
evaluating their complaint. The IDEA's
purposes of giving state educational agencies
the opportunity to ensure compliance with

federal law and ensuring that local experts are
able to analyze disputes before litigation
begins are well served by requiring
exhaustion here.
First, IDEA procedures would in fact have
been capable of resolving the Frys' dispute.
E.F.'s IEP already provided for a human aide
to accompany her while at school; it could
just as well have provided for her service
animal. Further, as the Second Circuit in
Cave has noted in similar circumstances,
measures and policies designed to minimize
the disruption caused by a service animal at
school (a concern raised by school officials in
refusing to permit Wonder to accompany
E.F.) would also best be addressed through
changes to an IEP. The Frys' complaint
alleges a basis under the IDEA for E.F. to
attend school with Wonder, and IDEA
procedures would have allowed the Frys and
school officials to work out exactly how the
school should adapt to Wonder's presence.
Second, the record IDEA procedures would
have created in this dispute would have been
directly relevant to analysis of the Frys'
complaint under the ADA and the
Rehabilitation Act. In order to prevail in their
ADA claim, the Frys would have to show that
permitting Wonder at school is “necessary to
avoid discrimination on the basis of
disability.” Under the allegations in their
complaint, this can be the case only because
of Wonder's contribution to and role in E.F.'s
education—an issue that would be
extensively analyzed in IDEA procedures.
The Frys would have to make a similar
showing under the Rehabilitation Act. Thus
the IDEA exhaustion requirement's purpose
of allowing courts to benefit from the
development of an administrative record also
suggests that exhaustion should be required.
Although the Frys seek money damages, a
remedy unavailable under the IDEA, rather
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than an injunction, this does not in itself
excuse
the
exhaustion
requirement.
Otherwise, plaintiffs could evade the
exhaustion
requirement
simply
by
“appending a claim for damages.”
It is true that IDEA procedures, which could
at best require Ezra Eby Elementary to permit
Wonder to accompany E.F. at school, would
not at present be effective in resolving the
Frys' dispute. First, E.F. no longer attends
Ezra Eby Elementary, and her current school
and school district permit Wonder to
accompany her. Second, before the Frys
decided to transfer E.F., the defendants
settled the Frys' ADA complaint before the
Department of Education's Office of Civil
Rights and agreed to permit Wonder to
accompany E.F. at school; IDEA procedures
could not have produced a substantially
better outcome.
On appeal, the Frys do not argue that, under
Covington, the above circumstances render
exhaustion of IDEA procedures futile.
Indeed, their argument does not rely on the
procedural posture of their dispute at all. We
therefore cannot decide whether the
exhaustion requirement should be excused as
futile. However, it is far from clear that the
Frys' circumstances satisfy the requirements
for futility under Covington. In the “unique
circumstances” of that case, we distinguished
precedent that required exhaustion when
relief under IDEA was unavailable due to the
plaintiff parents' “unilateral act” of removing
their child from the defendant school. That is,
plaintiffs cannot evade the exhaustion
requirement by singlehandedly rendering the
dispute moot for purposes of IDEA relief.
While that is not exactly the case here, the
Frys' failed to use IDEA procedures at any
point during the almost two-and-a-half year
period in which the school refused
permission for Wonder to accompany E.F.
The plaintiff in Covington, in contrast,

participated, albeit imperfectly, in the IDEA's
appellate procedures prior to her son's
graduating from the school where the dispute
arose. The Frys may thus bear some
responsibility for the present inapplicability
of IDEA procedures, and the futility doctrine
may be inapplicable.
In arguing that the exhaustion requirement
does not apply to their claim, the Frys rely
chiefly on a federal district court decision in
California in which the court refused to
require exhaustion for a wheelchair-bound
student's request for a service dog at school.
But applying that case's logic to this
complaint would allow any ADA or
Rehabilitation Act lawsuit to avoid the IDEA
exhaustion requirement by not explicitly
alleging a denial of a FAPE. The decision in
Sullivan viewed a Rehabilitation Act claim
as, in effect, asking questions distinct from
those considered by IDEA procedures:
“[O]nce plaintiff has made a
threshold showing that her decision to
use the service dog is reasonably
related to her disability, the sole issue
to be decided under section 504 [of
the Rehabilitation Act] is whether
defendants
are
capable
of
accommodating plaintiff's choice to
use a service dog. The issue of
whether the service dog enhances
plaintiff's educational opportunities,
which is central to the EHA [the
IDEA's predecessor] inquiry, is
completely irrelevant under section
504.”
This logic does not hold, because, as
explained above, having Wonder at school, in
addition to a human aide, is “reasonably
related” to E.F.'s disability only because
Wonder “enhances [E.F.]'s educational
opportunities.” The analysis that would be
necessary under the IDEA thus must be
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incorporated
into
the
ADA
and
Rehabilitation Act analysis for the Frys to
prevail under the latter statutes. The Frys do
not in so many words state that Wonder
enhances E.F.'s educational opportunities,
but if this is enough to avoid the exhaustion
requirement, then any carefully pleaded
claim under the ADA or Rehabilitation Act
could evade the exhaustion requirement.1
But the text of the IDEA exhaustion
requirement clearly anticipates that the
requirement will apply to some ADA and
Rehabilitation Act claims. Instead, at
minimum, the exhaustion requirement must
apply when the cause of action “arise[s] as a
result of a denial of a [FAPE]”—that is, when
the legal injury alleged is in essence a
violation of IDEA standards.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of
the district court is AFFIRMED.
MARTHA CRAIG DAUGHTREY, Circuit
Judge, dissenting.
DISSENT
The majority proposes to affirm the district
court's order dismissing this civil rights
action alleging violation of Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act and Title II of the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA),
based on its conclusion that “the specific
injuries the [plaintiffs] allege are essentially
educational” and, therefore, subject to
administrative exhaustion under an entirely
separate statute, the Individuals with
Disabilities Act (IDEA). Because I conclude
to the contrary that the claim here is
noneducational in nature and that the IDEA's
exhaustion provision was improperly
invoked by the district court, I respectfully
dissent.
Moreover,
even
if
the
accommodation sought could be considered
“educational,” the fact that school policy
would permit a “guide dog” on campus, but

not a certified “service dog,” suggests why an
attempt at exhaustion of administrative
remedies would be futile in this case and
should be excused.
The disability discrimination at issue is a
text-book example of the harms that Section
504 and the ADA were designed to prevent,
and the claims should not have been
dismissed essentially because the victim of
the discrimination was a school-aged child.
Stacy and Brent Fry's daughter Ehlena, five
years old when this dispute first arose in
2009, suffers from a severe form of cerebral
palsy that is sufficiently disabling to qualify
her under the IDEA for a “free appropriate
public education” (FAPE) based on an
individualized educational program (IEP)—
one specifically “designed to meet [her]
unique needs.” Parents dissatisfied with a
child's IEP are guaranteed “[a]n opportunity
... to present a complaint ... with respect to
any matter relating to the identification,
evaluation, or educational placement of the
child, or the provision of a free appropriate
public education to such child.” If the
complaint cannot be resolved, the parents are
entitled to a due-process hearing and, if
necessary, an appeal to the state's educational
agency. Failing that, suit against the school
district may be filed in federal district court
pursuant to 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2).
In this case, the Frys did not attempt to
exhaust their administrative remedies under
the IDEA because they were not dissatisfied
with Ehlena's educational program. Instead,
their complaint stemmed from the school
district's refusal to allow Ehlena's certified
service dog, Wonder, to accompany her to
school. Armed with a prescription from
Ehlena's physician, the Frys had secured the
dog at considerable expense through various
community fund-raising efforts even before
she started kindergarten, with the
understanding that Ehlena would be able to
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have the service dog accompany her to school
in the fall of 2009. In addition, the family had
undergone ten days of specialized training at
a service-animal training facility in Ohio. The
ultimate objective was to form the child and
the dog into a “team of two,” with Wonder
assisting Ehlena in myriad ways, including—
but not limited to—“retrieving dropped
items, helping her balance when she uses her
walker, opening and closing doors, turning
on and off lights, helping her take off her
coat, [and] helping her transfer to and from
the toilet.” In short, the goal was to help
Ehlena develop more independent motor
skills, which is not the function of an
academic program—put bluntly, basic
mobility is not a subject taught in elementary
school. After the Frys completed training,
what remained was the task of getting Ehlena
and Wonder to become closely attached to
one another in order to make the dog a
valuable resource for the child, especially
during non-school hours. Based on the advice
of experts, her parents maintained that for
Ehlena to develop the confidence necessary
to achieve independent mobility, she and
Wonder needed to be together around the
clock, including during school hours.
School district officials contended that
Ehlena already had an aide provided under
her IEP and, therefore, did not need the
additional assistance of a service animal.
Indeed, they threatened to eliminate the
human aide from the child's IEP if her parents
insisted on having Wonder accompany
Ehlena in school. Even more astounding, the
school district refused to recognize Wonder
as a service dog despite his official
certification, possibly because school policy
explicitly allowed “guide dogs”—but not
“service dogs”—on school premises, giving
lie to the claim that Wonder was
objectionable because he might cause allergic
reactions in staff members and students or
become a distraction to others.

When officials at Ehlena's school repeatedly
refused to accommodate the dog's presence,
the Frys filed suit as her next friends, alleging
that the school district had violated the child's
civil rights under Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act; and the Michigan Persons
with Disabilities Civil Rights Act applies to
public entities and their programs,
prohibiting exclusion from participation by
and discrimination against qualified
individuals with a disability “by reason of
such disability.” Moreover, ADA regulations
require that a public entity “make reasonable
modifications in policies, practices, or
procedures when the modifications are
necessary to avoid discrimination on the
basis of disability, unless the public entity
can demonstrate that
making the
modifications would fundamentally alter the
nature of the service, program, or activity.”
Similarly, the Rehabilitation Act prohibits
discrimination against the disabled by
recipients of federal funding and requires
reasonable accommodations to permit access
to such recipient facilities and programs by
disabled persons.
Depending upon a disabled child's
circumstances, the two anti-discrimination
laws and the IDEA could function as
complements, but their focus and the
obligations that they impose are independent
of one another. The ADA and the
Rehabilitation Act guard Ehlena's civil rights,
ensuring that she, like her fellow citizens, has
equal access to public facilities and publiclyfunded programs. By contrast, the IDEA
guarantees that her education will be
appropriate for her individual situation. If, for
example, the school district declined to
permit Ehlena to come to school altogether,
that action would violate both the ADA and
the Rehabilitation Act, by denying her access
to a public facility and its publicly-funded
program, and it would also violate the IDEA,
by depriving her of a “free appropriate public
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education.” On the other hand, if the school
lacked ramps providing access to the building
by someone using a wheelchair or walker,
rectification of such an ADA violation would
not likely be accomplished by modification
of an IEP. In short, the ADA's focus is on
ensuring access; the IDEA's focus is on
providing individualized education. The
point missed by both the district court and the
majority is that for Ehlena, Wonder functions
as an access ramp—not just in terms of the
school building but, more significantly, in all
aspects of her life.
This point was missed because the test
applied below was impossibly broad. In
granting the school district's motion to
dismiss, the district court observed that “[it]
fail[ed] to see how Wonder's presence would
not—at least partially—implicate issues
relating to E.F.'s IEP.” But, this conclusion
was based on nothing more than speculation,
because the Frys' complaint was dismissed on
the pleadings before any discovery could
occur. Moreover, in terms of a school-age
child, virtually any aspect of growth and
development could be said to “partially
implicate” issues relating to education. If
flimsy, however, the district court's
“implication” analysis was at least a test.
On appeal, the majority offers no useful
yardstick at all. My colleagues appear to
formulate something approaching a loose
standard, observing that “having Wonder at
school, in addition to a human aide, is
‘reasonably related’ to E.F.'s disability only
because Wonder ‘enhances [E.F.]’ s
educational opportunities.' ” But the majority
then quickly concedes that her parents “do
not in so many words state that Wonder
enhances E.F.'s educational opportunities.”
Indeed, the Frys' complaint does not tie use
of the service dog to Ehlena's academic
program or seek to modify her IEP in any

way. For this reason, the majority is also
incorrect in asserting that “[t]he Frys allege
in effect that E.F.'s school's decision
regarding whether her service animal would
be permitted at school denied her a free and
appropriate public education.” The Frys did
not allege the denial of a FAPE, only Ehlena's
access to it. Moreover, given the total
absence of discovery in this case, the
contention that further accommodation
through the service dog is unnecessary
because Ehlena already has a “human aide”
simply cannot be taken seriously. The aide
provided under the IEP is not there to help
Ehlena develop and maintain balance and
mobility, but to ensure her ability to progress
in her academic program. To equate that
assistance with the function of the service
dog, as the school district did and the
majority appears to approve, is ludicrous, and
it completely misconceives the purpose of
providing an aide under an IEP. Such an aide,
after all, would be equally available to assist
a special-needs child with no mobility
problems at all.
If “implication” and “relatedness” are vague
and unhelpful as standards for determining
whether a Section 504 claim under the
Rehabilitation Act or a Title II claim under
the ADA must first be exhausted under the
IDEA's administrative procedures, what test
should apply? Although the majority quotes
statutes at length and cites very little case
law, it does invoke the Ninth Circuit's
opinion in Payne v. Peninsula School
District, overruled on other grounds by
Albino v. Baca, for the proposition that “at
minimum, the exhaustion requirement must
apply when the cause of action ‘arise(s) as the
result of the denial of a FAPE’—that is, when
the legal injury alleged is in essence a
violation of the IDEA standards.” This
proposition is, obviously, true. But it is
immaterial, because the Frys neither alleged
that Ehlena was denied a FAPE nor asked for
228

a modification of her IEP. Moreover, there is
no proof in the record that what the Frys seek
to redress is the functional equivalent of a
deprivation under the IDEA.
Indeed, what is clear from the record—the
complaint and attached exhibits—is that the
request for a service dog would not require a
modification of Ehlena's IEP, because that
request could be honored simply by
modifying the school policy allowing guide
dogs to include service dogs. That wholly
reasonable accommodation—accomplished
by a few keystrokes of a computer—would
have saved months of wrangling between
Ehlena's parents and school district officials;
it would have prevented her absence from
public school during the two years she was
home-schooled following the school's
decision; it would have avoided the
disruption of relocating the child and her
service dog to another school district; and it
would have mooted the question of
exhaustion and eliminated the necessity of
litigation that has ensued since this action
was filed.
On the other hand, if litigation was inevitable,
then perhaps the majority in this case should
look to the Ninth Circuit's en banc opinion in
Payne for more guidance than merely a
restatement of the exhaustion provision
found in 20 U.S.C. § 1415(l ):
“[T]he exhaustion requirement in §
1415(l ) is not a check-the-box kind
of exercise. As our cases demonstrate,
determining what has and what has
not been exhausted under the IDEA's
procedures may prove an inexact
science. In other words, the
exhaustion requirement appears more
flexible than a rigid jurisdictional
limitation—questions about whether
administrative proceedings would be
futile, or whether dismissal of a suit

would be consistent with the “general
purposes” of exhaustion, are better
addressed through a fact-specific
assessment of the affirmative defense
than through an inquiry about
whether the court has the power to
decide the case at all.”
In summary, the Ninth Circuit held, “[n]onIDEA claims that do not seek relief available
under the IDEA are not subject to the
exhaustion requirement, even if they allege
injuries that could conceivably have been
redressed by the IDEA.” In this vein, the
court focused on Congress's intent as
explicitly set out in the IDEA itself: “Nothing
in this chapter shall be construed to restrict or
limit the rights, procedures, and remedies
available under the Constitution, the
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, title
V of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, or other
Federal laws protecting the rights of children
with disabilities....” This deliberate carve-out
would have no meaning if any and every
aspect of a child's development could be said
to be “educational” and, therefore, related to
a FAPE, requiring inclusion in an IEP, and
imposing an extra impediment to the
remediation of a disabled child's civil rights.
As the Payne court noted, “ § 1415 makes it
clear that Congress understood that parents
and students affected by the IDEA would
likely have issues with schools and school
personnel that could be addressed—and
perhaps could only be addressed—through a
suit under § 1983 or other federal laws.”
The majority here has told us that
“[d]eveloping a bond with Wonder that
allows E.F. to function more independently
outside the classroom is an educational goal”
but has failed to tell us how it reached this
conclusion. The omission is not entirely
surprising, given that the Payne court
identified the Sixth Circuit as one of the
“courts [that] have not articulated a
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comprehensive standard for determining
when exactly the exhaustion requirement
applies.” In developing such a standard for
itself, the Ninth Circuit abandoned an injurycentered approach, in which IDEA's
exhaustion requirement would apply to any
case in which the injuries alleged could be
redressed to any degree by the IDEA's
administrative procedures, in favor of a
relief-centered
approach
requiring
exhaustion in three situations: (1) “when a
plaintiff seeks an IDEA remedy or its
functional equivalent”—for example, when
“a disabled student files suit under the ADA
and challenges the school district's failure to
accommodate his special needs and seeks
damages for the costs of a private school
education;” (2) “where a plaintiff seeks
prospective injunctive relief to alter an IEP or
the educational placement of a disabled
student;” and (3) “where a plaintiff is seeking
to enforce rights that arise as a result of a
denial of a free appropriate public education,
whether pled as an IDEA claim or any other
claim that relies on the denial of a FAPE to
provide the basis for the cause of action....”
Because the Frys do not seek to “alter an IEP”
or to rectify “the denial of a FAPE,” a court
adopting the Payne approach would be left
with this question: is their request for the
service dog under the circumstances of this
case “the functional equivalent of an IDEA
remedy”?
The answer to this question involves the very
purpose of the IDEA's exhaustion
requirement, which “is designed to allow for
the exercise of discretion and educational
expertise by state and local agencies, [to]
afford full exploration of technical
educational issues, [to] further development
of a complete factual record, and [to] promote
judicial efficiency by giving agencies the first
opportunity to correct shortcomings in their
educational programs for disabled children.”
In short, the exhaustion provision in Section

1415(l ) is intended to insure that education
experts make the “expert determinations
about the best way to educate disabled
students.”
Clearly, an “expert determination” about
“technical educational issues” might well
concern whether a handicapped student could
be mainstreamed or would fare better in a
special-education classroom. It might also
concern whether speech therapy would help
a child struggling with autism to
communicate. And, it might concern whether
an intellectually-challenged student could
learn to read with the assistance of a reading
specialist. But it would not concern whether
a deaf child should be equipped with a
cochlear implant or relegated to learning sign
language; whether a blind child should be
furnished with a guide dog or outfitted with a
white cane; or whether a crippled child
should be confined to a wheelchair or
encouraged to use a walker assisted in
balance and navigation by a service dog. The
experts qualified to make the “technical
decisions” for children in the latter group are
obviously not trained educators but their
physicians and physical therapists.
In fact, it was Ehlena's pediatrician who
originally assessed her need for a service dog
and wrote a prescription that allowed the Frys
to provide Ehlena with Wonder. The school
district's failure to allow Wonder to
accompany Ehlena in school was no different
from denying her the use of a wheelchair, if
one were needed to enable her to achieve
mobility.
Rather than ask a state agency to make that
call, the Frys submitted their claim to federal
authorities in July 2010, by filing a complaint
with the United States Department of
Education's Office for Civil Rights (OCR),
the federal agency responsible for enforcing
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and
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Title II of the ADA. The complaint was based
on the school district's interference with
Ehlena's access to its publicly-funded school
program by refusing to allow her “trained
service animal” to accompany her in school.
In a report dated May 3, 2012, the Director of
the Office for Civil Rights indicated that
current Title II regulations require that
“public entities must modify policies,
practices, or procedures to permit the use of a
service animal by an individual with a
disability.” Moreover, the regulations in
effect at the time defined “service animals” to
include “any guide dog or other animal
individually trained to do work or perform
tasks for the benefit of an individual with a
disability, including, but not limited to,
guiding individuals with impaired vision,
alerting individuals with impaired hearing to
intruders or sounds, providing minimal
protection or rescue work, pulling a
wheelchair, or fetching dropped items.” The
report also notes that a “public entity is
required to permit an individual with a
disability to be accompanied by the
individual's service animal in all areas of a
public entity's facilities where members of
the public, participants in services, programs,
or activities; or invitees, as relevant, are
allowed to go.”
Addressing Ehlena's situation specifically,
the OCR Director summarized a letter from
Ehlena's physical therapists:
“[T]he therapists explained how the
service animal [Wonder] had
accompanied the Student to therapy
since November of 2009 and had
been incorporated into therapy in a
number of ways. For example, the
service animal assisted the Student
with directional control of her walker,
with ambulation, and with stabilizing
herself while transitioning into and
out of her walker from the floor. The

Student used the service animal as a
bridge for transitioning from her
walker to a standing or seated
position at a table. She also
consistently used the service animal
safely to improve her sitting balance
by having the service animal provide
posterior support as needed. The
letter also described how the service
animal was directed behind or to the
side of the Student when she was
standing at a supportive surface for
improved safety. Additionally, the
Therapists explained that the Student
used the service animal to safely pick
up dropped items. The letter stated
that, although the Student still needed
adult stand-by assistance for added
safety, her independence with
transitioning was improving.”
Nevertheless, the OCR Director noted,
Ehlena's school district “assert[ed] that the
Student does not need her service animal for
school, because they will provide her a
human aide,” but if they do, “it will violate
the antidiscrimination provisions of Section
504 and Title II.” The Director added:
“[T]he decision to deny the Student
the service animal in the school
setting
would
have
wider
implications for the Student outside
of the school day. Activities that the
service animal performs for the
Student during school, such as
providing assistance with balance and
support, retrieving dropped items,
and taking off her coat, are the same
types of activities for which the
Student uses the service animal
outside of the school.... Th[e]
evidence suggests that refusing to
allow the service animal to assist the
Student at school, which she is
required to attend for nine months a
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year, would result in a more
prolonged and complete separation
that would likely cause the Student's
working relationship with the service
animal to deteriorate.”
When the school district refused to accept the
factual findings and the legal conclusions in
the OCR report, the Frys filed this action in
district court.
It is difficult to fathom what could have been
gained by requiring the Frys to undergo
additional “exhaustion” before filing suit.
The stupefying fact, as noted previously, is
that the school district's policy would
explicitly have permitted Ehlena to have a
guide dog at school if she were blind, but was
not interpreted to allow the use of a service
dog as a reasonable accommodation for her
mobility handicap—even in the face of
federal regulations establishing that any
distinction between a guide dog and a service
dog is purely semantic. Moreover, the school
district's recalcitrance suggests a possible
reason for the Frys' decision to pass up the
bureaucratic process involved in pursuing
Section 1415(l ) exhaustion as futile, given
their repeated efforts to reach a favorable
accommodation with the school district
officials and their lack of success, even with
the OCR report in hand. Of course, we cannot
know why the Frys decided to file suit rather
than seek a due-process hearing, because the
district court dismissed the action on the
pleadings, thereby short-circuiting the case
before the complaint was answered and
discovery could occur.

law recognizes that “exhaustion is not
required under the IDEA in certain
circumstances ... [for example, where] it
would be futile or inadequate to protect the
plaintiff's rights.” Although “the burden of
demonstrating futility or inadequacy rests on
the party seeking to bypass the administrative
procedures,” id., the necessity of making
such a showing presumes that a plaintiff's
civil-rights action setting out Section 504 and
ADA claims will proceed at least to the
summary judgment stage, as it did in
Covington. It follows that the district court's
order dismissing the Frys' complaint was
inappropriate at best, arguably erroneous, and
not worthy of affirmance.
At the very least, this case should be
remanded to the district court to permit the
Frys to attempt a showing that Section 1415(l
) exhaustion was inapplicable to their case or
that it would have been “futile or
inadequate.” From the majority's decision to
affirm, I respectfully dissent.

In my judgment, the district court's dismissal
was inappropriately premature. When the
court granted the school district's motion for
judgment on the pleadings, the pleadings
were closed, as required by Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(c), but discovery had not
been undertaken. And yet, Sixth Circuit case
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“Supreme Court takes up case of girl's service dog”
CBS News
June 28, 2016

The Supreme Court is taking up an appeal
from an 11-year-old Michigan girl with
cerebral palsy who wasn't allowed to bring
her service dog to school.
The justices said Tuesday they will consider
whether Ehlena Fry's family can sue the
school district for violations of federal
disability laws.
Fry's family obtained a goldendoodle to help
her open doors and retrieve items. Her school
district initially refused to allow Wonder at
school. Officials relented a bit in 2010, but
they placed many restrictions on Wonder.
Ehlena and her dog later transferred to
another school.
Her family sued the school district for
violations of federal disability laws. The case
was dismissed after a judge said the Frys first
had to seek an administrative hearing. An
appeals court last year upheld that decision 21.
The American Civil Liberties Union, which
is representing the family, says the case is
important because school districts around the
country have repeatedly denied children with
disabilities their right to bring service dogs to
school. These districts often claim the service
animals are not necessary and that the schools
can help the children through other means.

The ACLU wants the justices to declare that
children prevented from using service
animals at school can proceed directly to
court without having to go through
administrative hearings that can be costly,
time consuming and burdensome.
The school argues that exhausting
administrative remedies encourages parents
and schools to work together to determine the
best plan for each child and are a cheaper way
to resolve educational disputes.
The Obama administration has backed the
Fry family, saying the appeals court's
decision was wrong and "leads to unsound
results." The government said at the time the
lawsuit was filed, Ehlena had already moved
to a new school district and there was no
ongoing dispute to compromise. Requiring
her to go through administrative proceedings
"would waste time a resources without
offering any chance of resolving their actual
dispute," the Justice Department said in a
brief to the court.
The high court will hear the case, Fry v.
Napoleon Community Schools, 15-497,
when the new term begins in the fall.
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“Girl with service dog wants US Supreme Court to take case”
Associated Press
Ed White
October 24, 2015

The U.S. Supreme Court is being asked to
take an appeal from an 11-year-old Michigan
girl with cerebral palsy who switched schools
after her service dog wasn't welcomed in a
district in Jackson County.
It's a long shot; the Supreme Court rejects
thousands of cases each year. But the
American Civil Liberties Union believes it's
ripe for review because federal appeals courts
have given different interpretations to laws
protecting the rights of children with
disabilities.
"To force a child to choose to between her
independence and her education is not only
illegal — it is heartless," said Michael
Steinberg, legal director at the ACLU in
Michigan.
In 2009, with support from families in the
Napoleon area, Ehlena Fry's family obtained
a service dog to help her open doors, retrieve
items and use the bathroom. She was 5 at the
time and suffered from mobility problems
due to cerebral palsy, which affects the brain.
But the Napoleon district that fall refused to
allow Wonder to accompany Ehlena at
school, 75 miles southwest of Detroit.
Officials relented somewhat by spring 2010,
but many restrictions were placed on Wonder

in the classroom. Ehlena was subsequently
home-schooled.
The U.S. Education Department in 2012 said
the girl's rights had been violated. The school
district agreed to let Ehlena return with
Wonder, but her parents, fearing difficulties,
instead sent her to the Manchester district,
which had no problem with the dog.
The Frys sued Napoleon, saying the district
violated federal disabilities laws when it had
refused to accommodate Wonder over a 2 ½year period. The case was dismissed on very
technical grounds: A judge said the Frys first
had to exhaust a series of administrative
hearings. An appeals court agreed, 2-1.
That's the issue at the Supreme Court. The
ACLU wants the justices to declare that a
quick, clear route to a courthouse is available.
The petition was filed Oct. 15.
"It's important to set a precedent so other
children's lives are not disrupted while school
officials drag their feet and refuse to provide
them their right to a service dog or other
accommodation," Ehlena's mother, Stacy
Fry, said Friday.
But an attorney for the Napoleon district, Tim
Mullins, said the hearing process works well
because families and schools can negotiate an
education plan.
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"I doubt very much the Supreme Court is
going to say, 'Yeah, let's pick this up,'"
Mullins said.
Ehlena's independence has improved and she
now attends school without Wonder.
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“Service Animals: Must Parent Exhaust IDEA Administrative
Remedies”

Lusk Albertson
Kevin Sutton
June 18, 2015

Courts in different jurisdictions have
disagreed whether requests for service
animals at school are subject to IDEA
administrative remedies or whether parents
may proceed directly to court under the ADA
or Section 504. The United States Circuit
Court for the Sixth Circuit, which interprets
federal law as it applies to Michigan school
districts, recently came down on the side of
exhaustion in Fry v Napoleon Community
Schools, ___ F3d ___; 115 LRP 25804 (6th
Cir, June 12, 2015).
The facts will seem familiar to anyone who
has encountered a service animal request.
The student, a five year old with cerebral
palsy, had an IEP that included a 1:1 human
paraprofessional. The parents requested that,
in addition, the student be permitted to bring
her service animal, a trained dog named
Wonder. The district convened an IEP to
consider the issue and concluded the service
animal was not necessary to provide the
student with FAPE because the human
paraprofessional could do everything the dog
could do (and, presumably, then some). The
parents did not initiate their administrative
remedies under IDEA – i.e., request a due
process hearing. Instead, they withdrew their
daughter from the district in favor of home

schooling and filed a complaint with the
United States Department of Education’s
Office for Civil Rights (OCR), which
investigates alleged violations of ADA and
Section 504. OCR concluded the district had,
in fact, violated ADA by prohibiting the
service animal. Later, the parents placed the
student in another school district that agreed
to permit Wonder to accompany the student.
The parents then sued in federal district court
alleging the first district had violated Section
504 and ADA. The district moved to dismiss
on the grounds the parents had failed to
exhaust their administrative remedies under
IDEA. The district court agreed and
dismissed the parents’ complaint. The
parents appealed.
The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s
decision dismissing the parents’ complaint.
The Sixth Circuit reasoned that the specific
injuries the parents alleged were “essentially
educational” – how the student would learn
and develop with or without the service
animal – and, therefore, fell into an area of
overlap between IDEA and Section 504 and
ADA. The Sixth Circuit also noted that the
provision of IDEA that requires exhaustion
of administrative remedies applies not only to
claims alleging IDEA violations, but also to
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claims under other federal laws seeking relief
that is also available under IDEA. Therefore,
given the overlap, the parents were required
to exhaust administrative remedies before
seeking relief under Section 504 and ADA.
It is worth noting that Fry does not answer the
question of whether ADA or Section 504
requires a school district to accommodate a
parent’s request for a service animal. The
answer to that question requires an
application of the specific facts of the case to
the ADA’s service animal requirements.
Fry does, however, prevent parents from
taking service animal requests directly to
court (at least in the Sixth Circuit) instead of
exhausting IDEA administrative remedies.
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Ivy v. Morath
15-486
Ruling Below: Ivy v. Williams, 781 F.3d 250 (5th Cir. 2015)
Deaf individuals brought a class action suit against the Texas Education Agency (TEA) head,
requesting that the TEA be required to bring their driver education program into compliance with
the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and Rehabilitation Act. The defendants filed a
motion to dismiss. The District Court for the Western District of Texas denied the motion, but
allowed for immediate appeal.
The Court of Appeals held that the plaintiffs had standing to bring their claims, but that the TEA
was not required to ensure the driver education program complied with the ADA and
Rehabilitation Act because the program was not directly a service, program, or activity under the
TEA. One judge filed a separate opinion which dissented in part and concurred in part.
Question Presented: Whether the Fifth Circuit erred in deciding that the relationship between
public and private actors does not invoke dual obligations to accommodate disabilities in any
context other than an express contractual relationship between a public entity and its private
vendor.

Donnika IVY; Bernardo Gonzalez; Tyler Davis, as next friend of Juana Doe, a minor;
Erasmo Gonzalez; Arthur Prosper, IV, Plaintiffs–Appellees
v.
Commissioner Michael WILLIAMS, in his official capacity as head of the Texas
Education Agency, Defendant–Appellant.
United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit
Decided on March 24, 2015
[Excerpt; some citations and footnotes omitted]
EDITH BROWN CLEMENT, Circuit Judge:
Plaintiffs-appellees Donnika Ivy (“Ivy”) and
the other named plaintiffs (collectively, the
“named plaintiffs”) are deaf individuals who
brought a putative class action against
defendant-appellant Michael Williams in his
official capacity as head of the Texas
Education Agency (the “TEA”). They
request injunctive and declaratory relief

requiring the TEA to bring driver education
into compliance with the Americans with
Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and Rehabilitation
Act. The district court denied the TEA's
motion to dismiss but certified its order for
immediate appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).
We granted leave for the TEA to file an
appeal, and we now REVERSE and
RENDER judgment dismissing the case.
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Facts and Proceedings
In Texas, individuals under the age of 25
cannot obtain driver's licenses unless they
submit a driver education certificate to the
Department of Public Safety (“DPS”). Driver
education certificates, in turn, are only
available from private driver education
schools licensed by the TEA. The named
plaintiffs are all deaf individuals who
contacted a variety of TEA-licensed private
driver education schools, all of which
informed the named plaintiffs that the
schools would not accommodate them.3
Because they cannot obtain driver education
certificates, the named plaintiffs cannot
obtain driver's licenses.
A Deafness Resource Specialist with the
Texas Department of Assistive and
Rehabilitative Services informed the TEA of
the inability of deaf individuals like the
named plaintiffs to receive driver education
certificates. But the TEA declined to
intervene, stating that it was not required to
enforce the ADA and that it would not act
against the private driver education schools
unless the United States Department of
Justice (“DOJ”) found that the schools had
violated the ADA. The Deafness Resource
Specialist filed a complaint against the TEA
with the DOJ, which the DOJ apparently
dismissed.
Ivy filed a lawsuit in federal district court
against the TEA and a private driver
education school, requesting injunctive and
declaratory relief against both parties under
the ADA. She later dismissed the private
driver education school from the lawsuit.
After some additional procedural steps that
are not relevant here, the lawsuit became a
putative class action with multiple named
plaintiffs and the TEA as the sole remaining
defendant. The live pleading, the Fourth
Amended Complaint, requests injunctive and

declaratory relief requiring the TEA to bring
driver education into compliance with the
ADA. The TEA filed a motion to dismiss for
want of jurisdiction and for failure to state a
claim. The district court denied these
motions, certified its order for interlocutory
appeal, and stayed the case. We granted the
TEA leave to file an interlocutory appeal.
Standard of Review
We review de novo the denial of a motion to
dismiss for want of jurisdiction and for
failure to state a claim.
Discussion
We first consider the TEA's argument that the
named plaintiffs lack standing to bring their
claims. Finding that they have standing, we
next consider whether they adequately state a
claim upon which relief can be granted. We
conclude that they do not, so we dismiss the
case.
A. Standing
There are three requirements for standing: (1)
the plaintiff must have suffered an “injury in
fact,” (2) there must be “a causal connection
between the injury and the conduct
complained of—the injury has to be fairly
traceable to the challenged action of the
defendant, and not the result of the
independent action of some third party before
the court,” and (3) “it must be likely, as
opposed to merely speculative, that the injury
will be redressed by a favorable decision.”
Here, the injury alleged is quite obvious—the
named plaintiffs' inability to receive driver
education certificates, which in turn prevents
them from receiving driver's licenses. The
TEA challenges the named plaintiffs'
standing under the second and third prongs.
The TEA argues that there is no causal
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connection between the named plaintiffs'
injury and the TEA's conduct because it is the
driver education schools, not the TEA, that
refuse to accommodate the named plaintiffs.
This contention is meritless. While driver
education schools' actions are one cause of
the injury, it is equally clear that the named
plaintiffs' alleged injuries are also “fairly
traceable” to the TEA's failure to inform
private driver education schools of their
ADA obligations and its failure to deny
licenses to driver education schools that
violate the ADA.
The TEA next argues that a court order could
not redress the plaintiffs' alleged injuries. It
advances three main arguments in support of
this contention. First, it argues that it does not
have the statutory authority under Texas law
to ensure private driver education schools'
compliance with the ADA. We disagree;
multiple provisions of Texas law empower
the TEA to perform actions that would likely
redress the named plaintiffs' injuries. For
example, the TEA can issue a license to a
driver education school only if the school
“complies with all county, municipal, state,
and federal regulations, including fire,
building, and sanitation codes and assumed
name registration.” Thus, the TEA has the
power to withhold licenses from driver
education schools that fail to comply with the
DOJ's ADA regulations. Further, Texas law
provides that the TEA “has jurisdiction over
and control of” driver education schools and
is allowed to “adopt and enforce rules
necessary to administer” the chapter on
driver education. These provisions give the
TEA the power to enact regulations relating
to ADA compliance in driver education
schools.
Second, the TEA argues that a federal court
cannot order it to ensure that driver education
schools comply with the ADA because the
court would effectively be commandeering

the state into implementing a federal
program. This argument misses the mark.
While the federal government cannot require
states to implement a federal program, the
federal government can require the states to
comply with federal law. The named
plaintiffs are arguing that driver education
schools are a “service, program, or activity”
of the TEA. If they are correct, requiring the
TEA to comply with the ADA in providing
driver education would only require the state
itself to comply with federal law, so the anticommandeering doctrine would not be
implicated.
Third, the TEA argues that withholding or
revoking licenses from driver education
schools would only shut down schools, not
improve their compliance with the ADA.
Similarly, the TEA argues that any potential
fines would not necessarily change the
schools' behavior. But it seems highly
unlikely that all driver education schools
would choose to shut their doors or accept
fines rather than comply with the ADA.
Instead, it is likely that the TEA's action
would help redress the named plaintiffs'
injuries. Thus, the redressability requirement
for standing is satisfied.
B. Failure to State a Claim
The named plaintiffs' lawsuit fails on the
merits, however. They sued under both the
Rehabilitation Act and Title II of the ADA. It
is uncontested that the TEA receives federal
funding, which is a prerequisite for
Rehabilitation Act coverage. Besides this
special prerequisite for the Rehabilitation
Act, the ADA and Rehabilitation Act “are
judged under the same legal standards, and
the same remedies are available under both
Acts.” Further, “[t]he parties have not
pointed to any reason why Title II and [the
Rehabilitation Act] should be interpreted
differently.” Thus, “[a]lthough we focus
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primarily on Title II, our analysis is informed
by the Rehabilitation Act, and our holding
applies to both statutes.”
Title II of the ADA provides that “no
qualified individual with a disability shall, by
reason of such disability, be excluded from
participation in or be denied the benefits of
the services, programs, or activities of a
public entity, or be subjected to
discrimination by any such entity.” It is
uncontested that the TEA is a public entity
and that the named plaintiffs are qualified
individuals with disabilities. The key
question is whether the named plaintiffs have
been “excluded from participation in or ...
denied the benefits of the services, programs,
or activities of [the TEA].” To answer that
question, we must decide whether driver
education is a service, program, or activity of
the TEA. We hold that it is not, although this
is a close question for which the statutes,
regulations, and case law provide little
concrete guidance.
Starting with the plain text of Title II of the
ADA, the phrase “services, programs, or
activities of a public entity” is undefined. The
Supreme Court has interpreted the phrase
with reference to what “services, programs,
or activities” are provided by the public
entity. Here, the TEA itself does not teach
driver education, contract with driver
education schools, or issue driver education
certificates to individual students. Instead,
the TEA licenses and regulates private driver
education schools, which in turn teach driver
education and issue certificates. Thus, the
TEA's program provides the licensure and
regulation of driving education schools, not
driver education itself. Title II of the ADA
therefore suggests that driver education is not
a program, service, or activity of the TEA.
The Rehabilitation Act does define “program
or activity,” defining it as “all the operations

of” a public entity. In the context of
interpreting this definition, we have
explained that “Webster's Dictionary broadly
defines ‘operations' as ‘the whole process of
planning for and operating a business or other
organized unit,’ and defines ‘operation’ as ‘a
doing or performing esp[ecially] of action.”
Here, as explained above, the TEA does not
operate or perform driver education because
it does not teach driver education or contract
with the schools that do so. Thus, driver
education seems to fall outside of the ambit
of the Rehabilitation Act's definition of
“program or activity.”
Turning to the regulations, the ADA tasks the
Attorney General with promulgating
regulations that implement Title II. 42 U.S.C.
§ 12134(a). Unfortunately, these regulations
do not further define what it means to be a
service, program, or activity of a public
entity.
The most relevant regulation is 28 C.F.R. §
35.130(b)(1)(v).
Section
35.130(b)(1)
provides that a public entity cannot
discriminate against qualified individuals
with disabilities “in providing any aid,
benefit, or service,” whether the state acts
“directly or through contractual, licensing, or
other arrangements.” Subsection (v), which is
not cited by the parties, provides that a state
may not “[a]id or perpetuate discrimination
against a qualified individual with a disability
by providing significant assistance to an
agency, organization, or person that
discriminates on the basis of disability in
providing any aid, benefit, or service to
beneficiaries of the public entity's program.”
But the regulations simply beg the ultimate
question here. Section 35.130(b)(1) does not
allow a state to discriminate “in providing
any aid, benefit, or service,” but it does not
define what it means for the state to
“provid[e]” an “aid, benefit, or service.” As
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detailed above, the TEA does not provide
driver
education.
Similarly,
section
35.130(b)(1)(v) prohibits a state from aiding
entities
that
discriminate
against
“beneficiaries of the public entity's program,”
but it does not define what it means for a
program to be the “public entity's.” It does
not seem that a program of driver education
belongs to the TEA.
Another regulation provides that “[t]he
programs or activities of entities that are
licensed or certified by a public entity are not,
themselves, covered.” But we agree with the
named plaintiffs that this statement does not
automatically immunize licensed activities
from the ADA's gamut, given that the
regulations also provide that a public entity
cannot discriminate “directly or through
contractual,
licensing,
or
other
arrangements.”
Looking further to the interpretative guidance
provided by the DOJ, the DOJ has
specifically stated that a public entity “is not
accountable for discrimination in the
employment or other practices of [a company
licensed by the public entity], if those
practices are not the result of requirements or
policies established by the [public entity].”
Here, any failure of the driver education
schools to comply with the ADA or
Rehabilitation Act cannot be said to be “the
result of requirements or policies established
by the” TEA. Instead, the named plaintiffs'
claim is at most that the TEA's failure to
establish requirements or policies has
allowed private driver education schools to
be
inaccessible.
Thus,
the
DOJ's
interpretative guidance indicates that the
TEA is not accountable for the driver
education schools' inaccessibility because the
TEA's requirements and policies have not
caused it.

Finally, as to case law, the named plaintiffs
cite two lottery cases as their primary
authority for finding that driver education is
a program of the TEA. In those state supreme
court cases, each court held that the state
lottery was a program of the state lottery
commission, so the ADA required the
commission to make the lottery program
accessible. Thus, even though the
inaccessible lottery agents were private
parties, the commission could be held liable
under the ADA because it ran a lottery
program that was inaccessible as a whole.
But there are two important differences
between these lottery cases and this case.
First, there, it was clear that the lottery
commissions were running lotteries, not just
licensing lottery agents. After all, the lottery
commissions themselves conducted the
lotteries; the agents that sold the tickets were
just one component of that entire program.
Here, in contrast, the TEA just as clearly does
not provide any portion of driver education;
it merely licenses driver education schools.
Second, in the lottery cases, the lottery
commissions contracted with the lottery
providers, which were paid commissions for
acting as agents for the state. Here, there is no
such agency or contractual relationship.
These cases are therefore unpersuasive.
The only other cases that have held a public
entity liable for a private actor's
inaccessibility involved similar situations
where the private actors had a contractual or
agency relationship with the public entity. In
the absence of such a contractual or agency
relationship, courts have routinely held that a
public entity is not liable for a licensed
private actor's behavior.
The importance of a contractual or agency
relationship is also demonstrated by the
DOJ's interpretative guidance, which
provides three examples of a private actor's
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activities being covered by Title II because of
the “close relationship” between the private
actor and a public entity. All three examples
involve some form of contractual or agency
relationship: a restaurant with a “concession
agreement with a State department of parks”;
a “joint venture” between a city and a private
corporation; and a nonprofit organization that
runs group homes “under contract with a
State agency.” Thus, we conclude that the
lack of a contractual or agency relationship
between driver education schools and the
TEA cuts strongly against holding that driver
education is a program of the TEA.
The named plaintiffs essentially argue that
the TEA's pervasive regulation and
supervision of driver education schools
transforms these schools into agents of the
state. But we hold that the mere fact that the
driver education schools are heavily
regulated and supervised by the TEA does
not make these schools a “service, program,
or activity” of the TEA. Otherwise, states and
localities would be required to ensure the
ADA compliance of every heavily-regulated
industry, a result that would raise substantial
policy, economic, and federalism concerns.
Nothing in the ADA or its regulations
mandates or even implies this extreme result.
Thus, we join the Second Circuit in holding
that public entities are not responsible for
ensuring the ADA compliance of even
heavily-regulated industries. Beyond heavy
regulation, the named plaintiffs allege only
that the TEA provides sample course
materials to driver education schools and
sells blank driver education certificates to
them. The provision of such sample course
materials and blank certificates is simply not
enough to turn the schools into proxies for the
TEA.
Admittedly, this case is further complicated
by the fact that the benefit provided by driver
education schools—a driver education

certificate—is necessary for obtaining an
important governmental benefit—a driver's
license. Given the broad remedial purposes of
the ADA, it would be extremely troubling if
deaf young adults were effectively deprived
of driver's licenses simply because they could
not obtain the private education that the State
of Texas has mandated as a prerequisite for
this important government benefit. But this
concern does not transform driver education
into a TEA program or service. Instead, it is
partly resolved by the fact that the ADA
regulations offer a potential avenue for relief
against the DPS. That is, the DPS may well
be required to give exemptions to certain deaf
individuals who cannot obtain driver
education certificates, given that using these
certificates as an eligibility criteria allegedly
“screen[s] out or tend[s] to screen out” deaf
people and may not be “necessary for the
provision of the” driver's license program.
But the named plaintiffs have not sued the
DPS, so we need not decide this issue.
We conclude that the TEA does not provide
the program, service, or activity of driver
education. Thus, it is not required to ensure
that driver education complies with the ADA.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we REVERSE the
district court's order denying the TEA's
motion to dismiss and RENDER judgment
that the case is dismissed with prejudice for
failure to state a claim upon which relief can
be granted.
…
WIENER, Circuit Judge, concurring in part
and dissenting in part:
I concur in the panel majority's holding that
the named plaintiffs have standing to bring
their ADA claims. I respectfully dissent on
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the merits, however, in the firm conviction
that TEA's involvement in driver education in
Texas does constitute a service, program, or
activity under Title II of the ADA, which in
turn requires TEA to ensure that its licensee
driving schools accommodate the deaf.
Convinced that the named plaintiffs have
stated a claim for which relief may be
granted, I would affirm the district court's
judgment denying TEA's motion to dismiss
and permitting the case to proceed on the
merits.
1. Service, Program, or Activity
This case turns entirely on whether Texas,
through TEA, conducts a service, program, or
activity by licensing the driving schools that
train all drivers between 17 and 25 years of
age who seek driver's licenses. As the
majority opinion acknowledges, neither the
statutes and regulations nor the case law
provide a precise definition of “services,
programs, or activities.” We differ, however,
because the guidance to be derived from
these sources inexorably leads me to the
conclusion that the phrase is sufficiently
broad and flexible to apply to TEA's licensing
in this case. The indisputable truism that
virtually every adult, including those
between 17 and 25 years old, must have the
opportunity to be licensed to drive a car (or,
in Texas, a truck), given driving's unique and
indispensable importance in their daily lives,
confirms to me beyond cavil that TEA does
in fact engage in the public “program” of
driver education. That in turn warrants our
mandating that TEA ensure that every
driving school accommodates deaf students.
2. Contract; Agency; Licensing
The majority opinion rests its holding on its
perceived distinction between contractual
and agency relationships, on the one hand,
and licensing relationships on the other. This

to me is a classic distinction without a
difference. First and foremost, no such
dichotomy appears in the text of Title II. As
for the implementing regulations, if the term
“services, programs, or activities” hinged on
the technical legal formalities of agency or
contract and distinguished them based on the
formalities of licensing, such a clear rule
would surely be set out in the text, not
relegated to subtext. The fact that 28 C.F.R.
§ 35.130 is couched in the language of
standards, not rules, suggests that DOJ
interprets Title II to encompass a greater set
of public/private interactions than the
majority opinion recognizes. Indeed, the
regulations explicitly forbid public entities
from engaging in discrimination through
“contractual,
licensing,
or
other
arrangements.” Not only does 28 C.F.R. §
35.130(b)(1) specifically include licensing
regimes, but the breadth of the additional,
catch-all phrase, “other arrangements,” cuts
against the majority's narrow construction
that only contractual or agency relationships
qualify as programs and that licensing does
not. To me, it's not a matter of undefined
labels but of the substance of each particular
public/private relationship.
I also read DOJ's Technical Assistance
Manual as supportive of a more expansive
view of “services, programs, or activities.”
Surely, if the rule to be gleaned from the four
examples in section II–1.3000 were that only
contractual or agency relationships between
public and private entities could invoke dual
Title II and Title III obligations, but that
licensing could not, the manual would have
stated so plainly. Instead, the manual makes
only the general point that, “[i]n many
situations, however, public entities have a
close relationship to private entities that are
covered by title III, with the result that certain
activities may be at least indirectly affected
by both titles.” “Close relationship” is not
synonymous with or restricted to “contractual
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or agency relationship,” and I am reluctant to
so narrow DOJ's language. Rather, I see the
four illustrations that follow not as
delineating the outer limits of what
constitutes a “close relationship,” but as
presenting four non-exclusive, typical
examples of public-private interactions-nonexclusive examples that occur often in the
real world and thus are useful to include as
illustrations. The driver education system at
issue here, however, is sui generis—atypical
if not unique—so it is unsurprising that the
manual presents no close analogy. What the
manual does do, however, is instruct us to
focus on the closeness of the particular
relationship—here, the one between TEA
and private driving schools—not on the
legalistic labeling of the relationship as
licensing.
Finally, the panel majority's perceived
distinction between contractual and agency
relationships and licensing relationships is
nowhere apparent in the limited case law on
this issue. It may well be that a contractual or
agency relationship is a sufficient condition
to finding that a public entity's program
encompasses a private entity's activities, but
it is neither the only one nor a necessary one.5
The critical issue is not whether a contract
exists, but (1) whether a private party
services the beneficiaries of the public
entity's program, and (2) how extensively the
public entity is involved in the functions and
operations of the private entity. If the private
entity does so serve, and the public and
private entities are closely intertwined, then
under those particular circumstances, the
private entity's activities might be fairly
considered an integral and inseparable part of
the public entity's program.
3. TEA and Driving Schools Are Inextricably
Intertwined

The crux of the plaintiffs' case (and mine!) is
that, even though the driving schools perform
the actual day-to-day instruction, instruction
is but one component of the broader program
of driver education that is continually
overseen and regulated in discrete detail by
TEA. When Chapter 1001 of the Texas
Education Code is considered as a whole, it
reveals that TEA superintends a wideranging driver training program in support of
Texas's overarching policy goal of ensuring
safe roads for all. Chapter 1001 does not
merely establish TEA's authority over driver
education—and consequently, its role as
gatekeeper to the uniquely pervasive and
indispensable state function of licensing its
drivers-but also the agency's role in ensuring
driving safety. The named plaintiffs do not
discuss driving safety schools, but it is
notable that Chapter 1001 gives TEA
oversight of both driver education and
driving safety, under the general umbrella of
driver training.
TEA plays a significant hands-on role in
licensing drivers, but its role in driving safety
is anything but remote or marginal. For
example, Texans who receive specified
minor traffic tickets may have those tickets
dismissed if the drivers complete a driving
safety course certified and licensed by TEA.8
The way that the state interfaces driver
training and the receipt of state benefits
indicates that its intimate participation at all
levels of the private driving school industry
is more than merely regulatory. Through
TEA, the state employs and manages this
industry to achieve its own public ends.
Again, the fact that the state's active
involvement in this industry is labeled
licensing does not diminish, much less block,
its qualifying as a program of the state for the
purposes of the ADA.
4. TEA's Role
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The powers granted to TEA in Chapter 1001
further support the view that private driving
instruction forms one component of an
overall state program. This is because TEA
exerts more rigorous oversight of providers
of driver education than would be expected in
most run-of-the-mill licensing regimes.
Every driving school's curriculum must be
approved by TEA, and the agency
“designate[s]” the textbooks that may be
used. Furthermore, TEA's enforcement
powers over driver education schools are
broad and varied—its power to order a peer
review, for example, suggests a greater
degree of involvement in the driving schools'
operations than is typical of a plain vanilla
licensing arrangement. The requirement that
driving school owners and staff be of “good
reputation and character” signals a
heightened level of concern for the reliability
of these schools' services—a concern that is
consistent with TEA as a public provider of a
social services program. Similarly, the fact
that each driver education school must post a
significant bond, payable to TEA for its
direct use in paying refunds to students,
portrays a higher and more intimate level of
agency involvement in these licensees'
activities than would be expected if TEA
were purely a hands-off licensing entity.13
And TEA has the right to inspect every
school physically at least once a year as a
condition of license renewal—more
frequently if the school has a history of
regulatory violations.
Beyond TEA's intertwined involvement with
driver education schools, however, is the fact
that through TEA the state also employs
driver training to teach civic responsibility,
including lessons having nothing to do with
the mechanics of driving. Chapter 1001
requires TEA to ensure that information
about litter prevention and organ donation is
included in all driving courses certified by the
agency. That the Texas Legislature has

chosen to promote these important civic and
community values through the vehicle of
driver training is another indication that the
private driving school industry participates in
a public program of TEA.
All of this makes abundantly clear that driver
education is not merely a passively licensed,
private, for-profit industry, but constitutes a
means by which TEA substantively and
substantially effectuates the policy goals that
the state has charged it with implementing
and maintaining. The fact that driver
education forms part of the academic
curriculum in some public schools only
reinforces the conclusion that this entire
infrastructure is truly a “program” of the state
of Texas.
As the panel majority acknowledges, 28
C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(1)(v) is the regulation that
is most relevant to this case. It contemplates
precisely the instant situation: A public entity
may well discriminate indirectly by
furnishing significant assistance to a private
entity that discriminates directly by failing to
provide the public entity's program to
disabled beneficiaries. The regulation, in
other words, covers a public entity that farms
out the practical implementation of its
program to private entities while retaining
and exercising considerable oversight,
regulation,
and
other
substantive
involvement. In this case, the driving school
students are the direct beneficiaries of TEA's
program, and TEA furnishes operating
licenses and course completion certificates to
private schools that in turn discriminate on
the basis of disability. In my view, the
plaintiffs have stated a viable cause of action:
The State of Texas cannot legislatively
mandate driver education, then evade ADA
responsibility via a “flea-flicker” lateral from
TEA to private licensees.
5. “Parade of Horribles” Is Inapt
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TEA claims that affirming the district court
in this case could lead to requiring the state to
police ADA compliance by all heavily
regulated, licensed industries, such as
massage parlors and tattoo artists—a typical
“parade of horribles” frequently advanced by
desperate public defendants. That may well
be, but the one and only issue before us today
is the discrete driver education scheme
mandated by the Texas legislature and
created and administered by TEA. It is
sufficiently distinct and distinguishable from
all others that affirming the district court
surely will not open those floodgates. There
exist obviously meaningful differences
between this particular public/private
operation and virtually every other private
operation that Texas licenses. TEA's role is
not just about consumer protection, as is the
focus of the several occupational codes cited
by the state. I repeat here for emphasis that,
in this day and age, the driving of private and
personal vehicles is a uniquely important,
pervasive, and indispensable entitlement, and
driving responsibly is a civic duty that the
state seeks to promote with this unique
regulatory scheme that it entrusts to TEA.
Nothing about this is changed by the fact that
state-licensed driver education schools
happen to be private enterprises.
To illustrate this distinction between driver
education and essentially all other heavily
regulated businesses and industries, consider
a hypothetical world in which every driver
education school in Texas shuts down, so that
no person under the age of 25 could obtain a
driver's license via private instruction. Texas
would undoubtedly fill the void itself—
perhaps by adding courses at community
colleges and expanding the driver education
programs that currently exist in its public
schools. But if, by contrast, each and every
massage therapist or tattoo artist school in
Texas were to close, the state surely would
not respond by entering the business of

training massage therapists or tattoo artists.
Unlike driver education schools, those
industries do not serve as private mechanisms
for achieving public ends and public policy.
Viewing the case law from this perspective,
the distinction becomes even more apparent.
Liquor stores, buses to gambling and ski
resorts, and taxi cabs are not services of the
state. Like Kansas, Colorado, and New York,
Texas might well regulate these industries,
but it is not likely to replicate them. Again,
the feature that sets driver education apart
from all the rest is the pervasiveness of
driving private vehicles in a state like Texas.
States regulate other industries to prevent
unlicensed operators from doing harm. In
contrast, driver education alone is a positive
good and an end unto itself. Texas has chosen
to educate drivers via private driving schools,
and it regulates this private industry not
simply to protect consumers from unlicensed
operators, but first and foremost to ensure
that important training goals for this large
segment of the state's adult population are
met to the state's satisfaction. Texas has an
inherent interest in driver education that it
does not have in any of the other licensed
endeavors, accounting for its extensive
involvement through TEA.
Finally, I acknowledge the concern that
requiring TEA to take a more active role in
promoting handicap accessibility in driver
education would unduly expand its role.
True, it may well impose an unanticipated
ADA burden on the agency. Yet Congress
made the conscious calculation to impose this
burden on public entities. In light of this
nation's unseemly history of systematically
excluding persons with disabilities from
public life and public activities, Congress
intentionally wrote the ADA “to provide a
clear and comprehensive national mandate
for the elimination of discrimination.” It
might not be convenient for TEA to require
ADA compliance by its licensed driver
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education schools, but the ADA's sweeping
purpose is clear. And, after all, TEA may rely
on the ADA's safety valve of reasonableness.
Although TEA is obligated to make
“reasonable modifications in policies,
practices, or procedures,” if it finds that such
modifications are too strenuous, it may
“demonstrate that making the modifications
would fundamentally alter the nature of the
service, program, or activity,” and be excused
from compliance. A public entity's
obligations under Title II are broad, but they
are not unlimited.

For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully
dissent from the panel majority's reversal of
the district court's denial of TEA's motion to
dismiss.
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“Supreme Court Takes Up Deaf Texans' Suit Against State”
Texas Tribune
Aneri Pattani
June 30, 2016

A group of deaf Texans fighting what they
claim is discriminatory treatment is hoping
the U.S. Supreme Court will step in and force
the state to provide sign-language interpreters
at classes young drivers must take to get
licenses.
The high court on Tuesday agreed to hear the
case, Ivy v. Morath, involving a group of deaf
Texans who sued the state in 2011. The state
requires first-time driver's license applicants
under age 25 to take classes that are typically
conducted by private companies. The suit
argues that since Texas requires the classes,
it should make sure there are interpreters for
deaf students.
The private companies were regulated and
licensed by the Texas Education Agency
when the suit was filed, but the duties have
since been transferred to the Texas
Department of Licensing and Regulation.
The state argues that since the TEA did not
directly contract with the companies, the state
isn't liable for their compliance with federal
laws on access for the disabled.
Disability advocates hope the nation's high
court will use the case to define when a state
agency is responsible for discrimination
against people with disabilities when that
agency farms out public programs to private
vendors.

The case shines a spotlight on issues that
people with disabilities frequently face, said
Wayne Krause Yang, legal director of the
Texas Civil Rights Project, which is
representing the five deaf plaintiffs.
“This has the potential to be a landmark
decision for deaf rights, and indeed for all
disability rights,” he said. “Folks with
disabilities and the deaf community are often
left in the shadows. The time has come for the
Supreme Court to recognize loudly and
clearly civil rights for folks with disabilities.”
The TEA referred all questions to the state
attorney general’s office, which said it could
not comment on ongoing litigation.
The plaintiffs, who hail from Austin, Dallas,
Plano, Midland and Arlington, say their
requests for sign-language interpreters from
several Texas driver education schools were
denied. They also asked the TEA to provide
accommodations, but those efforts were
unsuccessful. They argue that the Americans
with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation
Act requires Texas to ensure that a mandatory
state program, such as driver education
courses, is accessible to the disabled.
Title II of the ADA, which applies to public
entities, mandates that “no qualified
individual with a disability shall, by reason of
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such disability, be excluded from
participation in or be denied the benefits of
the services, programs, or activities of a
public entity.” Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act includes similar language,
prohibiting discrimination of the disabled in
any “program or activity” receiving federal
funding.
But the phrase “services, programs, or
activities” is not precisely defined, and its
meaning cuts to the heart of the deaf students'
case.
U.S. District Judge Lee Yeakel ruled in favor
of the plaintiffs in 2013, but the U.S. 5th
Circuit Court of Appeals, in a 2-1 decision,
dismissed the case in 2015, saying that driver
education is not a service, program, or
activity of the TEA.
“We hold that the mere fact that the driver
education schools are heavily regulated and
supervised by the TEA does not make these
schools a ‘service, program, or activity’ of
the TEA,” the court’s opinion said.
“Otherwise, states and localities would be
required to ensure the ADA compliance of
every heavily regulated industry, a result that
would raise substantial policy, economic, and
federalism concerns.”

“The schools could not exist if not for the
TEA,” Krause Yang said, “and there would
be no driver training that the TEA is
responsible for doing if the driving schools
didn’t provide the classes. They work as a
team.”
Rather than suing each individual driving
school, Krause Yang said the plaintiffs want
to hold the state accountable for ensuring
private entities it works with provide
disability accommodations.
Lucy Wood, clinical professor of law at UTAustin, said she believes this case could
clarify what constitutes a “program, service,
or activity” once and for all, eliminating
potential loopholes in the ADA.
"This case is important because it, hopefully,
will eliminate state's' ability to avoid Title II
responsibility through various arrangements
with private entities,” she said.

The plaintiffs appealed, arguing to the
Supreme Court that the circuit’s ruling
overlooked how intertwined the TEA and
private driver education schools were. The
TEA — and the licensing and regulation
department after it — evaluate and license the
schools, approve the course materials, certify
the instructors and provide the school with
unique course completion certificates for
each student.
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“Supreme Court To Hear Deaf Texans' Drivers Ed Appeal”
Law 360
Michelle Casady
June 28, 2016

The U.S. Supreme Court on Tuesday agreed
to review a lawsuit brought by a group of deaf
Texas residents who allege the state's driver
education requirements prevent them from
receiving licenses, in violation of the
Americans with Disabilities Act.
The high court on Tuesday granted certiorari
in the case that the Fifth Circuit had
dismissed with prejudice in March 2015 after
finding that the class of deaf students —
requesting that the TEA bring its driver
education course in compliance with the
ADA — had failed to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted. The Texas
Education Agency, the Fifth Circuit held, did
not provide the driving instruction but only
licensed the private schools that did, meaning
it isn't required to ensure ADA compliance.
In July 2015 the Fifth Circuit denied named
plaintiff Donnika Ivy's petition for an en banc
rehearing of the case, and in October she filed
her petition with the nation's high court.
The Fifth Circuit wrote in March 2015 that it
would be “extremely troubling” if deaf
residents were deprived of driver's licenses
because the private education Texas has
mandated as a prerequisite for the license is
unavailable to them.

“But this concern does not transform driver
education into a TEA program or service,”
the court wrote.
The court noted that there's a possible avenue
for relief via the ADA as it relates to the
state's Department of Public Safety, as it may
be required to give exemptions to deaf
individuals in this situation.
“But the named plaintiffs have not sued the
DPS, so we need not decide this issue,” the
opinion reads. “We conclude that the TEA
does not provide the program, service, or
activity of driver education. Thus, it is not
required to ensure that driver education
complies with the ADA.”
The class of plaintiffs comprises deaf Texas
residents between the ages of 16 and 25 who
alleged they couldn't obtain a driver's license
in the state. According to court documents,
the plaintiffs contacted a number of drivereducation schools and were refused
accommodations, like an American Sign
Language interpreter, that would have
allowed them to complete the course.
Additionally, before filing suit, Ivy and
others contacted Heather Bise, a deafresource specialist, who also reached out to
the TEA on their behalf without luck.
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In its brief asking the Fifth Circuit to toss the
case filed in May 2014, the state had argued
that if the district court's interpretation of the
ADA was allowed to stand, the TEA would
be required to use its limited resources to
police ADA compliance in private
businesses.
“And all kinds of other private businesses
licensed by state agencies might also be
subject to previously unanticipated oversight
by those agencies, which presumably also
would be charged with adopting and
enforcing their own regulations to ensure
compliance with the ADA (and presumably
other federal laws),” the brief reads.

The parties did not immediately respond
Tuesday to requests for comment.
The state is represented by Richard B. Farrer,
Jonathan F. Mitchell and Daniel T. Hodge of
the Texas Attorney General's Office.
The plainiffs are represented by Joe T.
Sanders I and Olga Kobzar of Scott,
Douglass & McConnico and James C.
Harrington and Joseph P. Berra of the Texas
Civil Rights Project.
The case is Donnika Ivy et al. v. Mike Morath,
in his official capacity as head of the Texas
Education Agency, case number 15-486, in
the U.S. Supreme Court.

In a reply brief from the class of hearing
impaired individuals, they attacked the TEA's
argument that the lower court's decision
could lead to the TEA policing other entities,
like barber shops and massage therapy
schools.
“But not one of the statutes for the licensure
of the businesses the TEA cites in its brief
expressly conditions the receipt of a license
on compliance with state and federal law,”
the brief reads. “Unlike driver education, the
state does not mandate that the state citizens
patronize these businesses, and its
involvement in those industries is limited to
mere licensing.”
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G.G. v. Gloucester
15-8049
Ruling Below: G.G. ex rel. Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 822 F.3d 709 (4th Cir. 2016)
G.G. brought action against the Gloucester County School Board under the Equal Protection
Clause and Title IX. The plaintiff specifically challenged the school board’s policy of requiring
students to use the school’s sex-segregated bathrooms in accordance with their birth sex, not
their gender identity. The plaintiff moved for a preliminary injunction to be allowed to use the
boys’ restroom. The school board filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The
District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia dismissed the Title IX claim and denied the
preliminary injunction. The student appealed. The Court of Appeals held that the Department of
Education’s instruction to treat student’s according to their gender identity was entitled to
deference. The school board applied for a grant of certiorari from the Supreme Court.
Question Presented: Whether, under Title IX, schools must treat students consistent with their
gender identity with regards to sex-segregated bathrooms.

G.G., by his next friend and mother, Deirdre GRIMM, Plaintiff–Appellant,
v.
GLOUCESTER COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD, Defendant–Appellee.
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit
Decided on April 19, 2016
[Excerpt; some citations and footnotes omitted]

FLOYD, Circuit Judge:
G.G., a transgender boy, seeks to use the
boys' restrooms at his high school. After G.G.
began to use the boys' restrooms with the
approval of the school administration, the
local school board passed a policy banning
G.G. from the boys' restroom. G.G. alleges
that the school board impermissibly
discriminated against him in violation of
Title IX and the Equal Protection Clause of
the Constitution. The district court dismissed
G.G.'s Title IX claim and denied his request
for a preliminary injunction. This appeal

followed. Because we conclude the district
court did not accord appropriate deference to
the relevant Department of Education
regulations, we reverse its dismissal of G.G.'s
Title IX claim. Because we conclude that the
district court used the wrong evidentiary
standard in assessing G.G.'s motion for a
preliminary injunction, we vacate its denial
and remand for consideration under the
correct standard. We therefore reverse in
part, vacate in part, and remand the case for
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further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
I.
At the heart of this appeal is whether Title IX
requires schools to provide transgender
students access to restrooms congruent with
their gender identity. Title IX provides: “[n]o
person ... shall, on the basis of sex, be
excluded from participation in, be denied the
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination
under any education program or activity
receiving Federal financial assistance.” The
Department of Education's (the Department)
regulations implementing Title IX permit the
provision of “separate toilet, locker room,
and shower facilities on the basis of sex, but
such facilities provided for students of one
sex shall be comparable to such facilities for
students of the other sex.” In an opinion letter
dated January 7, 2015, the Department's
Office for Civil Rights (OCR) interpreted
how this regulation should apply to
transgender individuals: “When a school
elects to separate or treat students differently
on the basis of sex ... a school generally must
treat transgender students consistent with
their gender identity.” Because this case
comes to us after dismissal pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the
facts below are generally as stated in G.G.'s
complaint.
A.
G.G. is a transgender boy now in his junior
year at Gloucester High School. G.G.'s birthassigned sex, or so-called “biological sex,” is
female, but G.G.'s gender identity is male.
G.G. has been diagnosed with gender
dysphoria, a medical condition characterized
by clinically significant distress caused by an
incongruence between a person's gender
identity and the person's birth-assigned sex.
Since the end of his freshman year, G.G. has

undergone hormone therapy and has legally
changed his name to G., a traditionally male
name. G.G. lives all aspects of his life as a
boy. G.G. has not, however, had sex
reassignment surgery.
Before beginning his sophomore year, G.G.
and his mother told school officials that G.G.
was a transgender boy. The officials were
supportive and took steps to ensure that he
would be treated as a boy by teachers and
staff. Later, at G.G.'s request, school officials
allowed G.G. to use the boys' restroom. G.G.
used this restroom without incident for about
seven weeks. G.G.'s use of the boys'
restroom, however, excited the interest of
others in the community, some of whom
contacted the Gloucester County School
Board (the Board) seeking to bar G.G. from
continuing to use the boys' restroom.
Board Member Carla B. Hook (Hook) added
an item to the agenda for the November 11,
2014 board meeting titled “Discussion of Use
of Restrooms/Locker Room Facilities.” Hook
proposed
the
following
resolution
(hereinafter the “transgender restroom
policy” or “the policy”):
Whereas the GCPS [i.e., Gloucester
County Public Schools] recognizes
that some students question their
gender identities, and
Whereas the GCPS encourages such
students to seek support, advice, and
guidance from parents, professionals
and other trusted adults, and
Whereas the GCPS seeks to provide a
safe learning environment for all
students and to protect the privacy of
all students, therefore
It shall be the practice of the GCPS to
provide male and female restroom
and locker room facilities in its
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schools, and the use of said facilities
shall be limited to the corresponding
biological genders, and students with
gender identity issues shall be
provided an alternative appropriate
private facility.
At the November 11, 2014 meeting twentyseven people spoke during the Citizens'
Comment Period, a majority of whom
supported Hook's proposed resolution. Many
of the speakers displayed hostility to G.G.,
including by referring pointedly to him as a
“young lady.” Others claimed that permitting
G.G. to use the boys' restroom would violate
the privacy of other students and would lead
to sexual assault in restrooms. One
commenter suggested that if the proposed
policy were not adopted, non-transgender
boys would come to school wearing dresses
in order to gain access to the girls' restrooms.
G.G. and his parents spoke against the
proposed policy. Ultimately, the Board
postponed a vote on the policy until its next
meeting on December 9, 2014.
At the December 9 meeting, approximately
thirty-seven people spoke during the
Citizens' Comment Period. Again, most of
those who spoke were in favor of the
proposed resolution. Some speakers
threatened to vote the Board members out of
office if the Board members voted against the
proposed policy. Speakers again referred to
G.G. as a “girl” or “young lady.” One speaker
called G.G. a “freak” and compared him to a
person who thinks he is a “dog” and wants to
urinate on fire hydrants. Following this
second comment period, the Board voted 6–
1 to adopt the proposed policy, thereby
barring G.G. from using the boys' restroom at
school.
G.G. alleges that he cannot use the girls'
restroom because women and girls in those
facilities “react[ ] negatively because they

perceive[ ] G.G. to be a boy.” Further, using
the girls' restroom would “cause severe
psychological distress” to G.G. and would be
incompatible with his treatment for gender
dysphoria. As a corollary to the policy, the
Board announced a series of updates to the
school's restrooms to improve general
privacy for all students, including adding or
expanding partitions between urinals in male
restrooms, adding privacy strips to the doors
of stalls in all restrooms, and constructing
single-stall unisex restrooms available to all
students. G.G. alleges that he cannot use
these new unisex restrooms because they
“make him feel even more stigmatized ....
Being required to use the separate restrooms
sets him apart from his peers, and serves as a
daily reminder that the school views him as
‘different.’ ” G.G. further alleges that,
because of this stigma and exclusion, his
social transition is undermined and he
experiences “severe and persistent emotional
and social harms.” G.G. avoids using the
restroom while at school and has, as a result
of this avoidance, developed multiple urinary
tract infections.
B.
G.G. sued the Board on June 11, 2015. G.G.
seeks an injunction allowing him to use the
boys' restroom and brings underlying claims
that the Board impermissibly discriminated
against him in violation of Title IX of the
Education Amendments Act of 1972 and the
Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution.
On July 27, 2015, the district court held a
hearing on G.G.'s motion for a preliminary
injunction and on the Board's motion to
dismiss G.G.'s lawsuit. At the hearing, the
district court orally dismissed G.G.'s Title IX
claim and denied his request for a preliminary
injunction, but withheld ruling on the motion
to dismiss G.G.'s equal protection claim. The
district court followed its ruling from the
bench with a written order dated September
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4, 2015 denying the injunction and a second
written order dated September 17, 2015
dismissing G.G.'s Title IX claim and
expanding on its rationale for denying the
injunction.
In its September 17, 2015 order, the district
court reasoned that Title IX prohibits
discrimination on the basis of sex and not on
the basis of other concepts such as gender,
gender identity, or sexual orientation. The
district court observed that the regulations
implementing Title IX specifically allow
schools to provide separate restrooms on the
basis of sex. The district court concluded that
G.G.'s sex was female and that requiring him
to use the female restroom facilities did not
impermissibly discriminate against him on
the basis of sex in violation of Title IX. With
respect to G.G.'s request for an injunction, the
district court found that G.G. had not made
the required showing that the balance of
equities was in his favor. The district court
found that requiring G.G. to use the unisex
restrooms during the pendency of this lawsuit
was not unduly burdensome and would result
in less hardship than requiring other students
made uncomfortable by G.G.'s presence in
the boys' restroom to themselves use the
unisex restrooms.
This appeal followed. G.G. asks us to reverse
the district court's dismissal of his Title IX
claim, grant the injunction he seeks, and,
because of comments made by the district
judge during the motion hearing, to assign the
case to a different district judge on remand.
The Board, on the other hand, asks us to
affirm the district court's rulings and also asks
us to dismiss G.G.'s equal protection claim—
on which the district court has yet to rule—as
without merit. The United States, as it did
below, has filed an amicus brief supporting
G.G.'s Title IX claim in order to defend the
government's interpretation of Title IX as
requiring schools to provide transgender

students access to restrooms congruent with
their gender identity.
II.
We turn first to the district court's dismissal
of G.G.'s Title IX claim. We review de novo
the district court's grant of a motion to
dismiss. “To survive a motion to dismiss, a
complaint must contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.”
As noted earlier, Title IX provides: “[n]o
person ... shall, on the basis of sex, be
excluded from participation in, be denied the
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination
under any education program or activity
receiving Federal financial assistance.” To
allege a violation of Title IX, G.G. must
allege (1) that he was excluded from
participation in an education program
because of his sex; (2) that the educational
institution was receiving federal financial
assistance at the time of his exclusion; and (3)
that the improper discrimination caused G.G.
harm. We look to case law interpreting Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 for
guidance in evaluating a claim brought under
Title IX.
Not all distinctions on the basis of sex are
impermissible under Title IX. For example,
Title IX permits the provision of separate
living facilities on the basis of sex: “nothing
contained [in Title IX] shall be construed to
prohibit any educational institution receiving
funds under this Act, from maintaining
separate living facilities for the different
sexes.” The Department's regulations
implementing Title IX permit the provision
of “separate toilet, locker room, and shower
facilities on the basis of sex, but such
facilities provided for students of one sex
shall be comparable to such facilities
provided for students of the other sex.” The
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Department recently delineated how this
regulation should be applied to transgender
individuals. In an opinion letter dated January
7, 2015, the Department's Office for Civil
Rights (OCR) wrote: “When a school elects
to separate or treat students differently on the
basis of sex ... a school generally must treat
transgender students consistent with their
gender identity.”
A.
G.G., and the United States as amicus curiae,
ask us to give the Department's interpretation
of its own regulation controlling weight
pursuant to Auer v. Robbins. Auer requires
that an agency's interpretation of its own
ambiguous regulation be given controlling
weight unless the interpretation is plainly
erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation
or statute. Agency interpretations need not be
well-settled or long-standing to be entitled to
deference. They must, however, “reflect the
agency's fair and considered judgment on the
matter in question.” An interpretation may
not be the result of the agency's fair and
considered judgment, and will not be
accorded Auer deference, when the
interpretation conflicts with a prior
interpretation, when it appears that the
interpretation is no more than a convenient
litigating position, or when the interpretation
is a post hoc rationalization.
The district court declined to afford
deference to the Department's interpretation
of 34 C.F.R. § 106.33. The district court
found the regulation to be unambiguous
because “[i]t clearly allows the School Board
to limit bathroom access ‘on the basis of sex,’
including birth or biological sex.” The district
court also found, alternatively, that the
interpretation advanced by the Department
was clearly erroneous and inconsistent with
the regulation. The district court reasoned
that, because “on the basis of sex” means, at

most, on the basis of sex and gender together,
it cannot mean on the basis of gender alone.
The United States contends that the
regulation clarifies statutory ambiguity by
making clear that schools may provide
separate restrooms for boys and girls
“without running afoul of Title IX.”
However, the Department also considers §
106.33 itself to be ambiguous as to
transgender students because “the regulation
is silent on what the phrases ‘students of one
sex’ and ‘students of the other sex’ mean in
the context of transgender students.” The
United States contends that the interpretation
contained in OCR's January 7, 2015 letter
resolves the ambiguity in § 106.33 as that
regulation applies to transgender individuals.
B.
We will not accord an agency's interpretation
of an unambiguous regulation Auer
deference. Thus, our analysis begins with a
determination of whether 34 C.F.R. § 106.33
contains an ambiguity. Section 106.33
permits schools to provide “separate toilet,
locker room, and shower facilities on the
basis of sex, but such facilities provided for
students of one sex shall be comparable to
such facilities provided for students of the
other sex.”
“[D]etermining whether a regulation or
statute is ambiguous presents a legal
question, which we determine de novo.” We
determine ambiguity by analyzing the
language under the three-part framework set
forth in Robinson v. Shell Oil Co. The
plainness or ambiguity of language is
determined by reference to (1) the language
itself, (2) the specific context in which that
language is used, and (3) the broader context
of the statute or regulation as a whole.
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First, we have little difficulty concluding that
the language itself—“of one sex” and “of the
other sex”—refers to male and female
students. Second, in the specific context of §
106.33, the plain meaning of the regulatory
language is best stated by the United States:
“the mere act of providing separate restroom
facilities for males and females does not
violate Title IX ....” the language “of one sex”
and “of the other sex” appears repeatedly in
the broader context of 34 C.F.R. § 106
Subpart D, titled “Discrimination on the
Basis of Sex in Education Programs or
Activities Prohibited.” This repeated
formulation indicates two sexes (“one sex”
and “the other sex”), and the only reasonable
reading of the language used throughout the
relevant regulatory section is that it
references male and female. Read plainly
then, § 106.33 permits schools to provide
separate toilet, locker room, and shower
facilities for its male and female students. By
implication, the regulation also permits
schools to exclude males from the female
facilities and vice-versa.
Our inquiry is not ended, however, by this
straightforward conclusion. Although the
regulation may refer unambiguously to males
and females, it is silent as to how a school
should determine whether a transgender
individual is a male or female for the purpose
of access to sex-segregated restrooms. We
conclude that the regulation is susceptible to
more than one plausible reading because it
permits both the Board's reading—
determining maleness or femaleness with
reference exclusively to genitalia—and the
Department's interpretation—determining
maleness or femaleness with reference to
gender identity. It is not clear to us how the
regulation would apply in a number of
situations—even under the Board's own
“biological gender” formulation. For
example, which restroom would a
transgender individual who had undergone

sex- reassignment surgery use? What about
an intersex individual? What about an
individual born with X–X–Y sex
chromosomes? What about an individual
who lost external genitalia in an accident?
The Department's interpretation resolves
ambiguity by providing that in the case of a
transgender individual using a sexsegregated facility, the individual's sex as
male or female is to be generally determined
by reference to the student's gender identity.
C.
Because we conclude that the regulation is
ambiguous as applied to transgender
individuals, the Department's interpretation
is entitled to Auer deference unless the Board
demonstrates that the interpretation is plainly
erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation
or statute. “Our review of the agency's
interpretation in this context is therefore
highly deferential.” “It is well established
that an agency's interpretation need not be the
only possible reading of a regulation—or
even the best one—to prevail.” An agency's
view need only be reasonable to warrant
deference.
Title IX regulations were promulgated by the
Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare in 1975 and were adopted
unchanged by the Department in 1980. Two
dictionaries from the drafting era inform our
analysis of how the term “sex” was
understood at that time. The first defines
“sex” as “the character of being either male
or female” or “the sum of those anatomical
and physiological differences with reference
to which the male and female are
distinguished....” The second defines “sex”
as:
the sum of the morphological,
physiological,
and
behavioral
peculiarities of living beings that
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subserves biparental reproduction
with its concomitant genetic
segregation and recombination which
underlie most evolutionary change,
that in its typical dichotomous
occurrence is usu[ally] genetically
controlled and associated with special
sex chromosomes, and that is
typically manifested as maleness and
femaleness ....
Although these definitions suggest that the
word “sex” was understood at the time the
regulation was adopted to connote male and
female and that maleness and femaleness
were determined primarily by reference to
the factors the district court termed
“biological sex,” namely reproductive
organs, the definitions also suggest that a
hard-and-fast binary division on the basis of
reproductive organs—although useful in
most cases—was not universally descriptive.
The dictionaries, therefore, used qualifiers
such as reference to the “sum of” various
factors, “typical dichotomous occurrence,”
and “typically manifested as maleness and
femaleness.” Section 106.33 assumes a
student population composed of individuals
of what has traditionally been understood as
the usual “dichotomous occurrence” of male
and female where the various indicators of
sex all point in the same direction. It sheds
little light on how exactly to determine the
“character of being either male or female”
where those indicators diverge.
We conclude that the Department's
interpretation of how § 106.33 and its
underlying assumptions should apply to
transgender individuals is not plainly
erroneous or inconsistent with the text of the
regulation. The regulation is silent as to
which restroom transgender individuals are
to use when a school elects to provide sexsegregated restrooms, and the Department's
interpretation, although perhaps not the

intuitive one, is permitted by the varying
physical, psychological, and social aspects—
or, in the words of an older dictionary, “the
morphological, physiological, and behavioral
peculiarities”—included in the term “sex.”
D.
Finally, we consider whether the
Department's interpretation of § 106.33 is the
result of the agency's fair and considered
judgment. Even a valid interpretation will not
be accorded Auer deference where it conflicts
with a prior interpretation, where it appears
that the interpretation is no more than a
convenient litigating position, or where the
interpretation is a post hoc rationalization.
Although the Department's interpretation is
novel because there was no interpretation as
to how § 106.33 applied to transgender
individuals before January 2015, “novelty
alone is no reason to refuse deference” and
does not render the current interpretation
inconsistent with prior agency practice. As
the United States explains, the issue in this
case “did not arise until recently,” see id.,
because schools have only recently begun
citing § 106.33 as justification for enacting
new policies restricting transgender students'
access to restroom facilities. The Department
contends that “[i]t is to those ‘newfound’
policies that [the Department's] interpretation
of the regulation responds.” We see no reason
to doubt this explanation.
Nor is the interpretation merely a convenient
litigating position. The Department has
consistently enforced this position since
2014. Finally, this interpretation cannot
properly be considered a post hoc
rationalization because it is in line with the
existing guidances and regulations of a
number of federal agencies—all of which
provide that transgender individuals should
be permitted access to the restroom that
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corresponds with their gender identities.
None of the Christopher grounds for
withholding Auer deference are present in
this case.
E.
We conclude that the Department's
interpretation of its own regulation, § 106.33,
as it relates to restroom access by transgender
individuals, is entitled to Auer deference and
is to be accorded controlling weight in this
case.9 We reverse the district court's contrary
conclusion and its resultant dismissal of
G.G.'s Title IX claim.

to be accorded controlling weight. In a case
such as this, where there is no constitutional
challenge to the regulation or agency
interpretation, the weighing of privacy
interests
or
safety
concerns11—
fundamentally questions of policy—is a task
committed to the agency, not to the courts.
The Supreme Court's admonition in Chevron
points to the balance courts must strike:

In many respects, we are in agreement with
the dissent. We agree that “sex” should be
construed uniformly throughout Title IX and
its implementing regulations. We agree that it
has indeed been commonplace and widely
accepted to separate public restrooms, locker
rooms, and shower facilities on the basis of
sex. We agree that “an individual has a
legitimate and important interest in bodily
privacy such that his or her nude or partially
nude body, genitalia, and other private parts”
are not involuntarily exposed. It is not
apparent to us, however, that the truth of
these propositions undermines the conclusion
we reach regarding the level of deference due
to the Department's interpretation of its own
regulations.

Judges are not experts in the field, and
are not part of either political branch
of the Government. Courts must, in
some cases, reconcile competing
political interests, but not on the basis
of the judges' personal policy
preferences. In contrast, an agency to
which Congress has delegated policymaking responsibilities may, within
the limits of that delegation, properly
rely
upon
the
incumbent
administration's views of wise policy
to inform its judgments. While
agencies are not directly accountable
to the people, the Chief Executive is,
and it is entirely appropriate for this
political branch of the Government to
make such policy choices—resolving
the competing interests which
Congress itself either inadvertently
did not resolve, or intentionally left to
be resolved by the agency charged
with the administration of the statute
in light of everyday realities.

The Supreme Court commands the use of
particular analytical frameworks when courts
review the actions of the executive agencies.
G.G. claims that he is entitled to use the boys'
restroom pursuant to the Department's
interpretation of its regulations implementing
Title IX. We have carefully followed the
Supreme Court's guidance in Chevron, Auer,
and Christopher and have determined that the
interpretation contained in the OCR letter is

Not only may a subsequent administration
choose to implement a different policy, but
Congress may also, of course, revise Title IX
explicitly to prohibit or authorize the course
charted here by the Department regarding the
use of restrooms by transgender students. To
the extent the dissent critiques the result we
reach today on policy grounds, we reply that,
our Auer analysis complete, we leave policy
formulation to the political branches.

F.
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III.
G.G. also asks us to reverse the district court's
denial of the preliminary injunction he sought
which would have allowed him to use the
boys' restroom during the pendency of this
lawsuit. “To win such a preliminary
injunction, Plaintiffs must demonstrate that
(1) they are likely to succeed on the merits;
(2) they will likely suffer irreparable harm
absent an injunction; (3) the balance of
hardships weighs in their favor; and (4) the
injunction is in the public interest.” We
review a district court's denial of a
preliminary injunction for abuse of
discretion. “A district court has abused its
discretion if its decision is guided by
erroneous legal principles or rests upon a
clearly erroneous factual finding.” “We do
not ask whether we would have come to the
same conclusion as the district court if we
were examining the matter de novo.” Instead,
“we reverse for abuse of discretion if we form
a definite and firm conviction that the court
below committed a clear error of judgment in
the conclusion it reached upon a weighing of
the relevant factors.”
The district court analyzed G.G.'s request
only with reference to the third factor—the
balance of hardships—and found that the
balance of hardships did not weigh in G.G.'s
favor. G.G. submitted two declarations in
support of his complaint, one from G.G.
himself and one from a medical expert, Dr.
Randi Ettner, to explain what harms G.G.
will suffer as a result of his exclusion from
the boys' restroom. The district court refused
to consider this evidence because it was
“replete with inadmissible evidence
including thoughts of others, hearsay, and
suppositions.”
The district court misstated the evidentiary
standard governing preliminary injunction
hearings. The district court stated: “The

complaint is no longer the deciding factor,
admissible evidence is the deciding factor.
Evidence therefore must conform to the rules
of evidence.” Preliminary injunctions,
however, are governed by less strict rules of
evidence:
The purpose of a preliminary
injunction is merely to preserve the
relative positions of the parties until a
trial on the merits can be held. Given
this limited purpose, and given the
haste that is often necessary if those
positions are to be preserved, a
preliminary injunction is customarily
granted on the basis of procedures
that are less formal and evidence that
is less complete than in a trial on the
merits.
Thus, although admissible evidence may be
more persuasive than inadmissible evidence
in the preliminary injunction context, it was
error for the district court to summarily reject
G.G.'s proffered evidence because it may
have been inadmissible at a subsequent trial.
Additionally, the district court completely
excluded some of G.G.'s proffered evidence
on hearsay grounds. The seven of our sister
circuits to have considered the admissibility
of hearsay in preliminary injunction
proceedings have decided that the nature of
evidence as hearsay goes to “weight, not
preclusion” and have permitted district courts
to “rely on hearsay evidence for the limited
purpose of determining whether to award a
preliminary injunction.” We see no reason for
a different rule to govern in this Circuit.
Because preliminary injunction proceedings
are informal ones designed to prevent
irreparable harm before a later trial governed
by the full rigor of usual evidentiary
standards, district courts may look to, and
indeed in appropriate circumstances rely on,
hearsay or other inadmissible evidence when
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deciding whether a preliminary injunction is
warranted.
Because the district court evaluated G.G.'s
proffered evidence against a stricter
evidentiary standard than is warranted by the
nature and purpose of preliminary injunction
proceedings to prevent irreparable harm
before a full trial on the merits, the district
court was “guided by erroneous legal
principles.” We therefore conclude that the
district court abused its discretion when it
denied G.G.'s request for a preliminary
injunction without considering G.G.'s
proffered evidence. We vacate the district
court's denial of G.G.'s motion for a
preliminary injunction and remand the case
to the district court for consideration of
G.G.'s evidence in light of the evidentiary
standards set forth herein.

G.G. argues that both the first and second
Guglielmi factors are satisfied. He contends
that the district court has pre-existing views
which it would be unwilling to put aside in
the face of contrary evidence about medical
science generally and about “gender and
sexuality in particular.” For example, the
court accepted the Board's “mating” concern
by noting:
There are only two instincts—two.
Everything else is acquired—
everything. That is, the brain only has
two instincts. One is called selfpreservation, and the other is
procreation. And procreation is the
highest instinct in individuals who are
in the latter part of their teen-age
years. All of that is accepted by all
medical science, as far as I can
determine in reading information.

IV.
Finally, G.G. requests that we reassign this
case to a different district judge on remand.
G.G. does not explicitly claim that the district
judge is biased. Absent such a claim,
reassignment is only appropriate in “unusual
circumstances where both for the judge's sake
and the appearance of justice an assignment
to a different judge is salutary and in the
public interest, especially as it minimizes
even a suspicion of partiality.” In
determining whether such circumstances
exist, a court should consider: (1) whether the
original judge would reasonably be expected
upon remand to have substantial difficulty in
putting out of his or her mind previously
expressed views or findings determined to be
erroneous or based on evidence that must be
rejected, (2) whether reassignment is
advisable to preserve the appearance of
justice, and (3) whether reassignment would
entail waste and duplication out of proportion
to any gain in preserving the appearance of
fairness.

The district court also expressed skepticism
that medical science supported the
proposition that one could develop a urinary
tract infection from withholding urine for too
long. The district court characterized gender
dysphoria as a “mental disorder” and resisted
several attempts by counsel for G.G. to
clarify that it only becomes a disorder when
left untreated. The district court also seemed
to reject G.G.'s representation of what it
meant to be transgender, repeatedly noting
that G.G. “wants” to be a boy and not a girl,
but that “he is biologically a female.” The
district court's memorandum opinion,
however, included none of the extraneous
remarks or suppositions that marred the
hearing.
Reassignment is an unusual step at this early
stage of litigation. Although the district court
did express opinions about medical facts and
skepticism of G.G.'s claims, the record does
not clearly indicate that the district judge
would refuse to consider and credit sound
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contrary evidence. Further, although the
district court has a distinct way of proceeding
in court, the hearing record and the district
court's written order in the case do not raise
in our minds a question about the
fundamental fairness of the proceedings,
however idiosyncratic. The conduct of the
district judge does not at this point satisfy the
Guglielmi standard. We deny G.G.'s request
for reassignment to a different district judge
on remand.
V.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of
the district court is
REVERSED IN PART, VACATED IN
PART, AND REMANDED.
DAVIS, Senior Circuit Judge, concurring:
I concur in Judge Floyd's fine opinion. I write
separately, however, to note that while I am
happy to join in the remand of this matter to
the district court so that it may consider
G.G.'s evidence under proper legal standards
in the first instance, this Court would be on
sound ground in granting the requested
preliminary injunction on the undisputed
facts in the record.
I.
In order to obtain a preliminary injunction,
G.G. must demonstrate that (1) he is likely to
succeed on the merits, (2) he is likely to suffer
irreparable harm in the absence of an
injunction, (3) the balance of hardships tips
in his favor, and (4) the requested injunction
is in the public interest. The record before us
establishes that G.G. has done so.
A.

G.G. alleges that by singling him out for
different treatment because he is transgender,
the Board's restroom policy discriminates
against him “on the basis of sex” in violation
of Title IX. In light of the weight of circuit
authority concluding that discrimination
against transgender individuals constitutes
discrimination “on the basis of sex” in the
context of analogous statutes and our holding
here that the Department's interpretation of
34 C.F.R. § 106.33 is to be given controlling
weight, G.G. has surely demonstrated a
likelihood of success on the merits of his Title
IX claim.
B.
In support of his claim of irreparable harm,
G.G. submitted an affidavit to the district
court describing the psychological distress he
experiences when he is forced to use the
single-stall restrooms or the restroom in the
nurse's office. His affidavit also indicates that
he has “repeatedly developed painful urinary
tract infections” as a result of holding his
urine in order to avoid using the restroom at
school.
An expert declaration by Dr. Randi Ettner, a
psychologist specializing in working with
children and adolescents with gender
dysphoria, provides further support for G.G.'s
claim of irreparable harm. In her affidavit,
Dr. Ettner indicates that treating a
transgender boy as male in some situations
but not in others is “inconsistent with
evidence-based medical practice and
detrimental to the health and well-being of
the child” and explains why access to a
restroom appropriate to one's gender identity
is important for transgender youth. With
respect to G.G. in particular, Dr. Ettner states
that in her professional opinion, the Board's
restroom policy “is currently causing
emotional distress to an extremely vulnerable
youth and placing G.G. at risk for accruing
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lifelong psychological harm.” In particular,
Dr. Ettner opines that:
“[a]s a result of the School Board's
restroom policy, ... G.G. is put in the
humiliating position of having to use
a
separate
facility,
thereby
accentuating
his
‘otherness,’
undermining his identity formation,
and impeding his medically necessary
social transition process. The shame
of being singled out and stigmatized
in his daily life every time he needs to
use the restroom is a devastating blow
to G.G. and places him at extreme risk
for immediate and long-term
psychological harm.”
The Board offers nothing to contradict any of
the assertions concerning irreparable harm in
G.G.'s or Dr. Ettner's affidavits. Instead, its
arguments focus on what is purportedly
lacking from G.G.'s presentation in support
of his claim of irreparable harm, such as
“evidence that [his feelings of dysphoria,
anxiety, and distress] would be lessened by
using the boy[s'] restroom,” evidence from
his treating psychologist, medical evidence,
and an opinion from Dr. Ettner
“differentiating between the distress that
G.G. may suffer by not using the boy[s']
bathroom during the course of this litigation
and the distress that he has apparently been
living with since age 12.”
As to the alleged deficiency concerning Dr.
Ettner's opinion, the Board's argument is
belied by Dr. Ettner's affidavit itself, which,
as quoted above, provides her opinion about
the psychological harm that G.G. is
experiencing “[a]s a result of the School
Board's restroom policy.” With respect to the
other purported inadequacies, the absence of
such evidence does nothing to undermine the
uncontroverted statements concerning the
daily psychological harm G.G. experiences

as a result of the Board's policy or Dr. Ettner's
unchallenged opinion concerning the
significant long-term consequences of that
harm. Moreover, the Board offers no
argument to counter G.G.'s averment that he
has repeatedly contracted a urinary tract
infection as a result of holding his urine to
avoid using the restroom at school.
The uncontroverted facts before the district
court demonstrate that as a result of the
Board's restroom policy, G.G. experiences
daily psychological harm that puts him at risk
for long-term psychological harm, and his
avoidance of the restroom as a result of the
Board's policy puts him at risk for developing
a urinary tract infection as he has repeatedly
in the past. G.G. has thus demonstrated that
he will suffer irreparable harm in the absence
of an injunction.
C.
Turning to the balance of the hardships, G.G.
has shown that he will suffer irreparable harm
without the requested injunction. On the
other end of the scale, the Board contends
that other students' constitutional right to
privacy will be imperiled by G.G.'s presence
in the boys' restroom.
As the majority opinion points out, G.G.'s use
of the restroom does not implicate the
unconstitutional actions involved in the cases
cited by the dissent. Moreover, students'
unintentional exposure of their genitals to
others using the restroom has already been
largely, if not entirely, remedied by the
alterations to the school's restrooms already
undertaken by the Board. To the extent that a
student simply objects to using the restroom
in the presence of a transgender student even
where there is no possibility that either
student's genitals will be exposed, all students
have access to the single-stall restrooms. For
other students, using the single-stall
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restrooms carries no stigma whatsoever,
whereas for G.G., using those same
restrooms is tantamount to humiliation and a
continuing mark of difference among his
fellow students. The minimal or non-existent
hardship to other students of using the singlestall restrooms if they object to G.G.'s
presence in the communal restroom thus does
not tip the scale in the Board's favor. The
balance of hardships weighs heavily toward
G.G.
D.
Finally, consideration of the public interest in
granting or denying the preliminary
injunction favors G.G. Having concluded that
G.G. has demonstrated a likelihood of
success on the merits of his Title IX claim,
denying the requested injunction would
permit the Board to continue violating G.G.'s
rights under Title IX for the pendency of this
case. Enforcing G.G.'s right to be free from
discrimination on the basis of sex in an
educational institution is plainly in the public
interest.
The Board contends that the public interest
lies in allowing this issue to be determined by
the legislature, citing pending legislation
before Congress addressing the issue before
the Court. But, as discussed above, the
weight of authority establishes that
discrimination based on transgender status is
already prohibited by the language of federal
civil rights statutes, as interpreted by the
Supreme Court. The existence of proposed
legislation that, if passed, would address the
question before us does not justify forcing
G.G. to suffer irreparable harm when he has
demonstrated that he is likely to succeed on
the merits of his claims under current federal
law.
II.

Based on the evidence presented to the
district court, G.G. has satisfied all four
prongs of the preliminary injunction inquiry.
When the record before us supports entry of
a preliminary injunction—as it amply does
here—we have not hesitated to act to prevent
irreparable injury to a litigant before us.
Nevertheless, it is right and proper that we
defer to the district court in this instance. It is
to be hoped that the district court will turn its
attention to this matter with the urgency the
case poses. Under the circumstances here, the
appropriateness and necessity of such prompt
action is plain. By the time the district court
issues its decision, G.G. will have suffered
the psychological harm the injunction sought
to prevent for an entire school year.
With these additional observations, I concur
fully in Judge Floyd's thoughtful and
thorough opinion for the panel.
…
NIEMEYER, Circuit Judge, concurring in
part and dissenting in part:
I concur in Part IV of the court's opinion.
With respect to whether G.G. stated a claim
under Title IX and whether the district court
abused its discretion in denying G.G's motion
for a preliminary injunction, I would affirm
the ruling of the district court dismissing
G.G.'s Title IX claim and denying his motion
for a preliminary injunction. I therefore
dissent from the majority's decision on those
issues.
G.G., a transgender boy who is 16, challenges
as discriminatory, under the Equal Protection
Clause and Title IX of the Education
Amendments of 1972, his high school's
policy for assigning students to restrooms
and locker rooms based on biological sex.
The school's policy provides: (1) that the
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girls' restrooms and locker rooms are
designated for use by students who are
biologically female; (2) that the boys'
restrooms and locker rooms are designated
for use by students who are biologically
male; and (3) that all students, regardless of
their sex, are authorized to use the school's
three single-stall unisex restrooms, which the
school created to accommodate transgender
students. Under this policy, G.G., who is
biologically female but who identifies as
male, is authorized to use the girls' restrooms
and locker rooms and the unisex restrooms.
He contends, however, that the policy
discriminates against him because it denies
him, as one who identifies as male, the use of
the boys' restrooms, and he seeks an
injunction compelling the high school to
allow him to use the boys' restrooms.
The district court dismissed G.G.'s Title IX
claim, explaining that the school complied
with Title IX and its regulations, which
permit schools to provide separate living
facilities, restrooms, locker rooms, and
shower facilities “on the basis of sex,” so
long as the facilities are “comparable.”
Strikingly, the majority now reverses the
district court's ruling, without any supporting
case law, and concludes that when Title IX
and its regulations provide for separate living
facilities, restrooms, locker rooms, and
shower facilities on the basis of sex, the
statute's and regulations' use of the term
“sex” means a person's gender identity, not
the person's biological status as male or
female. To accomplish its goal, the majority
relies entirely on a 2015 letter sent by the
Department of Education's Office for Civil
Rights to G.G., in which the Office for Civil
Rights stated, “When a school elects to
separate or treat students differently on the
basis of sex [when providing restrooms,
locker rooms, shower facilities, housing,
athletic teams, and single-sex classes], a

school generally must treat transgender
students consistent with their gender
identity.” Accepting that new definition of
the statutory term “sex,” the majority's
opinion, for the first time ever, holds that a
public high school may not provide separate
restrooms and locker rooms on the basis of
biological sex. Rather, it must now allow a
biological male student who identifies as
female to use the girls' restrooms and locker
rooms and, likewise, must allow a biological
female student who identifies as male to use
the boys' restrooms and locker rooms. This
holding completely tramples on all
universally accepted protections of privacy
and safety that are based on the anatomical
differences between the sexes. And,
unwittingly, it also tramples on the very
concerns expressed by G.G., who said that he
should not be forced to go to the girls'
restrooms because of the “severe
psychological distress” it would inflict on
him and because female students had
“reacted negatively” to his presence in girls'
restrooms. Surely biological males who
identify as females would encounter similar
reactions in the girls' restroom, just as
students physically exposed to students of the
opposite biological sex would be likely to
experience psychological distress. As a
result, schools would no longer be able to
protect physiological privacy as between
students of the opposite biological sex.
This unprecedented holding overrules
custom, culture, and the very demands
inherent in human nature for privacy and
safety, which the separation of such facilities
is designed to protect. More particularly, it
also misconstrues the clear language of Title
IX and its regulations. And finally, it reaches
an unworkable and illogical result.
The recent Office for Civil Rights letter,
moreover, which is not law but which is the
only authority on which the majority relies,
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states more than the majority acknowledges.
In the sentence following the sentence on
which the majority relies, the letter states
that, to accommodate transgender students,
schools are encouraged “to offer the use of
gender-neutral, individual-user facilities to
any student who does not want to use shared
sex-segregated facilities [as permitted by
Title IX's regulations].” This appears to
approve the course that G.G.'s school
followed when it created unisex restrooms in
addition to the boys' and girls' restrooms it
already had.
Title IX and its implementing regulations are
not ambiguous. In recognition of
physiological privacy and safety concerns,
they allow schools to provide “separate living
facilities for the different sexes,” provided
that the facilities are “proportionate” and
“comparable,” and to provide “separate
toilet, locker room, and shower facilities on
the basis of sex,” again provided that the
facilities are “comparable.” Because the
school's policy that G.G. challenges in this
action comports with Title IX and its
regulations, I would affirm the district court's
dismissal of G.G.'s Title IX claim.
I.
The relevant facts are not in dispute. G.G. is
a 16 year-old who attends Gloucester High
School in Gloucester County, Virginia. He is
biologically female, but “did not feel like a
girl” from an early age. Still, he enrolled at
Gloucester High School for his freshman
year as a female.
During his freshman year, however, G.G.
told his parents that he considered himself to
be transgender, and shortly thereafter, at his
request, he began therapy with a
psychologist, who diagnosed him with
gender dysphoria, a condition of distress

brought about by the incongruence of one's
biological sex and gender identity.
In August 2014, before beginning his
sophomore year, G.G. and his mother met
with the principal and guidance counselor at
Gloucester High School to discuss his need,
as part of his treatment, to socially transition
at school. The school accommodated all of
his requests. Officials changed school
records to reflect G.G.'s new male name; the
guidance counselor supported G.G.'s sending
an email to teachers explaining that he was to
be addressed using his new name and to be
referred to using male pronouns; G.G. was
permitted to fulfill his physical education
requirement through a home-bound program,
as he preferred not to use the school's locker
rooms; and the school allowed G.G. to use a
restroom in the nurse's office “because [he]
was unsure how other students would react to
[his] transition.” G.G. was grateful for the
school's “welcoming environment.” As he
stated, “no teachers, administrators, or staff at
Gloucester High School expressed any
resistance to calling [him] by [his] legal name
or referring to [him] using male pronouns.”
And he was “pleased to discover that [his]
teachers and the vast majority of [his] peers
respected the fact that [he is] a boy.”
As the school year began, however, G.G.
found it “stigmatizing” to continue using the
nurse's restroom, and he requested to use the
boys' restrooms. The principal also
accommodated this request. But the very next
day, the School Board began receiving
“numerous complaints from parents and
students about [G.G.'s] use of the boys'
restrooms.” The School Board thus faced a
dilemma. It recognized G.G.'s feelings, as he
expressed them, that “[u]sing the girls'
restroom[s][was] not possible” because of the
“severe psychological distress” it would
inflict on him and because female students
had previously “reacted negatively” to his
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presence in the girls' restrooms. It now also
had to recognize that boys had similar
feelings caused by G.G.'s use of the boys'
restrooms, although G.G. stated that he
continued using the boys' restrooms for some
seven weeks without personally receiving
complaints from fellow students.
The Gloucester County School Board
considered the problem and, after two public
meetings, adopted a compromise policy, as
follows:
Whereas the GCPS recognizes that
some students question their gender
identities, and
Whereas the GCPS encourages such
students to seek support, advice, and
guidance from parents, professionals
and other trusted adults, and
Whereas the GCPS seeks to provide a
safe learning environment for all
students and to protect the privacy of
all students, therefore
It shall be the practice of the GCPS to
provide male and female restroom
and locker room facilities in its
schools, and the use of said facilities
shall be limited to the corresponding
biological genders, and students with
gender identity issues shall be
provided an alternative appropriate
private facility.
Gloucester
High
School
promptly
implemented the policy and created three
single-stall unisex restrooms for use by all
students, regardless of their biological sex or
gender identity.
In December 2014, G.G. sought an opinion
letter about his situation from the U.S.
Department of Education's Office for Civil

Rights, and on January 15, 2015, the Office
responded, stating, as relevant here:
The Department's Title IX regulations
permit schools to provide sexsegregated restrooms, locker rooms,
shower facilities, housing, athletic
teams, and single-sex classes under
certain circumstances. When a school
elects to separate or treat students
differently on the basis of sex in those
situations, a school generally must
treat transgender students consistent
with their gender identity. [The
Office for Civil Rights] also
encourages schools to offer the use of
gender-neutral,
individual-user
facilities to any student who does not
want to use shared sex-segregated
facilities.
G.G. commenced this action in June 2015,
alleging that the Gloucester County School
Board's policy was discriminatory, in
violation of the U.S. Constitution's Equal
Protection Clause and Title IX of the
Education Amendments of 1972. He sought
declaratory relief, injunctive relief, and
damages. With his complaint, G.G. also filed
a motion for a preliminary injunction
“requiring the School Board to allow [him] to
use the boys' restrooms at school.”
The district court dismissed G.G.'s Title IX
claim because Title IX's implementing
regulations permit schools to provide
separate restrooms “on the basis of sex.” The
court also denied G.G.'s motion for a
preliminary injunction. As to the Equal
Protection claim, the court has not yet ruled
on whether G.G. failed to state a claim, but,
at the hearing on the motion for a preliminary
injunction, it indicated that it “will hear
evidence” and “get a date set” for trial to
better assess the claim.
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From the district court's order denying G.G.'s
motion for a preliminary injunction, G.G.
filed this appeal, in which he also challenges
the district court's Title IX ruling as
inextricably intertwined with the district
court's denial of the motion for a preliminary
injunction.
II.
G.G. recognizes that persons who are born
biologically female “typically” identify
psychologically as female, and likewise, that
persons who are born biologically male
“typically” identify as male. Because G.G.
was born biologically female but identifies as
male, he characterizes himself as a
transgender male. He contends that because
he is transgender, the School Board singled
him out for “different and unequal
treatment,” “discriminat[ing] against him
based on sex [by denying him use of the boys'
restrooms], in violation of Title IX.” He
argues, “discrimination against transgender
people is necessarily discrimination based on
sex because it is impossible to treat people
differently based on their transgender status
without taking their sex into account.” He
concludes that the School Board's policy
addressing restrooms and locker rooms thus
illegally fails to include transgender persons
on the basis of their gender identity. In
particular, he concludes that he is
“prevent[ed] ... from using the same
restrooms as other students and relegat [ed]
... to separate, single-stall facilities.”
As noted, the School Board's policy
designates the use of restrooms and locker
rooms based on the student's biological sex—
biological females are assigned to the girls'
restrooms and unisex restrooms; biological
males are assigned to the boys' restrooms and
unisex restrooms. G.G. is thus assigned to the
girls' restrooms and the unisex restrooms, but
is denied the use of the boys' restrooms. He

asserts, however, that because neither he nor
the girls would accept his use of the girls'
restroom, he is relegated to the unisex
restrooms, which is stigmatizing.
The School Board contends that it is treating
all students the same way, as it explains:
The School Board's policy does not
discriminate against any class of
students. Instead, the policy was
developed to treat all students and
situations the same. To respect the
safety and privacy of all students, the
School Board has had a long-standing
practice of limiting the use of
restroom and locker room facilities to
the corresponding biological sex of
the students. The School Board also
provides three single-stall bathrooms
for any student to use regardless of his
or her biological sex. Under the
School Board's restroom policy, G.G.
is being treated like every other
student in the Gloucester Schools. All
students have two choices. Every
student can use a restroom associated
with their anatomical sex, whether
they are boys or girls. If students
choose not to use the restroom
associated with their anatomical sex,
the students can use a private, singlestall restroom. No student is
permitted to use the restroom of the
opposite sex. As a result, all students,
including female to male transgender
and male to female transgender
students, are treated the same.
While G.G. has pending a claim under the
Equal Protection Clause (on which the
district court has not yet ruled), only his
preliminary injunction challenge and Title IX
claim are before us at this time.
Title IX provides:
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No person in the United States shall,
on the basis of sex, be excluded from
participation in, be denied the
benefits of, or be subjected to
discrimination under any education
program or activity receiving Federal
financial assistance ....
The
Act,
however,
provides,
“Notwithstanding anything to the contrary
contained in this chapter, nothing contained
herein shall be construed to prohibit any
educational institution receiving funds under
this Act, from maintaining separate living
facilities for the different sexes.” Similarly,
implementing Regulation 106.33 provides
for particular separate facilities, as follows:
A recipient may provide separate
toilet, locker room, and shower
facilities on the basis of sex, but such
facilities provided for students of one
sex shall be comparable to such
facilities provided for students of the
other sex.
Thus, although Title IX and its regulations
provide generally that a school receiving
federal funds may not discriminate on the
basis of sex, they also specify that a school
does not violate the Act by providing, on the
basis of sex, separate living facilities,
restrooms, locker rooms, and shower
facilities.
While G.G. only challenges the definition
and application of the term “sex” with respect
to separate restrooms, acceptance of his
argument would necessarily change the
definition of “sex” for purposes of assigning
separate living facilities, locker rooms, and
shower facilities as well. All are based on
“sex,” a term that must be construed
uniformly throughout Title IX and its
implementing regulations.

Across societies and throughout history, it
has been commonplace and universally
accepted to separate public restrooms, locker
rooms, and shower facilities on the basis of
biological sex in order to address privacy and
safety concerns arising from the biological
differences between males and females. An
individual has a legitimate and important
interest in bodily privacy such that his or her
nude or partially nude body, genitalia, and
other private parts are not exposed to persons
of the opposite biological sex. Indeed, courts
have consistently recognized that the need for
such privacy is inherent in the nature and
dignity of humankind.
Moreover, we have explained that separating
restrooms
based
on
“acknowledged
differences” between the biological sexes
serves to protect this important privacy
interest. Indeed, the Supreme Court
recognized, when ordering an all-male
Virginia college to admit female students,
that such a remedy “would undoubtedly
require alterations necessary to afford
members of each sex privacy from the other
sex.” Such privacy was and remains
necessary because of the inherent “[p]hysical
differences between men and women,”
which, as the Supreme Court explained, are
“enduring” and render “the two sexes ... not
fungible,” not because of “one's sense of
oneself as belonging to a particular gender,”
as G.G. and the government as amicus
contend.
Thus, Title IX's allowance for the separation,
based on sex, of living facilities, restrooms,
locker rooms, and shower facilities rests on
the universally accepted concern for bodily
privacy that is founded on the biological
differences between the sexes. This privacy
concern is also linked to safety concerns that
could arise from sexual responses prompted
by students' exposure to the private body
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parts of students of the other biological sex.
Indeed, the School Board cited these very
reasons for its adoption of the policy,
explaining that it separates restrooms and
locker rooms to promote the privacy and
safety of minor children, pursuant to its
“responsibility to its students to ensure their
privacy while engaging in personal bathroom
functions, disrobing, dressing, and showering
outside of the presence of members of the
opposite sex. [That the school has this
responsibility] is particularly true in an
environment where children are still
developing,
both
emotionally
and
physically.”
The need to protect privacy and safety
between the sexes based on physical
exposure would not be present in the same
quality and degree if the term “sex” were to
encompass only a person's gender identity.
Indeed, separation on this basis would
function nonsensically. A biological male
identifying as female could hardly live in a
girls' dorm or shower in a girls' shower
without invading physiological privacy
needs, and the same would hold true for a
biological female identifying as male in a
boys' dorm or shower. G.G.'s answer, of
course, is that he is not challenging the
separation, on the basis of sex, of living
facilities, locker rooms, and shower facilities,
but only of restrooms, where the risks to
privacy and safety are far reduced. This effort
to limit the scope of the issue apparently
sways the majority, as it cabins its entire
discussion to “restroom access by
transgender individuals.” But this effort to
restrict the effect of G.G.'s argument hardly
matters when the term “sex” would have to
be applied uniformly throughout the statute
and regulations, as noted above and, indeed,
as agreed to by the majority.
The realities underpinning Title IX's
recognition of separate living facilities,

restrooms, locker rooms, and shower
facilities are reflected in the plain language of
the statute and regulations, which is not
ambiguous. The text of Title IX and its
regulations allowing for separation of each
facility “on the basis of sex” employs the
term “sex” as was generally understood at the
time of enactment. Title IX was enacted in
1972 and the regulations were promulgated
in 1975 and readopted in 1980, and during
that time period, virtually every dictionary
definition of “sex” referred to the
physiological distinctions between males and
females, particularly with respect to their
reproductive functions. Indeed, although the
contemporaneous meaning controls our
analysis, it is notable that, even today, the
term “sex” continues to be defined based on
the physiological distinctions between males
and females. Any new definition of sex that
excludes
reference
to
physiological
differences, as the majority now attempts to
introduce, is simply an unsupported reach to
rationalize a desired outcome.
Thus, when the School Board assigned
restrooms and locker rooms on the basis of
biological sex, it was clearly complying
precisely with the unambiguous language of
Title IX and its regulations.
Despite the fact that the majority offers no
case to support the definition of “sex” as
advanced by G.G. and supported by the
government as amicus, the majority
nonetheless accepts that the meaning of the
term “sex” in Title IX and its regulations
refers to a person's “gender identity” simply
to accommodate G.G.'s wish to use the boys'
restrooms. But, it is not immediately apparent
whether G.G., the government, and the
majority contend that the term “sex” as used
in Title IX and its regulations refers (1) to
both biological sex and gender identity; (2) to
either biological sex or gender identity; or (3)
to only “gender identity.” In his brief, G.G.
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seems to take the position that the term “sex”
at least includes a reference to gender
identity. This is the position taken in his
complaint when he alleges, “Under Title IX,
discrimination ‘on the basis of sex’
encompasses both discrimination based on
biological differences between men and
women and discrimination based on gender
nonconformity.” The government seems to
be taking the same position, contending that
the term “sex” “encompasses both sex—that
is, the biological differences between men
and women—and gender [identity].”
(Emphasis in original). The majority,
however, seems to suggest that the term
“sex” refers only to gender identity, as it
relies solely on the statement in the Office for
Civil Rights' letter of January 7, 2015, which
said, “When a school elects to separate or
treat students differently on the basis of sex
[for the purpose of providing restrooms,
locker rooms, and other facilities], a school
generally must treat transgender students
consistent with their gender identity.” But,
regardless of where G.G., the government,
and the majority purport to stand on this
question, the clear effect of their new
definition of sex not only tramples the
relevant statutory and regulatory language
and disregards the privacy concerns
animating that text, it is also illogical and
unworkable.
If the term “sex” as used in the statute and
regulations refers to both biological sex and
gender identity, then, while the School
Board's policy is in compliance with respect
to most students, whose biological sex aligns
with their gender identity, for students whose
biological sex and gender identity do not
align, no restroom or locker room separation
could ever be accomplished consistent with
the regulation because a transgender student's
use of a boys' or girls' restroom or locker
room could not satisfy the conjunctive
criteria. Given that G.G. and the government

do not challenge schools' ability to separate
restrooms and locker rooms for male and
female students, surely they cannot be
advocating an interpretation that places
schools in an impossible position. Moreover,
such an interpretation would deny G.G. the
right to use either the boys' or girls'
restrooms, a position that G.G. does not
advocate.
If the position of G.G., the government, and
the majority is that the term “sex” means
either biological sex or gender identity, then
the School Board's policy is in compliance
because it segregates the facilities on the
basis of biological sex, a satisfactory
component of the disjunctive.
Therefore, when asserting that G.G. must be
allowed to use the boys' restrooms and locker
rooms as consistent with his gender identity,
G.G., the government, and the majority must
be arguing that “sex” as used in Title IX and
its regulations means only gender identity.
But this construction would, in the end, mean
that a school could never meaningfully
provide separate restrooms and locker rooms
on the basis of sex. Biological males and
females whose gender identity aligned would
be required to use the same restrooms and
locker rooms as persons of the opposite
biological sex whose gender identity did not
align. With such mixed use of separate
facilities, no purpose would be gained by
designating a separate use “on the basis of
sex,” and privacy concerns would be left
unaddressed.
Moreover, enforcement of any separation
would be virtually impossible. Basing
restroom access on gender identity would
require schools to assume gender identity
based on appearances, social expectations, or
explicit declarations of identity, which the
government concedes would render Title IX
and its regulations nonsensical:
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Certainly a school that has created
separate restrooms for boys and girls
could not decide that only students
who dress, speak, and act sufficiently
masculine count as boys entitled to
use the boys' restroom, or that only
students who wear dresses, have long
hair, and act sufficiently feminine
may use the girls' restroom.
Yet, by interpreting Title IX and the
regulations as “requiring schools to treat
students consistent with their gender
identity,” and by disallowing schools from
treating students based on their biological
sex, the government's position would have
precisely the effect the government finds to
be at odds with common sense.
Finally, in arguing that he should not be
assigned to the girls' restrooms, G.G. states
that “it makes no sense to place a transgender
boy in the girls' restroom in the name of
protecting student privacy” because “girls
objected to his presence in the girls'
restrooms because they perceived him as
male.” But the same argument applies to his
use of the boys' restrooms, where boys felt
uncomfortable because they perceived him as
female. In any scenario based on gender
identity, moreover, there would be no
accommodation for the recognized need for
physiological privacy.
In short, it is impossible to determine how
G.G., the government, and the majority
would apply the provisions of Title IX and
the implementing regulations that allow for
the separation of living facilities, restrooms,
locker rooms, and shower facilities “on the
basis of sex” if “sex” means gender identity.
The Office for Civil Rights letter, on which
the majority exclusively relies, hardly
provides an answer. In one sentence it states
that schools “generally must treat transgender

students consistent with their gender
identity,” whatever that means, and in the
next sentence, it encourages schools to
provide “gender-neutral, individual-user
facilities to any student who does not want to
use shared sex-segregated facilities.” While
the first sentence might be impossible to
enforce without destroying all privacyserving separation, the second sentence
encourages schools, such as Gloucester High
School, to provide unisex single-stall
restrooms for any students who are
uncomfortable with sex-separated facilities,
as the school in fact provided.
As it stands, Title IX and its implementing
regulations authorize schools to separate, on
the basis of sex, living facilities, restrooms,
locker rooms, and shower facilities, which
must allow for separation on the basis of
biological sex. Gloucester High School thus
clearly complied with the statute and
regulations. But, as it did so, it was
nonetheless sensitive to G.G.'s gender
transition, accommodating virtually every
wish that he had. Indeed, he initially
requested and was granted the use of the
nurse's restroom. And, after both girls and
boys objected to his using the girls' and boys'
restrooms, the school provided individual
unisex restrooms, as encouraged by the letter
from the Office for Civil Rights. Thus, while
Gloucester High School made a good-faith
effort to accommodate G.G. and help him in
his transition, balancing its concern for him
with its responsibilities to all students, it still
acted legally in maintaining a policy that
provided all students with physiological
privacy and safety in restrooms and locker
rooms.
Because the Gloucester County School Board
did not violate Title IX and Regulation
106.33 in adopting the policy for separate
restrooms and locker rooms, I would affirm
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the district court's decision dismissing G.G.'s
Title IX claim and therefore dissent.
I also dissent from the majority's decision to
vacate the district court's denial of G.G.'s
motion for a preliminary injunction. As the
Supreme Court has consistently explained,
“[a]
preliminary
injunction
is
an
extraordinary remedy” that “may only be
awarded upon a clear showing that the
plaintiff is entitled to such relief,” and “ ‘[i]n
exercising their sound discretion, courts of
equity should pay particular regard for the
public consequences in employing the

extraordinary remedy.’ ” Given the facts that
the district court fully and fairly summarized
in its opinion, including the hardships
expressed both by G.G. and by other
students, I cannot conclude that we can “form
a definite and firm conviction that the court
below committed a clear error of judgment,”
particularly when we are only now
expressing as binding law an evidentiary
standard that the majority asserts the district
court violated.
As noted, however, I concur in Part IV of the
court's opinion.
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“Supreme Court grants emergency order to block transgender male
student in Virginia from using boys' restroom”
The Los Angeles Times
David G. Savage
August 3, 2016

The Supreme Court intervened for the first
time Wednesday in the controversy over
transgender rights and blocked a lower court
ruling that would have allowed a transgender
boy to use the high school restroom that fits
his “gender identity.”
In an unusual 5-3 order, the justices granted
an emergency appeal from a Virginia school
board, which said it is fighting to “protect the
basic expectations of bodily privacy of
Gloucester County students.”
The school board was seeking to be exempted
from the Obama administration’s position
that schools nationwide are required to allow
transgender students to use the bathroom they
prefer.
Justice Stephen G. Breyer signaled he did not
support the school board’s emergency
appeal, but said he joined the court’s four
conservatives as a “courtesy” to put the issue
on hold until the justices can review the
matter when they return in the fall.
“In light of the facts that four justices have
voted to grant the application referred to the
court by the chief justice, that we are
currently on recess and that granting the stay
will preserve the status quo,” he wrote, “I
vote to grant the application as a courtesy.”

The issue began last year when a U.S.
Department of Education lawyer advised
school districts nationwide that a federal antidiscrimination law known as Title IX, which
forbids sex discrimination in education, also
protects the rights of transgender students to
use restrooms and changing facilities that are
“consistent with their gender identity.”
In April, the U.S. 4th Circuit Court of
Appeals, in a 2-1 decision, upheld that policy
and ruled for Gavin Grimm, a 17-year-old
transgender boy who sued the school board.
The appeals court issued an order telling
Gloucester school officials they must abide
by the administration’s interpretation and
allow Grimm to use the boys’ restrooms.
In Wednesday’s order, the high court said it
had granted the school board’s emergency
request to temporarily “stay the mandate” of
the 4th Circuit until the school board can file
an appeal when the court returns.
The court’s action, while not a ruling, signals
at least four justices are skeptical of the
Obama administration’s stance. While that’s
enough to grant a petition to review the lower
court ruling, it will take at least five votes to
issue a ruling.
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Since the court has been ideologically split
since the February death of Justice Antonin
Scalia, a 4-4 tie on the transgender case is
likely and would result in the affirmation of
the 4th Circuit’s ruling.
Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Sonia
Sotomayor and Elena Kagan said they would
have turned down the emergency appeal in
the Gloucester case and allowed the lower
court’s ruling to take effect.
The request for an emergency stay was filed
with Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr., and
Justices Anthony M. Kennedy, Clarence
Thomas and Samuel A. Alito Jr. joined in
granting it.
Lawyers for the American Civil Liberties
Union had urged the court to turn down the
request on the grounds that the school board
would suffer “no irreparable harm” if the teen
was permitted to use the boys’ restroom.
“We are disappointed that the court has
issued a stay and that Gavin will have to
begin another school year isolated from his
peers and stigmatized by the Gloucester
County school board just because he’s a boy
who is transgender,” said Joshua Block, a
senior ACLU staff attorney. “We remain
hopeful that Gavin will ultimately prevail.”
Wednesday’s order comes as a federal judge
in North Carolina is weighing arguments on
whether to put on hold the state’s
controversial measure known as House Bill
2. It says public restrooms and changing
facilities, including in schools and colleges,
must be segregated by sex, as defined by “the
physical condition of being male or female
which is stated on a person’s birth
certificate.”

Lawyers for the ACLU and Lambda Legal
urged U.S. District Judge Thomas Schroeder
on Monday to block the state from enforcing
the measure while both sides prepare for a
trial on the issue in November. The judge said
he would rule on the request shortly. But the
high court’s order may influence the judge’s
decision.
The appeal in the Gloucester case raises an
issue that has long interested the conservative
justices. Congress did not pass a new law to
clarify the rights of transgender students, and
the Education Department did not issue a new
regulation.
Instead, its lawyers sent a “guidance” to
school officials advising them that in the
department’s view, Title IX, adopted in 1972,
means that excluding transgender students
from facilities that fit their gender identity
amounts to illegal sex discrimination.
In their appeal, lawyers for the Gloucester
school board said the case had “nationwide
importance.” And they argued the high court
should forbid federal executive agencies,
including the Education Department, from
issuing sweeping new interpretations of old
regulations.
The school board said it intended to file an
appeal petition by the end of this month that
formally asks the high court to review the
4th Circuit’s decision. If the justices agree to
hear the case, which now seems likely, it
would be one of the court’s major cases of
the coming term. If a 4-4 deadlock is
averted, the case could yield the court’s first
ruling on the issue of transgender rights.
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“Virginia School Board Asks Supreme Court to Block Order on
Transgender Bathroom Use”
The Wall Street Journal
Jess Bravin
July 13, 2016

A Virginia school board asked the Supreme
Court Wednesday to block a lower court
order allowing a transgender student who
identifies as male to use the boys’ restroom.
The case is the first over transgender
restroom use to reach the high court. It could
provide the justices an opportunity to decide
whether prohibitions of sex discrimination
extend to gender identity—a position taken
by some Obama administration agencies, but
disputed by more than a dozen Republicanleaning states.
“For decades, our nation’s schools have
structured their facilities and programs
around the sensible idea that in certain
intimate settings men and women may be
separated ‘to afford members of each sex
privacy from the other sex,’” the Gloucester
County School Board said in its petition.
The board wants to temporarily halt
implementation of an April decision by a
three-judge panel of the Fourth U.S. Circuit
Court of Appeals in Richmond, Va., which
ruled in favor of high-school junior Gavin
Grimm that the policy violated federal law
barring discrimination based on sex.
Gavin was born female but has said that since
age 12 he has identified as male. Gavin “has

been diagnosed with gender dysphoria, a
medical condition characterized by clinically
significant
distress
caused
by
an
incongruence between a person’s gender
identity and the person’s birth-assigned sex,”
the Fourth Circuit opinion said. He has
undergone hormone therapy but not sexreassignment surgery, the court said, and
“lives all aspects of his life as a boy.”
School officials were allowing him to use the
boys’ restroom, the appeals court said. He did
so “without incident for about seven weeks,”
but word of this “excited the interest of others
in the community,” who complained to the
school board. The board responded in
December 2014 with a resolution limiting use
of restrooms and locker rooms “to the
corresponding biological genders,” adding
that “students with gender-identity issues
shall be provided an alternative appropriate
private facility.”
Gavin, 17 years old, through his mother, sued
to block the policy. A federal-district court in
Newport News, Va., dismissed the suit,
finding that the federal educational sexequity law, known as Title IX, doesn’t extend
to sexual orientation, gender identity and
other categories beyond biological sex.
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Federal courts in the past typically have
rejected arguments that prohibitions of sexdiscrimination cover sexual orientation. The
Fourth Circuit’s April opinion, however,
relied heavily on new guidance from the U.S.
Education
Department
addressing
transgender questions. A January 2015
opinion letter from the department’s Office
of Civil Rights advised that schools
“generally must treat transgender students
consistent with their gender identity.”
“This case presents one of the most extreme
examples of judicial deference to an
administrative agency this court will ever
see,” the Gloucester school board said, noting
that the Education Department’s opinion
letter “was generated in response to an
inquiry about the school board’s restroom
policy in this very case.”

The Gloucester board addressed its
application to Chief Justice John Roberts,
who apart from presiding over the Supreme
Court oversees the Fourth Circuit. He can act
on the request himself or refer it to the full
court for action. No decision is expected
before additional briefing by both sides in the
case.
In May, the Obama administration provided
detailed guidance on bathroom use by
transgender students by telling educators
around the country they should allow
students to use the bathroom and locker
facilities of their chosen gender, saying
federal law bars discrimination against such
students.
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“Federal judge urges prompt appeal to Court on transgender rights”
SCOTUSblog
Lyle Denniston
June 1, 2016

Arguing that “time is of the essence,” a
federal appeals court judge on Tuesday called
for a prompt appeal to the Supreme Court to
sort out the rights of transgender students
when they use restrooms at school. Circuit
Judge Paul V. Niemeyer helped clear the way
for an early appeal by withholding a demand
that the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit vote on rehearing a test case on the
issue.

In this case, G.G. is a sixteen-year-old
student at Gloucester County High School in
Gloucester Courthouse, Va., who was born a
girl but now has the identity of a boy, and
wishes to use the boys’ restroom at school.
He won a two-to-one decision by a threejudge panel of the Fourth Circuit on April 19,
and the en banc Fourth Circuit on Tuesday
turned down a plea by the school board to
reconsider the controversy.

At issue in the case of G.G. v. Gloucester
County School Board is the meaning of a
1972 federal civil rights law that outlaws
discrimination “because of sex” in federally
funded education. Specially at issue is
whether that law — known as “Title IX” —
provides protection to students who identify
as having a gender other than what was
assigned to them at birth.

Judge Niemeyer had dissented from the panel
ruling, and said on Tuesday that the panel
should itself reconsider. But, he went on to
say that he declined to call for a vote among
his colleagues on the question of en banc
review. When there was no request for such
a poll, the school board’s rehearing plea was
denied.

There is a widespread, and rapidly growing
controversy over that and other transgender
rights issues, and the case of sixteen-year-old
“G.G.” could be the first to put the issue
before the Supreme Court. In some ways, the
rapid development of the controversy
parallels that over same-sex marriage rights,
leading to the Supreme Court decision
recognizing equal rights of gays and lesbians
to marry, across the nation.

In withholding such a request, the judge said
that “the momentous nature of the issue
deserves an open road to the Supreme Court
to seek the Court’s controlling construction
of Title IX for national application.” This
case, he said, presented the legal issue
clearly, without “the distraction of
subservient issues.”
Summarizing some of the arguments he had
made as the dissenter on the panel, Judge
Niemeyer concluded: “Time is of the

279

essence, and I can only urge the parties to
seek Supreme Court review.”
The county school board, in response to a
lawsuit by G.G. and his mother, Deirdre
Grimm, had sought to defend its policy of
providing separate restrooms and locker
rooms based upon a student’s biological sex
— that is, the sex noted on the birth
certificate. Its policy also provided singlestall restrooms that any student, of either sex
or of transgender identity, could use. G.G.
and his mother contended that keeping him
out of the boys’ restroom and confining him
to a single-stall alternative was a form of
discrimination based upon his gender
identity.
The Fourth Circuit panel majority did not
itself rule on whether Title IX actually does
provide protection against students based on
their gender identity, in federally funded
educational programs. Instead, the panel
majority chose to defer to the view of the U.S.
Department of Education that Title IX’s
reference to sex includes gender identity.
Technically, the panel majority had invoked
what is called “Auer deference.” That is a
reference to a 1997 Supreme Court decision
in the case of Auer v. Robbins, declaring that
federal courts should give deference to
federal agencies’ interpretations of their own
regulations, if those regulations are
ambiguous. (While there are some members
of the Supreme Court who in recent years
have called for a reconsideration of the Auer
decision, the Justices passed up a request to
do that earlier this month, in denying review
of United Student Aid Funds v. Bible; Justice
Clarence Thomas dissented alone.)

After accepting the government’s view of the
reach of Title IX, the Fourth Circuit panel
ordered a federal trial judge to reconsider his
ruling against G.G.’s claim, saying he had
used the wrong legal analysis. The majority
opinion was written by Circuit Judge Henry
F. Floyd, and joined by Senior Circuit Judge
Andre M. Davis. In a separation opinion,
Judge Davis said he would have gone ahead
and ruled in favor of G.G. now instead if
returning it to the trial judge. The panel did
refuse G.G.’s request that the case be
reassigned to a different trial judge on the
premise that the judge who ruled against him
was biased. Judge Niemeyer agreed with
leaving the case with the same judge, but
dissented on all of the remainder of the
majority ruling.
While much of the nationwide controversy
over transgender rights lately has focused on
school students and on access to restrooms,
the controversy also has included a dispute
over whether transgender rights are also
protected under Title VII of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act, which outlaws discrimination
based upon sex in the workplace. The U.S.
Equal
Employment
Opportunity
Commission has been active in promoting
transgender workers’ rights.
The Obama administration has taken a strong
position in favor of transgender rights, and
this month sent a nationwide letter to schools
noting its position that Title IX does protect
transgender students. The administration
also has sued the state of North Carolina over
the legality of a state law that restricts
transgender rights of students and workers
across the state. The administration also
filed its views with the Fourth Circuit panel
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in the G.G. case. Presumably, it would take
part in that case if it now moves on to the
Supreme Court.
Among a variety of newly filed lawsuits
around the country on that issue, eleven states
have sued the Obama administration in a
federal district court in Texas to challenge its
policy position.
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“Federal appeals court sides with transgender teen, says bathroom case
can go forward”
The Washington Post
Moriah Balingit
April 19, 2016

A federal appeals court in Richmond has
ruled that a transgender high school student
who was born as a female can sue his school
board on discrimination grounds because it
banned him from the boys’ bathroom.

judges also ruled that the lower court should
reconsider a request that would have allowed
Grimm to use the boys’ bathroom at
Gloucester High School while the case is
pending.

In backing high school junior Gavin Grimm,
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 4th Circuit
deferred to the U.S. Education Department’s
position that transgender students should
have access to the bathrooms that match their
gender identities rather than being forced to
use bathrooms that match their biological
sex. The department has said that requiring
transgender students to use a bathroom that
corresponds with their biological sex
amounts to a violation of Title IX, which
prohibits sex discrimination at schools that
receive federal funding.

The 4th Circuit is the highest court to weigh
in on the question of whether bathroom
restrictions constitute sex discrimination, and
the decision could have widespread
implications on how U.S. courts interpret the
issue as civil rights activists and local
politicians battle over bathrooms.

“It’s a complete vindication for the Education
Department’s interpretation of Title IX,” said
Joshua Block, an American Civil Liberties
Union lawyer who represents Grimm.

The question of which bathrooms
transgender people can use has become a
divisive political issue in several states,
emerging as an emotional fight in South
Dakota, Texas, Illinois, Mississippi and
Virginia. In North Carolina, a law banning
local protections for gay and transgender
people — a measure centering on bathrooms
— has sparked protests, boycotts and calls for
an immediate repeal.

In a 2-to-1 decision, the 4th Circuit ordered a
lower court to rehear the student’s claims that
the Gloucester County, Va., school board’s
bathroom policies — which restrict
transgender students to using a separate
unisex bathroom — violate federal law. The

Public bathrooms have become the latest
battleground in the fight for LGBT rights,
with conservative activists and some state
lawmakers pushing restrictions that prevent
transgender people from using bathrooms in
accordance with their gender identity.
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Activists have used the bathroom debate as a
venue for rolling back broader civil rights
protections,
arguing
that
allowing
transgender people into the supposedly safe
spaces of single-sex bathrooms creates
dangerous scenarios and violates privacy and
common sense.
The 4th Circuit judges wrote that
interpretations of federal discrimination
policies should be left to politicians, in this
case the Obama administration’s Education
Department. The court ruled that Grimm has
an argument that his school board violated his
rights based on those interpretations, but the
court did not decide whether transgender
students faced discrimination in Gloucester,
leaving that question to the lower court.
“At the heart of this appeal is whether Title
IX requires schools to provide transgender
students access to restrooms congruent with
their gender identity,” the court’s opinion
said. “We conclude that the Department’s
interpretation of its own regulation . . . as it
relates to restroom access by transgender
individuals, is . . . to be accorded controlling
weight in this case.”
LGBT advocates celebrated Tuesday’s court
decision and were hopeful that it would help
turn back the tide of efforts by state
lawmakers to get bathroom restrictions on the
books. The Human Rights Campaign, which
tracks bills related to lesbian, gay, bisexual
and transgender issues, counted 14 states that
debated bills that would restrict bathroom
usage for transgender students.
“I think this is going to be a wake-up call for
legislators,” said Peter Renn, an attorney for
an LGBT advocacy group. He said he

believes that lawmakers contemplating
bathroom restrictions for transgender people
are “essentially on a collision course with
federal law and federal courts.”
Lawyer Mat Staver of Liberty Counsel,
which has backed efforts to roll back LGBT
protections for students, took a more cautious
view, noting that the judges opted to send the
case back down to the district court. “I don’t
think this case has any definitive answer, and
it’s not a definitive ruling on what Title IX
says,” Staver said.
The issue has been at the center of state-level
debates in recent months, most notably in
North Carolina, where Gov. Pat McCrory (R)
recently signed into law a ban on local
government measures that protect gay and
transgender people from discrimination; he
focused specifically on the bathroom issue in
arguing that the ban was necessary to prevent
local governments from allowing “a man to
use a woman’s bathroom, shower or locker
room.” A transgender university student and
employee already have sued to overturn the
new law and the 4th Circuit’s ruling could
bolster their argument that bathroom
restrictions are discriminatory, Renn said.
The North Carolina law has sparked protests
and economic boycotts in the state. Duke
University leaders this week publicly
condemned “in the strongest possible terms”
the North Carolina law and called for its
repeal.
McCrory said in a video statement posted
online Tuesday that he disagreed with the 4th
Circuit’s ruling, calling it a “bad precedent.”
South Dakota Gov. Dennis Daugaard (R)
vetoed a bill that would restrict transgender
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public school students from using bathrooms
in accordance with their gender identity,
arguing that schools were best equipped to
handle accommodations for transgender
students.
Voters in Houston last year voted down a law
that would have extended nondiscrimination
protections to gay and transgender people,
and a new law in Mississippi allows schools
to require students to dress and use the
bathroom in accordance with the gender on
their birth certificate.
The case in Virginia centers on Grimm, now
a junior at Gloucester High School. Grimm,
who was born with female anatomy, came
out as male to his classmates in high school
and began using the boys’ bathroom his
sophomore year. Seven weeks later, angry
parents raised concerns with the school
board, prompting members to pass a policy
that requires students to use school
bathrooms corresponding with their
“biological gender” and indicates that
transgender students should use a separate,
unisex bathroom.
Grimm sued the school board in federal
court, arguing that the new rule violated Title
IX, the federal law that bars gender
discrimination in the nation’s schools. He
also asked for a preliminary injunction to
allow him to use the boys’ bathroom while
his case proceeded.

Transgender students say that using the
bathroom that corresponds with their gender
identity is important for them — and others
— to feel comfortable. A transgender boy
who appears male may generally raise alarms
if he is forced to use the girls’ bathroom.
Grimm has said that the debate made him the
subject of ridicule within his community.
“Matters like identity and self-consciousness
are something that most kids grapple with in
this age range,” Grimm said in January.
“When you’re a transgender teenager, these
things are often very potent. I feel humiliated
and dysphoric every time I’m forced to use a
separate facility.”
In a dissent, Judge Paul V. Niemeyer of the
4th Circuit said the ruling “completely
tramples on all universally accepted
protections of privacy and safety that are
based on the anatomical differences between
the sexes.”
“This unprecedented holding overrules
custom, culture, and the very demands
inherent in human nature for privacy and
safety, which the separation of such facilities
is designed to protect,” Niemeyer wrote.

Troy M. Andersen, chair of the Gloucester
County School Board, and David Corrigan,
the attorney representing the school board,
did not respond to requests for comment
Tuesday.
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“Appeals Court Favors Transgender Student in Virginia Restroom Case”
The New York Times
Richard Fausset
April 19, 2016

Weeks after a new North Carolina law put
transgender bathroom access at the heart of
the nation’s culture wars, a federal appeals
court in Richmond, Va., ruled on Tuesday in
favor of a transgender student who was born
female and wishes to use the boys’ restroom
at his rural Virginia high school.
Advocates for lesbian, gay, bisexual and
transgender people note that the ruling from
the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit applies to North Carolina,
where the controversial law approved last
month limits transgender people to
bathrooms in government buildings,
including public schools, that correspond
with the gender listed on their birth
certificates.
As a result of the ruling, those advocates say,
that portion of the North Carolina law that
applies to public schools now clearly violates
Title IX — the federal law that prohibits
gender discrimination in schools.
“Our expectation is that the North Carolina
schools reverse course immediately, as in
tomorrow,” Sarah Warbelow, the legal
director for the Human Rights Campaign, an
L.G.B.T. rights group, said Tuesday night.

The ruling in favor of Gavin Grimm, a junior
at Gloucester High School in southeastern
Virginia, does not immediately grant him the
right to use the boys’ restrooms; rather, it
directs a lower court that had ruled against
him to re-evaluate Mr. Grimm’s request for a
preliminary injunction to be able to use those
restrooms.
But it is the first time that a federal appellate
court has ruled that Title IX protects the
rights of such students to use the bathroom
that corresponds with their gender identity.
The ruling also comes as some school
districts and state governments around the
country are grappling with the question of
whether transgender people should be
allowed to go to the public facilities that
correspond with their gender identity, or
whether, as many conservatives believe, such
access would infringe on the privacy rights of
others.
Boycotts and protests have followed the
passage of the North Carolina law, but Gov.
Pat McCrory has essentially stood by it. On
Tuesday, Joshua Block, a lawyer with the
American Civil Liberties Union, which
brought the case on Mr. Grimm’s behalf,
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argued that such state and local legislation
violated federal law.
“With this decision, we hope that schools and
legislators will finally get the message that
excluding transgender kids from the
restrooms is unlawful sex discrimination,” he
said in a statement.
The North Carolina law has prompted the
Obama administration to consider whether
the state would be ineligible for billions of
dollars in federal funding for schools,
housing and highways.
Mr. McCrory, a Republican who is seeking
re-election in November, and other
supporters of the law have played down
suggestions that the Obama administration
would rescind those billions. Mr. McCrory’s
Democratic opponent, Roy Cooper, the
state’s attorney general, has said in the past
that the law may put the federal funding at
risk and has refused to defend the state in a
lawsuit challenging it.
In a statement Tuesday, Mr. McCrory said he
strongly disagreed with President Obama and
Mr. Cooper’s objective “to force our high
schools to allow boys in girls’ restrooms,
locker rooms or shower facilities,” but would
evaluate the effect of Tuesday’s ruling on
North Carolina law and policy.
The A.C.L.U. brought the case on behalf of
Mr. Grimm, who was born female but
identifies as a male, in June, seeking a
preliminary injunction so that Mr. Grimm
could use the boys’ restrooms at his school.
The school administration initially allowed
him to do so, but the local school board later
approved a policy that barred him from the

boys’ restrooms; according to court
documents, the policy also “required students
with ‘gender identity issues’ to use an
alternative private facility” to go to the
bathroom.
Judge Robert G. Doumar of Federal District
Court ruled against Mr. Grimm in September,
dismissing his claim that the school board
had violated Title IX, although the judge did
allow his case to go forward under the equal
protection clause of the 14th Amendment.
The ruling by a three-judge panel on Tuesday
reversed the lower court’s dismissal of the
Title IX claim, stating that the District Court
“did not accord appropriate deference” to
regulations issued by the Department of
Education. The department’s current
guidelines dictate that schools “generally
must treat transgender students consistent
with their gender identity.”
Roger Gannam, a lawyer with the
conservative Liberty Counsel, which filed an
amicus brief in the case on behalf of the
defendant, the Gloucester County School
Board, said Tuesday that the court had
engaged in “blatant judicial legislation.”
“It’s very disappointing, and it’s frightening,
in a sense,” he said.
Mr. Block of the A.C.L.U., in a phone
interview, said he was confident that the
District Court would rule in Mr. Grimm’s
favor and allow him to use the restroom. And
he noted that the five states covered by the
Fourth Circuit — Virginia, North Carolina,
Maryland, West Virginia and South Carolina
— must now follow the federal Department
of Education’s interpretation of Title IX on
this issue.
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The Obama administration has been
aggressive in its efforts to ensure that
transgender students can use the bathrooms
in public schools that correspond with their
gender identities. Some federal agencies have
threatened to rescind funding to pressure
some municipal governments in California
and Illinois to change their policies and allow
transgender students to do so. In June, the
Justice Department filed a “statement of
interest” in Mr. Grimm’s case.
We are pleased with the Fourth Circuit’s
decision, which agreed with the position that

the United States advocated in its brief,” the
Justice Department said in a statement
Tuesday night.
In an email, a clerk for the Gloucester school
system said the superintendent, Walter
Clemons, “has no comment at this time.”
In a statement released through the A.C.L.U.,
Mr. Grimm said: “I feel so relieved and
vindicated by the court’s ruling. Today’s
decision gives me hope that my fight will
help other kids avoid discriminatory
treatment at school.
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“Federal Transgender Bathroom Access Guidelines Blocked by Judge”

The New York Times
Erick Eckholm and Alan Blinder
August 22, 2016

A federal judge has blocked the Obama
administration
from
enforcing
new
guidelines that were intended to expand
restroom access for transgender students
across the country.
Judge Reed O’Connor of the Federal District
Court for the Northern District of Texas said
in a 38-page ruling, which he said should
apply nationwide, that the government had
not complied with federal law when it issued
“directives which contradict the existing
legislative and regulatory text.”
Judge O’Connor, whom President George W.
Bush nominated to the federal bench, said
that not granting an injunction would put
states “in the position of either maintaining
their current policies in the face of the federal
government’s view that they are violating the
law, or changing them to comply with the
guidelines and cede their authority over this
issue.”
The judge’s order on Sunday, in a case
brought by officials from more than a dozen
states, was a victory for social conservatives
in the continuing legal battles over the
restroom guidelines, which the federal
government issued this year. The culture war
over the rights of transgender people, and
especially their right to use public bathrooms

consistent with their gender identities, has
emerged as an emotional cause among social
conservatives.
The Obama administration’s assertion that
the rights of transgender people in public
schools and workplaces are protected under
existing laws against sex discrimination has
been condemned by social conservatives,
who said the administration was illegally
intruding into local affairs and promoting a
policy that would jeopardize the privacy and
safety of schoolchildren.
The ruling could deter the administration
from bringing new legal action against school
districts that do not allow transgender
students to use bathrooms and locker rooms
of their choice.
“We are pleased that the court ruled against
the Obama administration’s latest illegal
federal overreach,” Attorney General Ken
Paxton of Texas said in a statement on
Monday. “This president is attempting to
rewrite the laws enacted by the elected
representatives of the people and is
threatening to take away federal funding
from schools to force them to conform.”
A spokeswoman for the Justice Department,
Dena W. Iverson, said the department was

288

disappointed with the decision and was
reviewing its options.
In a statement, several civil rights
organizations that had submitted a brief
opposing the injunction called the ruling
unfortunate and premature.
“A ruling by a single judge in one circuit
cannot and does not undo the years of clear
legal precedent nationwide establishing that
transgender students have the right to go to
school without being singled out for
discrimination,” the groups — Lambda
Legal; the American Civil Liberties Union
and the A.C.L.U. of Texas; the National
Center for Lesbian Rights; the Transgender
Law Center; and G.L.B.T.Q. Legal
Advocates & Defenders — said in their
statement.
The ultimate impact of the Texas decision is
unclear and is likely to be limited, legal
experts said. For one thing, more senior
courts in other regions have agreed with the
administration that transgender students and
workers are protected by existing laws
against sex discrimination, and their
decisions will not be altered by the Texas
ruling.
Also, the decision will not necessarily affect
the outcome of other current cases. In the
most prominent one, a federal court in North
Carolina is weighing almost identical issues
in suits brought by civil rights groups and the
Justice Department that seek to block a state
law requiring people in government
buildings, including public schools, to use
bathrooms that correspond to the gender on
their birth certificates.

Adding another major note of uncertainty, the
United States Supreme Court has temporarily
blocked a decision by the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals that required a school
district in Virginia to allow a transgender boy
to use the boys’ bathrooms. The Supreme
Court issued a temporary injunction until it
decides, probably this fall, whether to hear
the case.
If the Supreme Court does take the case and
reaches a majority decision one way or
another, then existing rulings by district and
appeals courts could be superseded. If the
Supreme Court takes the Virginia case but
then is divided, four to four, on the issues, the
Fourth Circuit’s existing decision in favor of
transgender rights would take effect,
although it would not be a nationally binding
precedent.
The Texas lawsuit, filed by Mr. Paxton on
behalf of officials in 13 states, argued that the
Obama administration had overstepped its
authority in a series of pronouncements in
recent years holding that discrimination
against transgender people is a violation of
existing laws against sex discrimination,
including Title IX in federal education laws
and Title VII in federal civil rights laws
governing the workplace.
In May, in the latest such statement, the
federal Justice and Education Departments
issued a letter to public schools stating that
transgender people should be free to use
bathrooms and locker rooms that match their
gender identities, and that schools that
refused could lose federal funds.
“A school may not require transgender
students to use facilities inconsistent with
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their gender identity or to use individual-user
facilities when other students are not required
to do so,” the letter stated.

from coast to coast by usurping lawful
authority” and jeopardizing “billions of
dollars in federal funding.”

The letter was quickly condemned by social
conservatives, leading numerous state
governments and school districts around the
country to file lawsuits seeking to prevent the
administration from taking action.

The Justice Department countered that the
case was not suitable for litigation because
the states had not shown evidence that they
faced imminent harm, let alone a likelihood
of success on the merits.

The Obama administration, seeking to deflect
the Texas lawsuit and another brought by 10
other states, argued that the directive was not
a regulation or mandate but rather an
explanation of how the administration
interpreted
existing
sex-discrimination
protections. But it carried a threat that the
administration might sue noncompliant
school districts and seek to cut off vital
federal education aid.

If the administration brought action against
school districts, the government and groups
supporting lesbian, gay, bisexual and
transgender rights argued, the school districts
or states could make their case in court.

The states argued not only that the
administration was wrong as a matter of law,
but also that it had failed to follow legal
procedures for issuing what the states called
a “new mandate” that “harms school districts

“There is a multistep procedure before a state
might lose federal funding,” said Jon W.
Davidson, the legal director of Lambda
Legal. “The government would have to
specifically challenge a state, the state could
respond, the government could bring a
lawsuit, and then litigation in the courts
would decide whether the government’s
interpretation of the law is correct or not.”
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Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Pauley
15-577
Ruling Below: Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Pauley, 788 F.3d 779 (8th Cir.
2015)
Trinity Lutheran Church, a church that operated preschool and daycare programs, filed federal
and state constitutional claims against the Director of the Missouri Department of Natural
Resources Solid Waste Management Program, on the grounds that denial of the church's
application for grant for purchase of recycled tires to resurface the playground served as religious
discrimination. The District Court for the Western District of Missouri dismissed the action.
Trinity Lutheran appealed. The Court of Appeals for the Eight Circuit affirmed.
Question Presented: Whether the exclusion of churches from an otherwise neutral and secular
aid program violates the Free Exercise and Equal Protection Clauses when the state has no valid
Establishment Clause concern.

TRINITY LUTHERAN CHURCH OF COLUMBIA, INC., Plaintiff–Appellant
v.
Sara Parker PAULEY, in her official capacity, Defendant–Appellee
The Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, Amicus on Behalf of Appellant(s)
American Civil Liberties Union Foundation, et al., Amici on Behalf of Appellee(s).
United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit
Filed on May 29, 2015
[Excerpt; some citations and footnotes omitted]
LOKEN, Circuit Judge.
Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc.
(“Trinity Church”), filed this action alleging
that Sara Pauley, acting in her official
capacity as Director of the Missouri
Department of Natural Resources (“DNR”),
violated Trinity Church's rights under the
United States and Missouri Constitutions by
denying its application for a grant of solid
waste management funds to resurface a
playground on church property. The district
court1 dismissed the Complaint for failure to
state a claim and denied Trinity Church's

post-dismissal motion for leave to file an
amended complaint. Trinity Church appeals
both rulings. We affirm.
I.

Background

Trinity Church operates on its church
premises a licensed preschool and daycare
called the Learning Center. Initially
established as a non-profit corporation, the
Learning Center merged into Trinity Church
in 1985. The Learning Center has an open
admissions policy. It is a ministry of Trinity
Church that teaches a Christian world view
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and incorporates daily religious instruction in
its programs.
DNR offers Playground Scrap Tire Surface
Material Grants, a solid waste management
program. The grants provide DNR funds to
qualifying organizations for the purchase of
recycled tires to resurface playgrounds, a
beneficial reuse of this solid waste. In 2012,
Trinity Church applied for a grant to replace
the Learning Center's playground surface,
disclosing that the Learning Center was part
of Trinity Church. On May 21, 2012, the
Solid Waste Management Program Director
wrote the Learning Center's Director,
advising:
[A]fter further review of applicable
constitutional limitations, the department is
unable to provide this financial assistance
directly to the church as contemplated by the
grant application. Please note that Article I,
Section 7 of the Missouri Constitution
specifically provides that “no money shall
ever be taken from the public treasury,
directly or indirectly, in aid of any church,
section or denomination of religion.”
A Solid Waste Management Program planner
subsequently advised the Solid Waste
Management District Director that Trinity
Church's application ranked fifth out of forty
four applications in 2012, and that fourteen
projects were funded.
Trinity Church commenced this action,
asserting federal question jurisdiction over
claims that the denial of its Scrap Tire
application violated (i) the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, (ii) its
First Amendment right to free exercise of
religion, (iii) the First Amendment's
Establishment Clause, and (iv) its First
Amendment right of free speech. The
Complaint invoked the district court's
supplemental jurisdiction over a fifth cause

of action, alleging that DNR's denial violated
Article I, Section 7, of the Missouri
Constitution. Trinity Church sought
injunctive and declaratory relief against DNR
“policies and actions in denying grants to
applicants who are churches or connected to
churches.”
The district court granted Director Pauley's
motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to
state a claim. Trinity timely moved for
reconsideration and for leave to amend its
complaint to add a factual allegation that the
DNR had previously given grants under the
Scrap Tire Program to at least fifteen other
religious organizations, including churches.
The district court denied the motion to
reconsider. It also denied leave to amend
because Trinity Church “fail[ed] to provide
any explanation for not amending its
Complaint prior to the dismissal of this
action.” The court further noted that the
amendment was “futile” because, while
Trinity Church argued the newly alleged fact
“undermines Missouri's purported interest”
in denying the application, Trinity Church
“failed to identify any valid legal theory
under which Missouri would need to show
the existence of a compelling interest.”
Trinity Church appeals every aspect of the
district court's rulings, except the dismissal of
its First Amendment free speech claim. We
review the dismissal of a complaint for
failure to state a claim de novo. We review
the denial of leave to amend for abuse of
discretion, but we review de novo legal
conclusions underlying a determination of
futility.
II.

The Federal
Claims

Constitutional

“Missouri has a long history of maintaining a
very high wall between church and state.”
Two provisions in the Missouri Constitution
“declaring that there shall be a separation of
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church and state are not only more explicit
but more restrictive than the Establishment
Clause of the United States Constitution.”
Those provisions, one of which is at the core
of this dispute, were initially adopted in 1870
and 1875. As re-adopted in the Missouri
Constitution of 1945, they now provide:
Art. I, § 7. That no money shall ever be taken
from the public treasury, directly or
indirectly, in aid of any church, sect, or
denomination of religion, or in aid of any
priest, preacher, minister or teacher thereof,
as such; and that no preference shall be given
to nor any discrimination made against any
church, sect, or creed of religion, or any form
of religious faith or worship.
Art. IX, § 8. Neither the general assembly,
nor any county, city, town [etc.] shall ever
make an appropriation or pay from any public
fund whatever, anything in aid of any
religious creed, church or sectarian purpose,
or to help to support or sustain any private or
public school ... or other institution of
learning controlled by any religious creed,
church or sectarian denomination whatever;
nor shall any grant or donation ... ever be
made by the state ... for any religious creed,
church, or sectarian purpose whatever.
Trinity Church's Complaint alleged that, by
denying its grant application solely because it
is a church, DNR (i) violated the Free
Exercise clause because it “target[ed]
religion for disparate treatment” without a
compelling government interest; (ii) violated
the Establishment Clause because the denial
“was hostile to religion” and required DNR
“to determine what is religious enough” to
justify denial; and (iii) violated the Equal
Protection Clause by discriminating against
religious learning centers and day care
organizations
without
a
compelling
government interest. Although Trinity
Church couched these claims as an attack on

DNR's “customs, policies and practices,” all
its claims are plainly facial attacks on Article
I, § 7, of the Missouri Constitution, which
provides that “no money shall ever be taken
from the public treasury, directly or
indirectly, in aid of any church,” and which
was cited by DNR as the sole basis for its
denial.
Viewed in this light, it is apparent that Trinity
Church seeks an unprecedented ruling—that
a state constitution violates the First
Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause
if it bars the grant of public funds to a church.
To prevail, Trinity Church must clear a
formidable if not insurmountable hurdle,
what appears to be controlling adverse
precedent. In Luetkemeyer, a three-judge
district court was convened in the Western
District of Missouri to consider a claim that
the First Amendment and the Equal
Protection clause required Missouri to
provide the same public transportation
benefits for the pupils of church-related
schools as were being provided to transport
children to public schools. In denying
plaintiffs injunctive and damage relief, the
majority explained:
“We conclude without hesitation that
the long established constitutional
policy of the State of Missouri, which
insists upon a degree of separation of
church and state to probably a higher
degree than that required by the First
Amendment, is indeed a ‘compelling
state interest in the regulation of a
subject
within
the
State's
constitutional power’ ... That interest,
in our judgment, satisfies any
possible infringement of the Free
Exercise clause of the First
Amendment or of any other
prohibition in the Constitution of the
United States.”
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The fact that Missouri has determined to
enforce a more strict policy of church and
state separation than that required by the First
Amendment does not present any substantial
federal constitutional question.
Plaintiffs appealed to the Supreme Court of
the United States. The Court summarily
affirmed. Two Justices dissented, arguing the
Court should have noted probable
jurisdiction and set the case for argument on
two questions, whether the different
treatment of public-school and parochialschool children violated equal protection
principles, and whether the arbitrary denial of
a general public service made the State an
“adversary” of religion.
When the Supreme Court summarily affirms
a lower federal court, its decision “prevent[s]
lower courts from coming to opposite
conclusions on the precise issues presented
and necessarily decided,” but the Court has
affirmed only the judgment, not necessarily
the rationale of the lower court. Here, while
the parameters of the Supreme Court's
summary affirmance in Luetkemeyer may not
be free from doubt, given the issues
addressed in the dissent from summary
affirmance, we conclude that the Court
necessarily decided that Article I, § 7, of the
Missouri Constitution is not facially invalid.
That conclusion is supported by the Court's
prior summary affirmance in Brusca v. State
of Mo. ex rel. State Bd. of Educ.
Trinity Church requests injunctive relief
compelling Missouri to provide grants
directly to churches, funding that is
prohibited by a provision of the Missouri
Constitution that has been a bedrock
principle of state law for nearly 150 years.
Without question, a state constitutional
provision is invalid if it conflicts with either
religion clause of the First Amendment, or
with the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal

Protection Clause. We also recognize that the
Supreme Court's Establishment Clause
jurisprudence
has
evolved
rather
dramatically in the forty years since
Luetkemeyer was decided. For example, it
now seems rather clear that Missouri could
include the Learning Center's playground in
a non-discriminatory Scrap Tire grant
program without violating the Establishment
Clause. But the issue here is not what the
State is constitutionally permitted to do, but
whether the Free Exercise Clause, the
Establishment Clause, or the Equal
Protection Clause compel Missouri to
provide public grant money directly to a
church, contravening a long-standing state
constitutional provision that is not unique to
Missouri.
No Supreme Court case, before or after
Luetkemeyer, has granted such relief. Indeed,
in Locke v. Davey, the Court upheld State of
Washington statutes and constitutional
provisions that barred public scholarship aid
to post-secondary students pursuing a degree
in theology. The Court noted the “popular
uprisings against procuring taxpayer funds to
support church leaders, which was one of the
hallmarks of an ‘established’ religion.” In
Locke, “the link between government funds
and religious training [was] broken by the
independent and private choice of
[scholarship] recipients,” prompting the
Court to examine carefully the “relatively
minor burden” the scholarship exclusion
placed on students taking devotional
theology courses. By contrast, in this case
there is no break in the link. Trinity Church
seeks to compel the direct grant of public
funds to churches, another of the “hallmarks
of an ‘established’ religion.” Therefore,
while there is active academic and judicial
debate about the breadth of the decision, we
conclude that Locke reinforces our decision
that Luetkemeyer is controlling precedent
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foreclosing Trinity Church's facial attack on
Article I, § 7, of the Missouri Constitution.
Justice Scalia, dissenting for himself and
Justice Thomas in Locke, articulated a
contrary view of the First Amendment's
religion clauses:
“When the State makes a public benefit
generally available, that benefit becomes part
of the baseline against which burdens on
religion are measured; and when the State
withholds that benefit from some individuals
solely on the basis of religion, it violates the
Free Exercise Clause no less than if it had
imposed a special tax.”
If the Court were to adopt this view, and if
Justice Scalia's reference to withholding
benefits to “individuals” were held to include
direct public benefits to churches, then
Article I, § 7, of the Missouri Constitution
could not be validly applied to deny church
participation in a host of publicly-funded
programs. That may be a logical
constitutional leap in the direction the Court
recently seems to be going, but it is a leap of
great magnitude from the Court's decisions in
Luetkemeyer and in Locke. In our view, only
the Supreme Court can make that leap. As the
Court has often reminded us, a court of
appeals “should follow the case which
directly controls, leaving to this Court the
prerogative of overruling its own decisions.”
We therefore follow Luetkemeyer and the
many Supreme Court of Missouri decisions
concluding that Article I, § 7, of the Missouri
Constitution does not conflict with the First
Amendment or the Equal Protection Clause
of the United States Constitution.
For these reasons, we conclude that the
district court correctly dismissed Trinity
Church's federal constitutional claims for
failure to state a claim upon which relief
could be granted.

III.

The Missouri Constitutional
Claim

Trinity Church's fifth cause of action alleged
that the DNR's grant denial violated the
second clause of Article I, § 7, which forbids
“any discrimination made against any
church,” and that granting the application
would not have violated the first clause
because it would not have been “in aid of any
church.” Though pleaded last, this was the
only claim argued at length by Trinity Church
at the hearing on defendant's motion to
dismiss, and it was the lead argument in its
brief on appeal (seemingly an implicit
acknowledgment the federal constitutional
claims are weak). This inversion of the
theories pleaded distracted the district court
from a very serious issue—after dismissing
the federal claims, should the court have
declined to exercise its supplemental
jurisdiction over a state law claim that is
based on an important provision of the
Missouri Constitution and turns on the proper
interpretation of rather ambiguous Supreme
Court of Missouri precedents? We think that
question should have been answered
affirmatively, but we will nonetheless review
the district court's dismissal of this claim on
the merits.
Under Missouri law, the district court had
jurisdiction to decide the state law claim
pleaded in the initial Complaint because
whether Article I, § 7, permits DNR to deny
Scrap Tire Program grants to all church
applicants is an issue of law. Turning to the
merits, we agree with the district court that
the two clauses of Article I, § 7, must be
interpreted in harmony. Therefore, if granting
Trinity Church's application would have
constituted “aid” to a church prohibited by
the first clause of Article I, § 7, then denying
the grant was not a discriminatory action
prohibited by the second clause. So the
district court properly focused on Trinity
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Church's contention that a Scrap Tire
Program grant is not “aid” within the
meaning of the first clause of Article I, § 7,
because it involves a quid pro quo, with the
applicant undertaking obligations under the
Scrap Tire Program in exchange for the
granted funds. On appeal, Trinity Church
argues the court erred in rejecting this
interpretation of state law.
Trinity Church bases its contention on the
reasoning in two Supreme Court of Missouri
decisions, Kintzele v. City of St. Louis, which
Trinity Church did not cite to the district
court, and Americans United v. Rogers,
which the district court described as “grossly
misrepresented”
by Trinity Church.
Concluding that the quid pro quo exception
to Article I, § 7's, prohibition was not
supported by any Missouri case, the court
instead relied on the many Supreme Court of
Missouri decisions that “strictly interpreted
[Article I] Section 7 to prohibit public
funding of religious institutions” in order to
maintain “the higher wall of separation
between church and state present in the
Missouri Constitution.”
Based on these decisions, the district court
concluded that Trinity Church's state law
claim under the Missouri Constitution must
be dismissed because its “own pleadings
demonstrate that funds from [DNR] in the
form of the Scrap Tire Program would aid the
Church and its Ministry Learning Center
within the meaning of Missouri law.” We
agree with this assessment of how the
Supreme Court of Missouri would decide this
claim. In Kintzele, plaintiffs alleged that a
subsidized sale of land by the State to St.
Louis
University
constituted
an
unconstitutional use of public funds in aid of
a private sectarian school. The Court declined
to invalidate the sale, concluding that,
because Missouri law authorized “sale by
negotiation at fair value,” and the State tried

competitive bidding and thereafter sold the
land to SLU at nearly twice the highest bid,
“plaintiffs' contention of illegal ... subsidy
from public funds cannot be sustained.” This
decision in no way supports Trinity Church's
claim that a Scrap Tire Program grant is not
“aid.”
In Americans United, the Supreme Court of
Missouri upheld a statute providing tuition
grants to students at approved public and
private colleges. The statute was invalidated
by the trial court, applying Article I, § 7, and
Article IX, § 8. The State appealed. Noting
that “[a]n act of the legislature is presumed to
be valid and will not be declared
unconstitutional unless it clearly and
undoubtedly contravenes some constitutional
provision,” the Court concluded it could not
“with confidence declare that the statutory
program”
clearly contravened
these
constitutional provisions because “the
parochial school cases with which the court
has dealt in the past involved completely
different types of educational entities than the
colleges and universities herein involved.”
The defendants' quid pro quo argument was
noted but not adopted.
Americans United demonstrates that Article
I, § 7, will be difficult to apply in some cases,
particularly when an expenditure authorized
by state statute is challenged as beyond the
State's constitutional authority. But that
decision does not support Trinity Church's
claim to affirmative relief in this case. In
upholding the challenged program, the Court
reaffirmed that the Missouri Constitution is
“more restrictive than the First Amendment
to the United States Constitution in
prohibiting the expenditures of public funds
in a manner tending to erode the absolute
separation of church and state,” and it noted
that the program was “designed and
implemented for the benefits of the students,
not of the institutions, and that the awards are
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made to the students, not to the institutions.
The legislative purpose in no wise includes
supporting aiding or sustaining either public
or private educational institutions.”
We affirm the district court's dismissal of the
state law claim under the Missouri
Constitution in Trinity Church's original
Complaint.
IV.

The Motion to Amend

Following the district court's dismissal order,
Trinity Church filed a motion to reconsider
that included a motion for leave to amend its
Complaint. The proposed Amended
Complaint added a fact paragraph alleging
that the DNR had previously awarded Scrap
Tire Program grants to at least fifteen other
religious organizations. It also added a
paragraph to the Equal Protection Clause
cause of action alleging that DNR “has
allowed other similarly-situated religious
organizations to participate in the Scrap Tire
Program.” All other allegations in the ninetyseven-paragraph Complaint were unchanged.
Trinity Church attached as an exhibit a
document dated October 19, 2010, that listed
“Prior Recipients of Scrap Tire Surface
Material Grants.” The district court denied
the motion because Trinity Church failed to
provide any explanation for failing to amend
prior to dismissal of its action.
“Post-dismissal motions to amend are
disfavored.” While a post-dismissal motion
may be granted if timely requested, “interests
of finality dictate that leave to amend should
be less freely available after a final order has
been entered.” Numerous cases have ruled
that unexcused delay is sufficient to justify
denial of post-dismissal leave to amend.
On appeal, Trinity Church for the most part
ignores this well-established law, simply
distinguishing the cases cited by the district

court because Trinity Church was not “given
any warning that it needed to amend its
pleadings.” The briefs on appeal assert that
Trinity Church learned in discovery that
other religious entities had received grants,
but counsel admitted at oral argument that
Trinity Church obtained the October 2010
listing attached to the proposed Amended
Complaint from the DNR website, where it
was doubtless available when Trinity Church
filed its Complaint in January 2013. Thus, the
district court did not abuse its discretion in
concluding that Trinity Church failed to
provide a valid reason for its failure to amend
prior to dismissal.
The district court's alternative futility ruling
is more problematic and warrants de novo
consideration. The proposed amended
pleading did not alter the allegations in the
First Amendment causes of action based on
the Free Exercise Clause and the
Establishment Clause; it only alleged a
different type of discrimination violating the
Equal Protection Clause, discrimination
between “similarly situated religious
organizations.” Thus, when Trinity Church
argued to the district court that its newly
discovered evidence supported the claim that
DNR's grant application denial “lacks a
compelling interest,” the district court was
right to observe that this added nothing to the
original claims because, in the absence of a
valid Free Exercise or Establishment Clause
claim, the Equal Protection Clause claim was
subject to rational basis review and no
compelling interest need be shown.
There is a problem lurking here, one that was
camouflaged by Trinity Church's primary
contention that Article I, § 7, violates the
federal and state constitutions by mandating
that churches be excluded from the Scrap
Tire Program. The problem is that these
constitutional claims take on an entirely new
complexion if DNR is awarding Scrap Tire
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grants to some churches, but not to others. If
intentional, that would be a clear violation of
the First Amendment, and no doubt of the
Missouri Constitution as well. If the proposed
Amended Complaint plausibly pleaded this
dramatically new theory, did the district court
abuse its discretion in failing to grant leave to
amend, even if Trinity Church failed to
clearly articulate the theory? We conclude
not, for two distinct but related reasons.
First, “a district court does not abuse its
discretion in refusing to allow amendment of
pleadings to change the theory of a case if the
amendment is offered after summary
judgment has been granted against the party,
and no valid reason is shown for the failure to
present the new theory at an earlier time.” In
Littlefield, we affirmed the denial of leave to
amend a dismissed § 1983 due process action
to assert a new equal protection claim. That
is directly analogous to the situation here.
The facts were at hand to assert this narrower
theory in the initial Complaint, but Trinity
Church chose not to do so. “The district court
did not abuse its discretion in concluding
[this] tactical choice did not demonstrate
diligence or good cause.”
Second, the new theory we have identified
would significantly alter the lawsuit's
procedural landscape. Under the new theory,
both the federal and state constitutional
claims would turn on the fact bases for DNR's
allegedly discriminatory treatment of
similarly situated religious organizations, not
on a Constitution-driven “policy” of not
making any grants to churches. For the
federal claims, this raises a serious question
of what is called Pullman abstension—
“federal courts should abstain from decision
when difficult and unsettled questions of
state law must be resolved before a
substantial federal constitutional question
can be decided.” Here, a state court would be
in the best position to decide the “difficult

and unsettled” question of how Article I, § 7,
and other provisions of the Missouri
Constitution and statutes apply to DNR's
fact-based decisions whether to award Scrap
Tire Program grants to particular churchrelated applicants. And state court resolution
of that question would likely moot or resolve,
and most certainly would affect, a federal
court's resolution of the substantial, largely
overlapping First Amendment and Equal
Protection Clause issues.
For the state law claim, the new theory
appears to raise serious jurisdiction and
venue
issues
under
the
Missouri
Administrative Procedure Act. These issues
would best be resolved by a state court,
further supporting Pullman abstention. In
these circumstances, even if the proposed
Amended Complaint pleaded a new theory of
relief that was not entirely futile, the district
court did not abuse its discretion in denying
an untimely request to fundamentally alter
the litigation.
The judgment of the district court is affirmed.
…
GRUENDER, Circuit Judge, concurring in
part and dissenting in part.
Trinity
Lutheran
Church
(“Trinity
Lutheran”) applied for a grant through the
Learning Center, a daycare and preschool
that Trinity Lutheran runs. This grant would
allow the Learning Center to make its
playground safer by swapping the gravel that
covers it for a rubber surface made from
recycled tires. The Missouri Department of
Natural Resources (“the Department”),
which administers this grant program,
accepted Trinity Lutheran's application and
ranked it fifth out of the forty-four
applications from that year. The Department
approved fourteen grant applications, but
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Trinity Lutheran's was not among them.
Relying solely on the Missouri Constitution's
prohibition on using public funds to aid a
church, Mo. Const. art. I, § 7, the Department
denied Trinity Lutheran's grant application.
Thus, but for the fact that the Learning Center
was run by a church, it would have received
a playground-surfacing grant. Where, as
here, generally available funds are withheld
solely on the basis of religion, the Supreme
Court's decision in Locke v. Davey governs
claims brought under the Free Exercise
Clause of the First Amendment. Applying the
careful balance struck by Locke, I would
conclude that Trinity Lutheran has
sufficiently pled a violation of the Free
Exercise Clause as well as a derivative claim
under the Equal Protection Clause.
The court attempts to impose a barrier to full
consideration of Locke. Trinity Lutheran, the
court concludes, challenges the facial validity
of Article I, § 7 of the Missouri Constitution
by requesting a ruling that “a state
constitution violates the First Amendment
and the Equal Protection Clause if it bars the
grant of public funds to a church.” Ante at 5.
By framing Trinity Lutheran's claim this
broadly, the court avoids fully grappling with
Locke by merely pointing to an instance in
which this state constitutional provision has
been upheld. The court concludes that the
Supreme Court's summary affirmance in
Luetkemeyer v. Kaufmann, a case that
concerned the separate issue of busing is one
such application.
But Trinity Lutheran does not mount the
expansive facial challenge that the court
attributes to it. Trinity Lutheran tries to bring
an as-applied challenge; the complaint says
so numerous times. However, determining
whether a constitutional challenge is purely
as-applied, purely facial, or somewhere in
between turns on whether the plaintiff's
“claim and the relief that would follow ...

reach beyond the particular circumstances of
the[ ] plaintiff [ ].” If they do, the claim is
facial but only “to the extent of that reach.”
When analyzing a claim and the relief that
would follow, a court should “construe a
plaintiff's challenge, if possible, to be asapplied.” Trinity Lutheran, as the court
acknowledges, frames its challenge as an
attack on the Department's “customs,
policies, and practices.” And Trinity
Lutheran specifically requests a declaration
that the Department's denial of its grant
application was unconstitutional. Trinity
Lutheran also specifically requests injunctive
relief prohibiting the Department from
discriminating against it in future grant
applications. This claim and relief only
implicate Trinity Lutheran. Consequently,
Trinity Lutheran does not contend that
Article I, § 7 of the Missouri Constitution is
unconstitutional in all of its applications.
This brings me to Locke. In the face of a Free
Exercise challenge, the Court upheld a
college scholarship program that prevented
students from using the scholarship to pursue
a degree in devotional theology, a course of
study that the court characterized as “akin to
a religious calling as well as an academic
pursuit.” The Court began with the
proposition that “there are some state actions
permitted by the Establishment Clause but
not required by the Free Exercise Clause.”
Because the “State's disfavor of religion (if it
can be called that)” in prohibiting recipients
from using the scholarship to major in
devotional theology “is of a far milder kind,”
the Court concluded that the scholarship
program
was
not
presumptively
unconstitutional. In upholding the program,
the Court found that it “goes a long way
toward including religion in its benefits”—
for example, by allowing recipients to attend
pervasively religious schools that are
accredited and to take devotional-theology
courses. To the Court, this “relatively minor
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burden” was justified by a “historic and
substantial state interest” of not funding “an
essentially religious endeavor.” This interest,
the Court explained, was rooted in our
nation's history of “popular uprisings against
procuring taxpayer funds to support church
leaders” as well as the founding-era decisions
of many states to “place[ ] in their
constitutions formal prohibitions against
using tax funds to support the ministry.”
Considering this “historic and substantial
state interest” alongside the “relatively minor
burden,” the Court found no violation of the
Free Exercise Clause.
Locke did not leave states with unfettered
discretion to exclude the religious from
generally available public benefits. To the
contrary, Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion
for seven members of the Court was careful
to acknowledge its parameters. “The [Locke ]
opinion thus suggests, even if it does not
hold, that the State's latitude to discriminate
against religion is confined to certain
‘historic and substantial state interest[s],’ and
does not extend to the wholesale exclusion of
religious institutions and their students from
otherwise neutral and generally available
government support.” Locke “suggests the
need for balancing interests: its holding that
‘minor burden[s]’ and ‘milder’ forms of
‘disfavor’ are tolerable in service of ‘historic
and substantial state interest[s]’ implies that
major burdens and categorical exclusions
from public benefits might not be permitted
in service of lesser or less long-established
governmental ends.” Simply put, the Locke
Court “indicated that the State's latitude with
respect to funding decisions has limits.”
Applying the balancing of interests
contemplated by Locke, I conclude that
Trinity Lutheran has sufficiently pled a Free
Exercise violation. The disfavor of religion
here is more pronounced than in Locke. The
student in Locke could use his scholarship to

attend a pervasively religious school that was
accredited and to take courses in devotional
theology there. And a pervasively religious
school that received scholarship money even
could require its students to take devotionaltheology classes. The program, as the Court
put it, went “a long way toward including
religion in its benefits.” The same cannot be
said here. Trinity Lutheran has pled that the
Department categorically prohibited the
Learning Center from receiving a
playground-surfacing grant because it is run
by a church. This blanket prohibition is
different in kind from the disfavor of religion
that was present in Locke. Whereas the Locke
program excluded religious study while also
including it, the Department has entirely
excluded the Learning Center from receiving
a playground-surfacing grant. Much like the
Tenth Circuit, I read Locke to impose some
bounds on such a “wholesale exclusion of
religious institutions and their students from
otherwise neutral and generally available
government support.”
The Department's reason for singling out the
Learning Center differs from the historic and
substantial state interest in Locke, where the
state sought to avoid paying for the training
of clergy, “an essentially religious endeavor.”
The sheer religiosity of this activity led the
court to remark that “we can think of few
areas in which a State's antiestablishment
interests come more into play.” It is true that
the Department's interest in enforcing Article
I, § 7 of the Missouri Constitution is historic
in the sense that this provision is
longstanding. But the state's interest in Locke
traced to concerns that were specific to
paying for training the clergy. The Court was
unequivocal about this point: “[T]he only
interest at issue here is the State's interest in
not funding the religious training of clergy.”
Here, by contrast, the Department seeks to
enforce a general prohibition on aid to a
church that is in no way specific to the
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playground-surfacing grant program. This
case therefore lacks the correspondence
between the past and the Department's
present interest that the Court found
significant in Locke.
Perhaps more importantly, the substantial
antiestablishment interest identified in Locke
is not present here. Unlike a student
preparing for the ministry, which is “an
essentially
religious
endeavor,”
schoolchildren playing on a safer rubber
surface made from environmentally-friendly
recycled tires has nothing to do with religion.
If giving the Learning Center a playgroundsurfacing grant raises a substantial
antiestablishment concern, the same can be
said for virtually all government aid to the
Learning Center, no matter how far removed
from religion that aid may be. When the
Locke Court spoke of a substantial
antiestablishment concern, I seriously doubt
it was contemplating a state's interest in not
rubberizing a playground surface with
recycled tires.
In light of the Department's negligible
antiestablishment interest, I conclude that the
court overstates the significance of the
Department's concern about giving a grant
directly to the Learning Center, rather than
having the money filtered through the
independent choice of private individuals.
“Although private choice is one way to break
the link between government and religion, it
is not the only way.” Indeed, even though the
playground-surfacing program involves a
direct transfer of funds to the Learning
Center, the court concludes that “it now
seems rather clear that Missouri could
include the Learning Center's playground in
a non-discriminatory Scrap Tire program
without violating the Establishment Clause.”
I agree. And I, of course, agree with the court
that, in many cases, a concern about giving
money directly to a church-run school may

amount to a historic and substantial state
interest. Indeed, were it to be uncovered
during discovery that the Learning Center
regularly uses its playground for religious
activities, my Free Exercise concern would
be less acute. However, at this stage of the
litigation, I cannot conclude that the
Department's concern about direct funding
for a rubber playground surface translates
into
a
historic
and
substantial
antiestablishment concern.
In concluding that Trinity Lutheran has stated
a claim under the Free Exercise Clause, I
acknowledge that “[t]he precise bounds of
the Locke holding ... are far from clear.”
However, the best reading of Locke, in my
view, is that in the absence of a historic and
substantial interest, the Department's
“latitude to discriminate against religion ...
does not extend to the wholesale exclusion of
religious institutions and their students from
otherwise neutral and generally available
government support.” I therefore respectfully
dissent from the court's affirmance of the
dismissal of Trinity Lutheran's Free Exercise
claim. Because this claim is linked to Trinity
Lutheran's Equal Protection claim, I dissent
from the court's disposition of this claim as
well. Moreover, because I would reverse the
district court's dismissal of Trinity Lutheran's
complaint, I need not reach the separate
question of whether the district court abused
its discretion by denying Trinity Lutheran's
motion to amend that complaint. I otherwise
concur in the court's opinion.
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“Supreme Court agrees to hear case over separation of church and state”
The Washington Post
Robert Barnes
January 15, 2016

The Supreme Court on Friday agreed to hear
another legal battle over the separation of
church and state, and will determine whether
Missouri improperly excluded a church
playground from a state program that
provided safer play surfaces.
Trinity Lutheran Church in Columbia applied
to be part of a state initiative that recycles
tires so that it could replace the pea gravel in
its day-care center’s playground with a
bouncier surface. Although the church’s
application ranked high in the state’s 2012
Playground Scrap Tire Surface Material
Grant Program, it was ultimately turned
down.
A letter from the Missouri Department of
Natural Resources said including the church
would violate a section of the Missouri
constitution that says “no money shall ever be
taken from the public treasury, directly or
indirectly, in aid of any church, sect, or
denomination of religion.”
A judge agreed with the state, and the entire
U.S. Court of Appeals for the 8th Circuit split
on the question.
The conservative Alliance for Defending
Freedom brought the case to the Supreme
Court and said constitutional protections
against the establishment of religion could

not be invoked to deny the church’s
application for a playground surface.
“Trinity does not seek funding for an
essentially religious endeavor where the
state’s anti-establishment concerns may be
heightened,” the church said in its petition to
the court.
“Trinity seeks a grant for a rubber pour-inplace playground surface where its children
and those from the community play. Seeking
to protect children from harm while they play
tag and go down the slide is about as far from
an ‘essentially religious endeavor’ as one can
get.”
ADF Senior Counsel Erik Stanley said in a
statement that the case is about “religious
hostility.”
“This case has huge implications for state
constitutional provisions across the nation
that treat religious Americans and
organizations as inferiors solely because of
their religious identity,” he said.
The state responded that its actions did not
raise the kind of issues the court needed to
settle.
The question in the case is “not whether a
state can exclude churches and other
religious institutions from a program that
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otherwise provides benefits to everyone,”
wrote Missouri Attorney General Chris
Koster (D). “Rather, it is whether states are
required by the U.S. Constitution to violate
their own constitutions and choose a church
to receive a grant when that means turning
down nonchurch applicants.”

The Missouri case is the latest reflecting the
court’s recent interest in religious rights. It
already has accepted cases that ask whether
religious groups are protected from having to
comply with the Affordable Care Act’s
requirement that
employees
receive
contraceptive services.

Both sides say the case will require justices
to reexamine a 2004 Supreme Court ruling
that said states that offer college scholarships
can deny them to students majoring in
theology.

The new case is Trinity Lutheran Church v.
Pauley.
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“Playground spat looms as key church-state separation case”
The Washington Times
Valerie Richardson
January 20, 2016

A playground spat over surfacing made out
of scrap tires is looming as a pivotal churchstate separation case, one that religious
freedom advocates say could provide relief
from what they see as government hostility
toward faith.
The U.S. Supreme Court teed up the battle
when it agreed last week to consider Trinity
Lutheran Church v. Pauley, a 2013 lawsuit
filed by the church after the state of Missouri
rejected its application for a grant to replace
its preschool’s playground pebbles with
repurposed rubber from old tires.
State officials said the preschool was
ineligible because it was run by a church,
citing an 1875 Missouri constitutional
amendment — known as the Blaine
Amendment — prohibiting public funds from
being used “in aid of any church.”
Three dozen states have similar amendments,
but they “shouldn’t be applied in a way that
would treat churches and religious
organizations worse than everybody else
simply because they’re a church,” said Erik
Stanley, Alliance Defending Freedom senior
counsel.
The 8th Circuit Court of Appeals upheld last
year the trial court’s ruling against Trinity
Lutheran, but if that decision is allowed to

stand, “it could spell disaster for all kinds of
participation by churches and other religious
groups in what are evenhanded government
programs,” he said.
“Taken to the extreme, it could even mean
that a state could justify not providing fire
protection to a church,” Mr. Stanley said.
“They could say, ‘That’s aid to a church. And
so we’re not going to do that under our state
constitutional provision.’”
The church said in its appeal to the high court
that though the preschool itself may be part
of its ministry, the grant — and the
playground — were meant for purely secular
purposes.
“Seeking to protect children from harm while
they play tag and go down the slide is about
as far from an ‘essentially religious
endeavor’ as one can get,” the church argued.
That the Supreme Court has agreed to hear
the case has groups that promote a strict
separation of church and state on high alert.
The fear is that the court could loosen a 2004
decision that held that Washington state
could exclude a college student seeking a
divinity degree from its tuition-aid program.
“We were surprised that the Supreme Court
took this case, and we are definitely
concerned that the Supreme Court has taken
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this case,” said Alex Luchenitser, associate
legal director for Americans United for
Separation of Church and State. “It is
possible that this case could erode state
constitutional restrictions on the public
funding of religious institutions.”
The case is also being watched by
constitutional scholars.
“Regardless of outcome, the case will be one
for the history books,” said Noah Feldman,
Harvard professor of constitutional and
international law, in a column for Bloomberg
View.
When states began passing their own Blaine
amendments in the late 1800s, a key issue
was whether Catholic schools could receive
public funds. More recently, courts have
wrestled with whether the amendments
forbid state tax dollars from being used for
everything from church-run halfway houses
to soup kitchens.
Blaine amendments
It’s possible that the high court could
examine the constitutionality of Blaine
amendments, which go beyond the U.S.
Constitution’s prohibition against the
establishment of a state religion. Critics
contend the provisions, named after James
Blaine, a House speaker and senator from
Maine who ran unsuccessfully for president
in 1884, are rooted in anti-Catholic animus.
Eric Rassbach, deputy general counsel for
The Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, said,
“I would be surprised if the court simply
passes the history by.”
“It’s a bit like if they were adjudicating a Jim
Crow statute and they didn’t mention

anything about Jim Crow,” Mr. Rassbach
said. “This is Jim Crow for Catholics. You
don’t have to look too deeply into the second
half of the century in the United States to see
where these provisions were coming from.
‘Rum, Romanism and rebellion’ — that’s the
kind of stuff that was going on during that
time period when these state Blaine
amendments were enacted.”
But Mr. Luchenitser disputes that
interpretation of the amendments’ history,
arguing that state legislators had plenty of
other reasons for adding the provisions to
their constitutions, including a healthy regard
for the separation of church and state.
“That’s what the groups like the Alliance
Defending Freedom and the Becket Fund
charge, but that’s a very questionable reading
of history,” he said. “It’s true that there were
some people who made anti-Catholic
statements, but what was going on in the 19th
century was the Catholic Church was the
leading group that was seeking funding for
private religious schools.”
Mr. Luchenitser added that “there’s a lot of
debate and controversy about this.”
Supporters of Trinity Lutheran’s effort to win
state dollars for the playground say they don’t
expect the court to go so far as to strike down
the Blaine amendments, but they want to see
the court give churches more leeway in
accessing public funds, especially when the
purpose is clearly religion-neutral.
“A good outcome would be if the Supreme
Court said, ‘No, you cannot enforce these
Blaine amendments to exclude religious
institutions from equally distributed grant
programs or contracting programs or what
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have you just because they’re religious.
That’s an exclusion that just doesn’t make
sense,’” said Mr. Rassbach.
Mr. Stanley, who represents Trinity
Lutheran, said his client’s appeal to the
Supreme Court is “much more narrow and
focused.”
“The best outcome for Trinity Lutheran
would be to apply these amendments, even if
they remain, in an evenhanded and neutral
fashion that treats religious groups on the
same terms as everyone else,” Mr. Stanley
said.
Ten states filed a brief in support of Trinity
Lutheran’s request for a high court hearing,
saying that previous judicial rulings
“arguably push ‘no aid’ into the realm of
discrimination against religion.”

“Rather, it is whether states are required by
the U.S. Constitution to violate their own
constitutions and choose a church to receive
a grant when that means turning down
nonchurch applicants,” he said.
Mr. Luchenitser said he could foresee a
ruling in which the court identifies
“circumstances where the funding does not
actually support a religious facility or a
religious activity or religious teachings,” and
that “only in those circumstances the states
cannot treat religious and nonreligious
institutions differently in deciding who can
get public funds.”
“We wouldn’t support such a ruling; we’d be
disappointed,” he said. “But it would be
better than a more expansive ruling that
erodes the state constitutional provisions to a
greater extent.”

In his brief, Missouri Attorney General Chris
Koster, a Democrat, argued that the question
is not “whether a state can exclude churches
and other religious institutions from a
program that otherwise provides benefits to
everyone.”
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“The Case Against Separating Church and State”
Bloomberg
Noah Feldman
January 19, 2016

Is the separation of church and state
unconstitutional?
You read that right. The U.S. Supreme Court
said Friday that it would consider whether
Missouri’s constitution, which bars state aid
to religious groups, violates the U.S.
Constitution by discriminating against
religion.
This claim sounds crazy, and to those who
wrote the Missouri constitutional provision in
the 1870s, it would’ve been. But the claim, in
fact, isn’t utterly absurd -- if you consider the
historical circumstances in which the
provision was drafted. And although it’s a
long shot to change existing church-state law,
the case has the potential to be a landmark.
Start with the very simple facts: Trinity
Lutheran Church of Columbia, Missouri,
applied for state funds to improve its
playground. Under the U.S. Constitution as
interpreted by the Supreme Court, a church
may get generally available funds from the
government.
But
under
Missouri’s
constitution, the church isn’t eligible for the
funds, so it can’t get the money.
The relevant state provision -- Article
Section 7 -- says “no money shall ever
taken from the public treasury, directly
indirectly, in aid of any church, sect,

1,
be
or
or

denomination of religion … and that no
preference shall be given to nor any
discrimination made against any church, sect,
or creed.”
As written, this provision is framed more
strongly than the Establishment Clause of the
federal constitution, which never mentions
money but says Congress may not enact an
establishment of religion.
In a 2004 case, Locke v. Davey, the U.S.
Supreme Court said that it was permissible
for Washington state’s constitution to bar
state funding of religion to a greater extent
than the Establishment Clause requires.
Under that precedent, Trinity Lutheran would
seem to have no case. Missouri can do what
Washington does: Protect the separation of
church and state without violating the
religious liberty of religious funding
applicants.
Here’s where things get complicated. The
Missouri provision was adopted in 1875, in
the wake of a national effort to pass a federal
constitutional amendment that would have
similarly enacted a ban on state funding of
religious institutions. That effort was
spearheaded
by
Maine
Republican
presidential candidate James G. Blaine, and
the national amendment was nicknamed for
him.
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The Blaine Amendment was deeply
politicized. At the time, it was understood by
everyone to be targeted at Catholic
institutions. The word “sectarian” was code
for Catholic.
Republicans hoped to force Democrats into
the tough political position of either
supporting the amendment and alienating
Catholic voters, or opposing it and letting
themselves be criticized for opposing the
separation of church and state. Republicans
had gotten the idea from Ohio, where a brutal
denominational fight over state funding of
Catholic institutions had helped elect
Governor Rutherford B. Hayes.
In congressional debates, concern for the
separation of church and state was
interspersed with blatant anti-Catholicism
from Republicans. The federal amendment
failed, but it arguably helped the Republicans
reach a tie in the general election, which then
led to the political deal that made Hayes
president.

inoperative as violations of free religious
exercise of the equal protection of the law.
In Locke v. Davey, the court ducked the issue,
saying it hadn’t been shown that Washington
state’s constitutional provision, enacted more
than 25 years after Missouri’s, was a state
Blaine.
The court could conceivably duck the issue
again. Trinity Lutheran will argue that its
case isn’t covered by the Locke precedent
because its playground-resurfacing project is
different from the money at issue in that case,
which prevented students from using
scholarship money to major in theology. The
court would then have room to say that where
there isn’t a strong connection to religion,
states must give funding to religious
institutions on equal terms with nonreligious
ones. But the distinction with Locke is highly
tenuous, since the court said in that case that
the scholarship funding wouldn’t have
violated the Establishment Clause.

But numerous versions of the Blaine
Amendment, or “baby Blaines,” passed in
other states. Missouri’s provision is typical of
them. In historic terms, the amendments
played a meaningful role in strengthening the
separation of church and state as an American
ideal. They had little immediate effect in
practice, since states already weren’t funding
Catholic institutions.

For Trinity Lutheran to win, it probably
needs the court to go into the seedy history of
the Blaine Amendment and say that state
Blaine amendments violate federal equal
protection laws because of the bias inherent
in their adoption. Their best precedent is
Romer v. Evans, a 1996 case in which the
court struck down a Colorado state
constitutional amendment that was inspired
by anti-gay animus.

Historians of church-state relations, myself
included, have pointed out the anti-Catholic
origins of the state Blaine amendments. The
crucial question for the U.S. Supreme Court
is whether this aspect of the history should be
used to render the state amendments

In my view, that outcome would be
defensible but probably wrong. The Blaine
history is certainly replete with nasty antiCatholic bias reminiscent of today’s
Islamophobia. But the animus was at all
times intertwined with a legitimate
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constitutional aim -- namely, separation of
church and state. And strong separation
remains a plausible constitutional vision,
even though the court no longer embraces it - for example, by allowing state funding of
religious schools through vouchers.

Regardless of outcome, the case will be one
for the history books.

309

“Symposium: Confronting a nativist past; protecting school-choice’s
future”
SCOTUSblog
Rick Garnett
August 10, 2015

Trinity Lutheran Child Learning Center is, its
website reports, a “ministry of Trinity
Lutheran
Church”
that
“provides
opportunities for children to grow spiritually,
physically, socially, and cognitively.” As one
would expect at a pre-kindergarten, one place
this growth happens is on the swings and
slides that are spread around the Learning
Center’s colorful and inviting playground.

the scrap-tire-grants program informed the
school that the department was “unable to
provide this financial assistance directly to
the church” because the funding would
violate a provision of the Missouri
Constitution that states “no money shall ever
be taken from the public treasury, directly or
indirectly, in aid of any church, section or
denomination of religion.”

The Learning Center is – again, as one would
expect – committed and attentive to its
students’ safety. So, a few years ago, the
school’s staff decided that rubber surfaces
made from recycled scrap tires were better
for kids’ knees and elbows than pebbles,
mulch, rocks, or pavement. As it happens,
Missouri’s Department of Natural Resources
has a program that distributes Playground
Scrap Tire Surface Material Grants – that is,
money – to qualifying entities so they can buy
recycled tires for precisely this purpose.
Recycling, solid-waste disposal, kids’ safety
and growth . . . everybody wins.

The Church challenged this denial as a
violation of the Constitution of the United
States, but the federal trial court, and then the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit,
sided with the Department. In the latter
court’s view, the First and Fourteenth
Amendments to the Constitution permit
Missouri to discriminate in this way, in
keeping with what the court called the state’s
“long history of maintain a very high wall
between church and state.” Last January, the
Supreme Court agreed to take the case and
answer the question “[w]hether the exclusion
of churches from an otherwise neutral and
secular aid program violates the Free
Exercise and Equal Protection Clauses when
the state has no valid Establishment Clause
concern.”

But Trinity Church’s application was denied,
and for one reason only: It is a church. In
other respects, the Learning Center is a
qualifying institution and its application was
strong (ranked fifth out of the forty-four that
were submitted). Nevertheless, the director of

Less than one month later, Justice Antonin
Scalia died. As a result, some of the last
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year’s most closely watched, high-profile
cases turned out differently than, probably,
they would have had he lived. Given that
Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion in the
Court’s last major aid-to-religion case, Locke
v. Davey, provides strong and clear support
for Trinity Church’s argument that
Missouri’s
discriminatory
policy
is
unconstitutional, many wonder whether,
once again, his absence will – as his presence
and votes so often did in the religiousfreedom context – drive the result in Trinity
Lutheran.
The Eighth Circuit panel appeared to regard
Trinity Church’s claim as having been
already decided, and rejected, by the
Supreme Court. As the panel noted, the Court
had summarily affirmed, in Luetkemeyer v.
Kaufmann, a federal district court’s ruling
that the “no aid” provision in Missouri’s
constitution did not violate the Equal
Protection Clause and served a “compelling
state interest” in “maintaining a very high
wall between church and state.’” (Two
Justices dissented.) And, in Locke v. Davey,
Chief Justice William Rehnquist wrote for a
seven-Justice majority that the state of
Washington could, in keeping with its own
no-aid provision, deny scholarship funds to
an otherwise eligible student who chose to
pursue a degree in “devotional theology.”
The Supreme Court may and should read
Locke more narrowly, as some other lower
courts have done. That case was about the
specific and special issue of public funding
for the training of clergy and shouldn’t
determine the outcome in a case about
recycled scrap tires being used to upgrade a
pre-school playground. The decision’s
recognition that there is some “play in the
joints” between what the Constitution
requires and what it permits can and should

be regarded not as providing a blank check to
states seeking to discriminate, in the name of
extra-strict “separation,” against religious
beneficiaries and activities. The Justices
should take account of the fact that
Luetkemeyer reflected a way of thinking
about aid to religious schools that they have,
for good reasons, abandoned. In recent
decades, the doctrine and precedents having
to do with this matter have emphasized
neutrality, not strict separation, and have
asked whether a program is even-handed, not
whether it might, somehow, “advance”
religion.
In this way, the law has reconnected with a
foundational point that was the basis for its
first decision in the area, Everson v. Board of
Education, in which Justice Hugo Black
(who was certainly not a proponent of aid to
parochial schools) insisted that public
officials may not exclude citizens “of any . . .
faith, because of their faith, or lack of it, from
receiving the benefits of public welfare
legislation.” Similarly, in the Court’s
landmark (and still controversial) decision in
Employment Division v. Smith, the Justices
noted that the First Amendment forbids
governments from “impos[ing] special
disabilities on the basis of religious views or
religious status.” A dozen years earlier, in his
concurring opinion in McDaniel v. Paty,
Justice William Brennan had forcefully made
the same point: Generally speaking,
“government may not use religion as a basis
of classification for the imposition of duties,
penalties, privileges or benefits.”
But again: Justice Scalia is no longer on the
Court. Even if Justice Anthony Kennedy,
who voted with the majority in Locke but
whose record in nearly thirty years’ worth of
aid-to-religion cases is consistent with
Trinity
Church’s
nondiscrimination
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argument, sides with the school, joining the
three remaining Republican appointees, we
could see not a helpful clarification but
instead a confusion-prolonging tie.
Church-state aficionados should, in addition
to speculating about vote-counts or
compromises aimed at avoiding yet another
“affirmed by an equally divided Court,” be
listening and watching for hints regarding, or
answers to, at least three questions.
First, will the Justices acknowledge, and
perhaps even engage, the actual history and
purpose of no-aid provisions like the one
invoked by Missouri in this case? The Eighth
Circuit did not mention the term “Blaine
Amendments” and instead gestured vaguely
to, again, a “long history of maintaining a
very high wall between church and state” and
to Missouri’s embrace of a “more restrictive”
version of separation. In fact, though – as
Philip Hamburger, John McGreevy, Joseph
Viteritti, Lloyd Jorgenson, and many others
have shown – provisions like Missouri’s
were adopted by states (and sometimes
required by the federal government) not to
implement an abstraction like “separation”
but rather to marginalize and undermine
Roman Catholicism in America. These
provisions’ origins, regardless of how the
laws are justified or described today, are not
easily disentangled from nineteenth-century
America’s pervasive anti-Catholicism and
nativism or from a broader ideological,
nationalist project of using state-mandated
public schooling to inculcate “American”
values and loyalties. Justice Thomas
discussed this history in his 2000 opinion in
Mitchell v. Helms and Chief Justice
Rehnquist mentioned it in a footnote in
Locke. Will the Justices, in Trinity Lutheran,
deal with the elephant in the room?

Second, will the Democratic appointees – and
especially Justices Stephen Breyer and Ruth
Bader Ginsburg, who dissented in Zelman v.
Simmons-Harris, the Court’s landmark, fiveto-four school-voucher ruling – agree with
the Eighth Circuit panel that “Establishment
Clause jurisprudence has evolved rather
dramatically” and that “it now seems rather
clear that Missouri could include the
Learning Center’s playground in a nondiscriminatory Scrap Tire grant program
without violating the Establishment Clause”?
In other words, will an eight-member Court,
which is for now split fairly evenly on many
hot-button topics but which will almost
certainly change significantly, and move to
the left, in the next few years, signal to
judges, legislators, and activists that Zelman
is and will remain settled law? Or, will there
be hints from the Democratic appointees that
Zelman – like, many liberal academics and
observers hope, Heller v. District of
Columbia, Citizens United v. Federal
Election Commission, Parents Involved in
Community Schools v. Seattle School District
No. 1, etc. – could be revisited, revised, or
narrowed, that choice-based reforms are
again suspect, and that the school-voucher
question is again up for grabs?
Third, and related: Will any of the Justices
examine or embrace the claim, advanced in
the amicus brief filed by the Lambda Legal
Defense and Education Fund that the
Constitution should be read to disallow
government from cooperating, even through
neutral
programs,
with
religious
organizations that “discriminate on the basis
of religion and other grounds”? I have argued
in academic writing that it is a mistaken
oversimplification to equate invidious and
irrational “discrimination” by governments
with religious organizations’ efforts to
operate in keeping with their religious
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teachings, character, and mission. The
government, of course, may and should not
discriminate on the basis of religion.
However, there is not (or, at least, there
should not be) anything objectionable about
a religious school or social-welfare agency
hiring for mission. Nor does the latter
become
objectionable,
let
alone
unconstitutional, simply because the
religious actor is cooperating with the
government to do good works like feeding
the hungry, caring for the sick, or educating
the young. Unfortunately, some seem
determined to wage an aggressive culturewar campaign that conflates religious
commitments with “bigotry.” Will the Court
resist, or enlist in, this effort?
“Separation of church and state” is an
important idea. Correctly understood and
reasonably implemented, it is a limit on
government that protects religious freedom
by preventing the government from
corrupting religion or interfering in religious
groups’ affairs. It does not require, though,
and the Constitution’s neutrality principle
should
not
permit,
the
pointless
discrimination at issue in Trinity Lutheran
Church.
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“Catholic bishops urge Supreme Court on playground funding”
The Washington Times
April 28, 2016

The denial of a playground resurfacing grant
to a Lutheran school empowers religious
discrimination, not constitutional principles,
the U.S. Catholic bishops said in a Supreme
Court brief.
“Missouri’s religious discrimination not only
contravenes the First Amendment, it is
profoundly demeaning to people of faith,” the
U.S. bishops said in their April 21 amicus
curiae brief.
The brief backs Trinity Lutheran Church of
Columbia, Mo. in its suit against the Missouri
government.
The church’s learning center had sought a
state grant for playground resurfacing with
scrap tire material to improve playground
safety at its preschool and daycare center.
The grant could have totaled $30,000 in aid
to the school. The Missouri Department of
Natural Resources rejected the grant
application.
The Catholic bishops’ brief argued that
constitutional law does not authorize a
blanket exclusion from public programs that
provide “religiously neutral benefits” for
secular purposes.
“Otherwise the government could exclude
religious institutions from basic public
services like police and fire protection.”

The Catholic bishops said the religious
school was otherwise eligible, but the State of
Missouri denied it solely due to its religious
affiliation.
Since 1875, the Missouri state constitution
has barred public money for the direct or
indirect aid of any church or any minister or
teacher.
The bishops’ brief rejected the claim that
such a grant would violate the Establishment
Clause of the U.S. Constitution. This claim
could be used as “a pretext for penalizing
religious groups whose beliefs or practices
diverge
from
government-prescribed
orthodoxy,” they said.
“Official discrimination based on religion is
no less invidious or stigmatizing than
discrimination based on other protected
traits,” the brief said. “It sends a message that
religious people and their institutions are
second-class citizens who deserve special
disabilities and are not entitled to participate
on equal terms in government programs.”
In 2015 the 8th Circuit Court of Appeals
upheld a district court ruling against the
school, on the grounds the U.S. constitution
permits the provisions of the Missouri
constitution. The Supreme Court could hear
the case in its late 2016 session.
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Other signatories to the Catholic bishops’
brief include the Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-day Saints, the National Catholic
Educational Association, the Salvation Army
and the General Synod of the Reformed
Church in America.
Many groups have filed separate briefs in
favor of the Lutheran Church. These include
a brief from eighteen mostly Republican-run
states, The Oklahoman reports.
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